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In this thesis I will present a theoretical, non-realist account of moral language which I call 
‘Expressive Fictionalism’. Expressive Fictionalism is a combined approach involving 
semantic content based on Joycean revisionary fictionalism and pragmatic expressivism with 
influences of projectivism and the quasi-realism of Simon Blackburn. The result is a marriage 
between the two which ultimately works towards mutual advantage.  
 
The aim of this thesis is to provide a non-realist account of moral language in the form of 
expressive fictionalism, which, I posit, can explain a form of moral communication, on both a 
semantic and a pragmatic level, without compromising its own non-realism in the process, 
which avoids issues which are associated with the Frege-Geach problem and which is a non-
error theoretic account of moral discourse. My methodology is a combination of semantics, 
pragmatics, thought experiment with some influences of empiricism, references to modern 
studies in behavioural & cognitive psychology as well as historical analogy. The thesis 
ultimately rests on a portrayal of moral language as a means of communicating emotions, as 
well as projecting these emotions onto the world through moral utterance, using a constructed 
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Section 1 – Non-Realism, Expressivism 
& Quasi-Realism 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction(s) 
 
“Kicking cats is wrong!” “It is good to stop people from doing things like that!” These are 
moral sentiments that (for the most part at least) we take for granted and are devoid of 
controversy, and yet the question of what exactly these kinds of utterances actually mean is 
impressively difficult to answer philosophically. It is equally difficult to answer what exactly 
is going on linguistically, semantically or pragmatically. What exactly am I doing when I 
declare with no small degree of passion and conviction that it is wrong to kick the cat? Am I 
stating a fact? Am I making people aware of some important feature of the world and about 
the nature of kicking living organisms? If not, then what am I communicating? Am I trying to 
express some attitude towards kicking living things? How does that work? Are these attitudes 
expressed semantically? Am I even making an assertion at all when I say things like that? If 
not, then why does it sound like I am? Am I deceiving people in speaking like this? Am I 
deceiving myself? Are these adjectives of right and wrong, of good and of evil referential? 
Do they refer to natural qualities inherent in the world, or are they more like projections, the 
result of psychological constructions in response to perceived realities? What exactly is going 
on? 
 
There are two primary directions that we can go in order to answer questions like these within 
philosophy of language. We can examine the case for what we call ‘moral realism’, in which 
we take a stance of saying that these moral adjectives refer to qualities of right and wrong 
found in the world and in certain kinds of behaviour. This then leads us on a long and 
difficult quest of figuring out exactly how these kinds of qualities operate metaphysically, 
what constitutes them and how these moral ‘facts’ may be accessed epistemologically. 
Alternatively, we can examine the case for doubting the existence of qualities of right and 
wrong, proceeding on the basis that these kinds of qualities either simply do not exist or that 
we simply cannot have any epistemic access to them even if they do; this is what I call 
throughout the thesis ‘non-realism’. If we take a non-realist approach to the question of 
meaning in moral utterances like ‘kicking cats is wrong’, then we must account for meaning 
without relying in any way on metaphysics or epistemology, but purely through philosophy 
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of language and on the psychology of moral speakers, and this is what I will be doing over 
the following three sections.  
 
The aim of my thesis is to present a fully functioning, non-realist account of moral 
language. To do this, such an account needs to do the following things: 
 
1. It must account for the semantic meaning of moral utterances like ‘kicking cats is 
wrong!’ That is it must be able to explain the content of that sentence and what the 
literal meaning of the words are. 
2. It must explain what is being communicated in its entirety. This may involve going 
beyond semantics and into pragmatic discourse; that is to not only explain what is 
being said, but how, why and what the deeper meaning is in virtue of the context in 
which it is uttered.  
3. It must be non-realist in the sense that it does not rely on any additional metaphysics 
or epistemology. This includes commitments towards nihilistic positions on moral 
ontology; that is it does not rely on the idea that moral qualities do not exist anymore 
than it relies on the idea that they do.  
 
In this section, ‘Non-Realism, Expressivism and Quasi-Realism’, I begin by examining the 
case against moral realism. I do this by looking at arguments like Mackie’s argument from 
queerness and Harman’s argument from explanation, and whilst I do not set out to defend 
those arguments per se, I use them as notable examples of the fact that we do indeed have 
sophisticated philosophical reasons to doubt moral realism. I then delve into non-realism. In 
chapter three, I outline an important difference between non-realism and anti-realism and also 
what is meant by terminology which we will come to rely on later on, namely: non-
cognitivism, expressivism and projectivism. In these two chapters, I will also highlight the 
contested division in philosophy regarding the complexity of making a clear distinction 
between moral language and moral ontology, arguing ultimately that we can indeed make that 
distinction.  
 
I then briefly go over some of the non/anti-realist approaches to moral language. In particular, 
I look at error theory and explain some of the issues that I have with this kind of anti-realist 
approach. I then begin to explore expressivism. The version of expressivism that I am most 
interested in within section one is quasi-realism, specifically the work of Simon Blackburn. 
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This is because, on the face of it, quasi-realism seems to offer the non-realist everything that 
they need. Blackburn claims to circumvent the Frege-Geach problem (a serious problem for 
expressivism in general), and in addition to gain entitlement to give moral realists most or all 
that they want to hear about the nature of moral language as well (this will later prove 
problematic for Blackburn), including an account of moral fallibility, moral improvement and 
even moral truth conditions all within the non-cognitivist lens of projectivism. Throughout 
chapters five through to seven, I explore Blackburn’s solutions to the Frege-Geach problem 
and how his special logic of attitudes mirrors the language of assertion and more formal 
forms of logic, including an interesting account of rules like modus ponens.  
 
In chapter eight I begin to look at some of the problems with quasi-realism, in particular 
those argued by Andy Egan, who challenges Blackburn’s account of moral fallibility. This 
will eventually become a recurring theme in objections to quasi-realism in which Blackburn 
is challenged on his ability to demonstrate attitude inconsistency in a way that is logically 
significant in the same way that contradiction in propositional or other forms of formal logic 
is. In chapter nine, we examine a relatively recent paper by Nicholas Smyth in which we see 
a defence of quasi-realism in the form of ‘resolute-expressivism’. We then leave section one 
with a fairly positive outlook on quasi-realism as being the account that we are looking for, 
but with some worries, namely that it is not entirely clear that quasi-realism genuinely 
demonstrates attitude inconsistency, and if it does whether or not this is quasi-realism rather 
than merely a particularly abstract form of realism. 
 
The following two sections rely a great deal upon this section. Throughout the beginning of 
section two, I examine some of the more problematic objections to quasi-realism including 
those of G.F. Schueler, Van Roojen and David Lewis, as well as some new objections of my 
own. I eventually conclude that there are some seemingly insurmountable problems for quasi-
realism, which I outline in chapter five. However, there are some very important things we 
should take from quasi-realism (and from expressivism and projectivism more broadly) about 
the idea of communicating attitudes of approval and disapproval and about how moral 
speakers project qualities of right and wrong onto the world and onto people’s actions 
through moral utterance. These may also be accounted for pragmatically rather than 
semantically. Nevertheless, I argue that we still need an accounting of the semantic content 
of moral utterances, and it is within chapter five that we are also introduced to another non-




Throughout the second half of section two, I look at moral fictionalism as championed by 
Richard Joyce, in which we are introduced to more useful terminology and concepts like the 
tacit operator, pretence assertion and critical context, as well as the difference between 
revolutionary (or revisionary) and hermeneutic fictionalism. We are also given an interesting 
account by Joyce of some of the emotional/pragmatic motivations of fictionalist speakers. 
However, I argue that this account is underdeveloped and that it can be significantly 
augmented if we combine it with what we have previously learned in section one from 
expressivism, projectivism and quasi-realism, but only if we apply these pragmatically 
through an account of context, thus placing them around fictionalist semantics rather than 
replacing fictionalist semantics with expressivist semantics vulnerable to a lack of accounting 
for attitude inconsistency as well as the Frege-Geach problem. I demonstrate the strengths of 
this combined approach in chapter nine when I argue against Jonas Olson’s objections to 
revisionary fictionalism. In doing so, I take an approach not unlike Smyth’s style of 
defending quasi-realism, albeit by modifying it slightly in the process, but unlike Smyth I 
argue that these are not changes per se so much as developments of the original theory, and I 
call this combined approach ‘Expressive Fictionalism’.  
 
In doing this I argue that there is little more to say on semantic content, but there is a great 
deal more to say on the pragmatic act of speaking in moral terms in the form of useful fiction. 
Throughout section three, I apply a pragmatic expressivist approach to fictionalist semantics. 
I begin by explaining what exactly I mean by ‘pragmatic discourse’ and the significance of 
context in communicating things other than what semantic content implies. I then attempt to 
provide some scientific basis for establishing a connection between emotional sensitivity and 
moral language throughout chapter three, in which I look at correlations between attitudes 
and behaviour with neurobiological phenomena in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, 
observations of behavioural anomalies in humpback whales and case studies and testimonies 
of severe depression and anti-depressant medications, specifically of selective serotonin 
reuptake inhibitors, concluding that there is indeed enough empirical evidence to suggest a 
potent correlation and perhaps even a causal relation between emotions and moral thought 
and language. Throughout chapters four and five, I then discuss the role of emotions in the 
construction of moral language including a ten stage inferential process by which a 
fictionalist observes an event, reacts to this event emotionally and speaks out for or against it, 
communicating emotions and attitudes using a morality fiction as a contextual platform. This 
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process includes two separate models working in parallel with each other. The first is based 
in social positioning, and the role of emotions like pride and shame, and the formation of a 
concept of moral responsibility. The second model augments the first model by portraying the 
ten stage process mentioned earlier, using empathy or compassion as the primary mechanism.    
 
The remaining chapters of my final section deal largely with critical contexts and the problem 
of deception and with the idea of applying expressive fictionalism to narratives of moral 
progress, in which I look at Catherine Wilson’s account of unidirectional narratives and 
historical comparisons with progress within the natural sciences. Finally in chapter nine, I 
apply what we have learned by constructing an account of moral progress in human history as 
an example within the context of the morality fiction.  
 
In my last chapter, I conclude that the aim of the thesis has been satisfied and that the primary 




Chapter 2: The Case against Moral Realism & the Complexity of the 
Language/Ontology Distinction 
 
In this chapter, I will give as concise and comprehensive an account as I can of moral realism 
and why it will not be a central focus of my thesis. To put it succinctly, this boils down to the 
following issue: if we look at moral realism as a semantic claim (that moral sentences assert 
moral facts), then if there are issues with either the metaphysical or the epistemological 
foundation upon which this is based, then this will create problems for that claim. In other 
words, if there is a case to be made against either the existence or accessibility of moral facts, 
be it metaphysical or epistemological, (e.g. Mackie’s argument from queerness or Harman’s 
argument from explanation), then the semantic claim immediately becomes problematic, 
because we cannot prove that moral assertions can be true if the moral facts which they refer 
to are either inaccessible or non-existent. However, an additional problem lies in making the 
distinction in the first place between moral language and ontology. This is because a key 
point of contention between realism and anti-realism is how the linguistic and metaphysical 
issues of both may interact to constrain the shape of overall meta-ethical theories. This raises 
some extremely complex questions about which explanatory burdens exist regarding the 
metaphysics that arise for some accounts of the linguistic issues, and the linguistic issues that 
arise for some accounts of metaphysics. In this chapter I will use Harman’s argument as an 
example of the kind of problems with moral realism that can arise and thereby use that as a 
springboard towards a conversation about moral language. 
 
It should also be noted that this is an example; what I do not want to do is to defend 
Harman’s view per se, and it should also be noted that I am aware that moral realists do have 
strategies to counter this kind of argument. Rather, my purpose is to use this example to 
reveal something very strange about moral language, and that is that whether or not the realist 
claim holds up, moral language almost always comes across as realist. What I mean by this is 
that moral sentences very rarely appear to take the form of opinions (e.g. ‘that shirt is pretty 
cool, but that’s just my opinion’); rather they far more often resemble statements of fact (‘you 
cannot do this; this is wrong!’). If we assume for the sake of argument that, for example, 
Harman’s argument holds up, then that leaves us with a very puzzling conclusion: given that 
we have reason to doubt the existence of moral properties, why do we continue to talk about 
morality in a seemingly realist way? This is, fundamentally, the question I wish my thesis to 
be an investigation into. I will later discuss in more detail the complexity making the 
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distinction between moral language and moral ontology in the first place, arguing ultimately 
from a post mackian point of view that we can indeed (and would do well to) make that 
distinction.  
 
First, let us look at moral realism very broadly. In its broadest form, moral realism describes 
a general belief that moral sentences, that is sentences like, “kicking cats is morally wrong!” 
express propositions which refer (or attempt to refer) to objective features of the world, in 
other words they are independent of anyone’s subjective attitude towards them1. Furthermore, 
at least some of those propositions are truth apt in that they have real truth conditions. In 
simpler terms, moral realism usually manifests as a general belief that one may say, “kicking 
cats is morally wrong!”, and be objectively ‘correct’ or ‘normative’ (in point of fact) in 
saying so regardless of anyone’s opinion on the matter, including the subject’s (what exactly 
these notions of ‘normativity’ or ‘correctness’ mean, however, are a point of considerable 
debate between moral realists). By definition then, moral realism stands in stark opposition to 
all forms of non/anti-realism, such as non-cognitivism, moral nihilism, moral scepticism, 
ethical subjectivism and error theory. To make things very clear and simple here, let us then 
take moral non/anti-realism to be, by definition, that which does not embrace moral realism. 
In other words, it is a belief that either one cannot say that, “kicking cats is morally wrong!” 
with any objective accuracy, one cannot say it whilst genuinely referring to any objective 
features of the world, or both. To be a non/anti-realist is, therefore, to believe that at least one 
or both of these two essential components of moral realism are false, and to be a moral realist 
is to believe that both of these components are true. I will also, later on in this section, make 
an important distinction between ‘non’ and ‘anti’ realism. 
 
To clarify to ourselves what exactly we are looking at, let us divide what we are looking at in 
moral realism into two separate claims. The first is a metaphysical claim about nature: there 
are things in nature that are intrinsically normative/correct and these features of the world are 
objective. The second is a semantic claim: when we talk about morality, we are, when we 
speak accurately/truly, directly referring to these objective features of nature2. Of these two 
claims, it is the second that we should be particularly interested in. The first claim is what we 
                                                          
1 Objectivity and subjectivity are themselves famously problematic philosophically. For the purposes of this 
chapter, let us simplify things by treating ‘objective’ as meaning something which exists independently from the 
observer and ‘subjective’ as meaning something which results from the observer performing the observation.  
2 Once again, I would like to point out that this distinction is a contested issue in philosophy, something which I 
will address later on in this chapter.  
11 
 
may call an independent claim. In other words, it is a claim, no more or less, than about the 
way the world is. More interestingly, however, the second appears to be a much more 
dependent claim. Not only is it a claim about the nature of moral language, but it is a claim 
based on the assumption of the first claim (the one about the nature of the world). To avoid 
any unwanted confusion here, let us interpret the two separate claims like so: the first claim 
may be expressed like this, “There are objective moral facts”, and the second claim, may be 
expressed like this, “Utterances about moral wrongness attempt to refer to objective moral 
facts”. Under this interpretation, it seems that the second claim is dependent on the first 
claim. However, what happens then if we negate the first claim? For example: 
 
1. “There are no objective moral facts” 
2. “Utterances about moral wrongness attempt to refer to objective moral facts” 
 
Already a problem arises. Under this analysis, it seems clear that there is something amiss in 
terms of moral language. If we are to believe J.L. Mackie’s perspective for instance, we may 
be tempted to adopt a kind of moral nihilism, specifically ‘error theory’, in which we 
conclude that (1) is true, and that (2) betrays some kind of linguistic confusion or falsity. 
Before we get carried away with that, however, let us first consider why we might be tempted 
to adopt (1) in the first place.  
 
To do this we could look at either Mackie’s argument from queerness against moral realism, 
or alternatively we could look at Gilbert Harman’s argument from his 1977 text, The Nature 
of Morality: An Introduction to Ethics. Here Harman uses abductive reasoning to argue 
against the existence of objective moral facts. According to Harman, we have little reason to 
suppose that objective moral facts do exist, because there is nothing about moral judgements 
that cannot be explained in non-moral terms (Harman, 1977, 4). To demonstrate why he 
thinks this, Harman asks us to consider the following thought experiment. Suppose a 
physicist is trying to test a scientific theory by observing a vapour trail in a cloud chamber. 
What you or I do not know is that the physicist is testing for the presence of a proton particle. 
As a result, what you or I see is a meaningless trail of vapour. In the absence of theory, 
evidence is meaningless. In order to prove that the proton is indeed there, and creating the 
vapour trail, we must first hypothesize that the proton exists and that this hypothesis 
explains the observation of the vapour trail (Harman, 1977, 6). This abductive reasoning, or 
inference to the best explanation, is a common feature of scientific method. It is not, 
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however, as Harman argues it, so obviously applied when explaining moral judgements 
(Harman, 1977, 6).  
 
For example, suppose we observe the obscene act of a group of youths kicking a cat3, react 
with revulsion, and conclude that the reason we react to it the way that we do is because the 
act is morally wrong. It is not so clear in this case that there is the same kind of explanatory 
work being done here (Harman, 1977, 5). Let us suppose for the sake of argument that there 
is. Let us suppose that we formulate the hypothesis that the reason we react negatively to this 
kind of behaviour is because this kind of behaviour constitutes something ‘wrong’. In other 
words, something intrinsically or objectively ‘incorrect’ or ‘anti-normative’ about the way the 
world is or ought to be. Does the evidence fit the hypothesis? More importantly, does the 
hypothesis explain the evidence? Not really. Suppose for instance that there is something 
similarly ‘wrong’ (intrinsically/objectively), in the act of throwing a woman into an arena to 
be torn apart by lions. According to our hypothesis, if this is similarly wrong, then this should 
provoke a similar reaction, and perhaps today it would. However, we have plenty of historical 
evidence to believe that this behaviour has not always provoked this same negative reaction. 
To the contrary, execution by objicĕre bestiis (a defenceless victim devoured by beasts), or 
by damnatio ad bestias (where the victim is expected to fight the attacking beast) were, 
among others, common amusements to the fifty thousand or so Roman spectators who 
regularly flooded the Colosseum (Tacitus, AD 16-48, 44). So clearly this hypothesis is not 
sufficient, because clearly it does not tell us why we tend to disagree about what behaviours 
are right and wrong. More importantly, the hypothesis itself may be flawed, as we can 
provide numerous examples of seemingly ‘wrong’ or ‘evil’ behaviours that do not provoke 
any negative reactions whatsoever.  
 
Suppose alternately then that we do as Harman does and come up with an alternative 
hypothesis, that the reason we react negatively to the cat kicking scenario is because A – we 
observe it, and B – we feel compassion for the animal that is suffering (Harman, 1977, 5). 
This hypothesis has an obvious advantage in that not only does it explain why we react 
negatively to the kicking of cats but also why we might similarly react negatively to a person 
being torn apart by a lion in the Colosseum, and yet an ancient Roman might not. A 
                                                          
3 The example Harman actually uses is of them setting the cat on fire, but as I use the marginally less horrific 
‘cat kicking’ scenario many times throughout the thesis as my go to example of a morally repugnant act, I shall 
stick with that example here as well.  
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behaviour might be reacted to negatively by one party, as it is observed and the object of the 
act may be empathised with; conversely a behaviour might not be reacted to negatively 
because either it is not directly observed, or, in the case of the Roman(s), the object of the act 
may not be cared about. Most importantly, however, this later hypothesis is notable in that it 
refers to non-moral features of behaviour and does not refer to any moral property. Returning 
directly to Harman’s account, Harman argues that the existence or lack of existence of moral 
facts is in fact irrelevant to explaining our observing, responding and judging of behaviour 
(Harman, 1977, 9). To the contrary, it is the non-moral features of the behaviour that are all 
that are required in fitting the evidence with the theory. Given then that the question of the 
existence of moral properties is an irrelevant one in respect to us explaining why we react 
negatively to some behaviour(s) and positively to others, at least as far as Harman is 
concerned, why then should we suppose at all that these moral facts do exist?  
 
Whether or not then there are any issues relating to the independent metaphysical claim of 
moral realism, there seems to be an epistemological issue to consider as well. Supposing, for 
the sake of argument, that moral properties do exist. Can we access the kind of moral 
knowledge we would need to explain why some actions are evil and yet others are not? In 
other words, can we know not only that, but which moral facts exist? If we believe Harman’s 
argument, then it seems the answer to that question is no, because according to Harman, there 
is no abductive inference we can use to connect the existence of any alleged moral properties 
to the phenomenal evidence of moral judgement and moral discourse. However, this leaves 
us in a very confusing place.  
 
When addressing moral language, we do not speak in a way that reflects a hypothesis about 
observation or empathy. We do not say, “I disapprove of kicking cats”, we say, “Kicking cats 
is wrong!” This clearly seems to be a realist sentence. J.L. Mackie famously responded to 
this issue in 1977 in Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, when he coined the term ‘error 
theory’ (Mackie, 1977, 18). To explain what Mackie means by this, let us look again at an 
earlier example: 
 
1. “There are no objective moral facts” 




Suppose someone is at odds with moral realism on the basis that whilst they see no special 
problem with it as a semantic claim (moral sentences refer to moral facts), they do have 
issues with moral realism as a metaphysical claim, due to an epistemological argument e.g. 
Harman’s explanation argument. There is surely some kind of error here, because the 
semantic realist claim is dependent on the independent metaphysical claim, which we have 
epistemological reasons to doubt. Does it make sense to say that moral sentences refer to 
moral properties and to say that moral properties do not exist to be referred to?  According to 
Mackie, the only conclusion we can draw here is that our second claim must also be false. 
When we use a realist sentence in a moral discussion, this is either a reflection of the fact that 
we believe the metaphysical claim but are mistaken, or, we do not believe it and are simply 
speaking falsely. Either way, we are in error in using this kind of moral language. This is 
what is meant by ‘error theory’ (Mackie, 1977, 18). 
 
However, can we even make this distinction? Throughout this chapter, I’ve separated moral 
realism into two claims4: 
 
1. Moral language is descriptive. 
2. Something in the world corresponds to that description. 
 
Anti-realists like Mackie see these as two separate claims, accepting (1) and denying (2), the 
first being about language and the second being about ontology. Many realists, on the other 
hand, do not think that these two claims are as separable as philosophers like Mackie make 
them out to be. Whilst it is generally agreed that the two claims are distinct, a key point of 
contention is how the linguistic and metaphysical issues may interact to constrain the shape 
of overall meta-ethical theories. In other words, how do some accounts of the linguistics bear 
on certain metaphysical issues, and vice versa? What explanatory burdens regarding the 
metaphysics arise for some accounts of the linguistic issues? For example, say we look at this 
within the context of something like direct reference theory (Almog and Leonardi, 2012, 79). 
Already we run into serious problems, because according to this theory, meaning attributes its 
origin to what the word or the expression points to in the world. In other words, meaning is 
inescapably linked to reality, at least on some level. How can we make sense of language 
                                                          
4 Notice that I have now switched the two claims around, this is because previously, we were examining how the 
metaphysical claim is independent and the linguistic is dependent. However, under certain ways of looking at 
them, the reverse can also be true; ‘something in the world corresponds to a description of x’ depends on ‘x is 
being described’.  
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which fails to refer to reality in the first place? 5 One of the most substantial problems we 
face here is that realists want to connect how moral language is used with what morality 
ultimately is (metaphysically). This, of course, places certain explanatory burdens upon the 
realist to then provide for this connection with additional layers of theory based in 
metaphysics. Someone who claims, for instance, that moral predicates denote (non) natural 
moral properties, and that there are such properties, will need a meta-semantic story about 
how moral predicates come to have such properties, as opposed to other properties as their 
meanings. As a result, we ought to be careful here when discussing realists (in general) as 
like many other fields, how this actually manifests is both vast and varied. Reference 
magnetism (as found in Dunaway and McPherson, 2016) for instance, attempts to account for 
how moral properties come to be the meaning of moral predicates. There are objections to 
non-naturalism in the direction of there are no plausible meta-semantic stories of how moral 
predicates could come to denote non-natural, causally non-efficacious properties, and so on6 
(Baldwin, 1985, 23-45).  
 
However, things are by no means easier for the anti or non realist either, because on this side 
of the spectrum we see all of the linguistic issues associated with language about ‘something’ 
(morality) which is not regarded as real in the first place. Again, whilst realists want to 
connect how moral language is used with what morality ultimately is (metaphysically), non 
and anti-realists want to do something different, and what that is can get extremely confusing 
both metaphysically and linguistically. So even for this side of the spectrum, it is highly 
controversial to what extent facts about the conventional meaning of language have 
implications regarding the metaphysics of moral properties/truths, and vice versa. For 
instance, if we remember our Bertrand Russell and the subject of definite descriptions or the 
conundrum of whether or not the present king of France is bald (Russell, 1905, 479) or if we 
delve even further into the works of Stephen Neale and existential quantifiers (as found in 
Neale, 1990), or if we look at Strawson’s work with Fregean analyses (Ostertag, 1998, 3-4), 
                                                          
5 This is exactly the kind of issue which will come back to haunt us in section two when we discuss issues like 
the problem of fictional discourse in respect to moral fictionalism (see section 2 chapter 8).  
6 Ethical non-naturalism is a non-definist form of moral realism as well as a form of cognitivism. It claims that: 
1. Moral predicates express propositions 
2. Some of those propositions are true 
3. Those propositions are determined by objective features of the world 
4. These features are not reducible to any set of non-moral features 
Pioneers in ethical non-naturalism include G.E. Moore, one of the founders of the analytic tradition in 
philosophy alongside Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein and (prior to them) Gottlob Frege (Van Der 
Schaar, 2013, 8). This definition can be seen as compatible with non-reductive naturalist realism.  
16 
 
then we will quickly realise how talking about things which either by definition do not exist, 
or in the case of moral non-realism where the existence of moral properties is, at the very 
least, highly suspect, then this can be a pretty substantial can of worms in and of itself. If 
‘wrong’ is not real, then what is my sentence about kicking cats being wrong doing exactly? 
In the case of certain kinds of non-realism, for instance quasi-realism, which we will discuss 
later on in this section, it can get even more confusing. For a quasi-realist for instance, 
‘wrong’ is described as a kind of psychological construct, projected onto the world through 
moral utterance rather than any property of our environment. However, this surely demands 
some kind of semantic explanation concerning its reference, which proves to be extremely 
problematic as the sentence is not even asserted but expressed, as highlighted by the Frege-
Geach problem (see section one, chapter five). In sections two and three when we deal with 
moral fictionalism as well, issues like this will become even more important when we attempt 
to deal with things like presupposition failure and the problem of fictional discourse (see 
section two, chapter eight). Ultimately, this will become a recurring issue which will be faced 
time and again throughout this thesis. Suffice it to say, for now, that we do need to be 
extremely careful when delineating linguistic and meta-semantic issues about moral language 
vs. metaphysical issues about the nature and existence of moral properties. We would also do 
well to outline, in no uncertain terms, what commitments on the linguistic issues, the 
metaphysical issues, and the dialectical connections we are defending and why. 
 
Unfortunately, what I cannot do is give both the anti-realists and the realists everything that 
they want, because that would be somewhat akin to violating the law of the excluded middle7. 
Ultimately, either moral properties are real or they are not. Quasi-realists like Simon 
Blackburn try very hard to find some middle ground on this issue, incurring very substantial 
explanatory burdens regarding the meta-semantic and metaphysical stances which they hold. 
By contrast, I do ultimately want to make clear where on the spectrum of realism and anti-
realism my account lies in relation to existing literature. Fortunately, referring to this 
realism/anti-realism divide as a spectrum is useful here in that it allows for some leeway to 
say that whilst my account very much does lean towards the anti-realism side, my approach is 
nevertheless different from most in that I leave the door open for the realist by committing to 
                                                          
7 The law of excluded middle states that for any proposition, either it is true or its negation is true. It is one of 
the three laws of thought dating back to Plato (Boole, 2003, 3-4), alongside the law of non-contradiction and the 
law of identity. It is, however, not without considerable controversy. For example, criticisms in logic and 
mathematics contest this, claiming rather that a proposition is either true or it is not able to be proved as true 
(Clark, 1978, 292-322). 
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avoiding the claim: ‘there are no moral properties’. There is an absolutely vital distinction 
that must be made here. There is an important difference between claiming that an 
explanation is wrong vs. providing an alternative explanation. In other words, where anti-
realists like Mackie accept (1) (moral language is descriptive), and reject (2) (there are moral 
properties), I do something entirely different. I reject (1), and withhold judgement on (2). In 
terms of the linguistic component of moral realism, that moral predicates refer to moral 
properties, this is something which I do reject, at least in terms of when we are talking about 
a particular kind of moral utterance used by a non-realist8. In this sense, my account stands 
opposed to error theory in many respects, as I do claim that there is not a pervasive error 
being committed by the non-realist who uses realist ‘sounding’ moral predicates. In terms of 
the metaphysical component of moral realism, however, that there are moral properties, that 
is something which my account withholds judgement on. However, the very way I approach 
this issue is nevertheless through that post mackian paradigm of treating moral language and 
moral ontology as two separate issues, because it is only through making that distinction that 
what follows throughout the rest of this thesis ultimately works.  
 
In the following sub chapter, ‘2.1. In Defence of Non-Realism’, I discuss my own concerns 
about moral realism as a metaphysical claim which mirror those of Harman’s argument from 
explanation. Like Harman, my concerns are less with the pure metaphysics than they are with 
the epistemology surrounding them; I see no abductive inference at least to suppose the 
existence of something explaining observations for which we already have much simpler and 
more evident explanations for. However, where I differ from Harman is that I do not then 
actively suppose that moral properties do not exist, but rather leave the question unanswered. 
I do not violate the law of the excluded middle either, because in order to do so I would need 
to answer the question of whether or not moral properties are real with something other than a 
yes or a no, which I do not do; I simply do not answer such a gigantic question as this, 
leaving it firmly in the hands of other philosophers. The distinction that I make between 
moral language and ontology is, thus, also a theoretical one. Assuming, for the sake of 
argument, that we cannot rely on real moral properties to help us out; can we still explain 
moral language in a meaningful way? I argue that we most definitely can. However, as 
mentioned before, this still leaves us with a problem, because even if we make that 
                                                          
8 Later on, when we discuss moral fictionalism, I will discuss the phenomenon of ‘pretence assertion’; this 
means that moral language is treated ‘as if’ it is descriptive, but in reality, it is not. Later on than that, when I 
discuss my own ‘expressive fictionalism’, I will explain how emotion states may be expressed and 
communicated through this phenomenon of moral fictionalism (see section 3 chapters 4 and 5).  
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distinction, if we have reasons to doubt the existence of moral reality, then how can we make 
sense of moral language, which sounds realist, in anything other than a theory of pervasive 
error?  
 
I will conclude this chapter then with a simple question. Is this really the conclusion that we 
want to arrive at? If not, then it seems we have the following options. We can either attempt 
to refute Harman and Mackie’s arguments in an attempt to save moral realism, or we can 
attempt to tackle the question of realist moral language in the (assumed) absence of real 
moral content directly. In other words, we can attempt to answer the following question: 
assuming we do not believe that there are any moral facts, and assuming we are not confused 
or lying, why do we continue to talk about morality ‘as if’ we do believe that there are moral 
facts? In other words, why do we continue to say, “Kicking cats is wrong!” instead of “I 
disapprove of kicking cats!” To do this, we should see if there is an account of moral 
language that can explain why we speak about morality in a seemingly realist way that is 
independent (does not depend on a separate metaphysical claim), and which retains 
explanatory power (retains the ability to explain why we react negatively to certain 
behaviour(s) and why we disagree about them), and does all this without a reduction to error 
theory. In so doing we should find an account which is immune to Mackie and Harman’s 
arguments. So to recap, what we are looking for is an independent, linguistic account of 
seemingly realist moral language, which has explanatory power and is not reducible to error 
theory. Throughout the rest of this thesis, I will look at two candidates for this in particular, 
both of which are non-realist and non-cognitive: expressivism (specifically in the form of 
Blackburn’s quasi-realism), and later in section two, moral fictionalism as championed by 




Chapter 2.1. In Defence of Non-Realism 
 
In chapter two I made reference to Harman’s argument from explanation as a go to example 
of the kinds of argument that may provoke us to doubt moral realism as a metaphysical claim. 
In the interest of solidifying this premise, I would also do well to offer up some of my own 
concerns about moral realism as a metaphysical claim. Like Harman, my concern is less with 
metaphysical arguments for the existence of moral properties per se and far more with the 
epistemological dilemma of how we may have access to them even if they do exist, and 
whether or not we really need to do so. For me the dilemma seems to be rooted in moral 
disagreement. There are numerous theories about how we may ‘define’ what is right, and 
what is wrong, for instance from utilitarianism, deontology or from Aristotelian virtue ethics. 
Ironically, this is not unlike some of the deeper levels of material science where there are 
multiple models that may explain the nature of the universe both at a cosmological and at a 
subatomic level, and like debates in philosophy about the ‘true’ nature of morality, there are 
similarly lengthy debates among physicists about whether or not string theory is an accurate 
model of subatomic particles, or whether the big rip is a probable outcome of dark energy 
pushing galaxies further apart. Like Harman, however, I would argue that there is an 
important difference between these kinds of debates and that is the process of fitting theory 
with evidence, and about the use of abductive reasoning.  
 
For example, take the idea of ‘moral progress’; say we attempt to explain why people have 
disagreed about what constitutes ‘good’ and ‘decent’ behaviour throughout history by 
arguing that some cultures have had a closer, or more sophisticated understanding of the 
nature of morality than others. For me this is extremely problematic for the simple reason that 
there is a much simpler explanation, which fits the observable evidence much better, and that 
is that a society’s system of values is shaped not by eternal truths wrought by the laws of 
nature, but by human attitudes & sentiments, which are highly suggestible. In other words, 
‘right’ and ‘wrong’ resemble less a collection of mathematical constants, like the speed of 
light or the laws of thermodynamics, which (assuming our current model of physics is 
accurate) physically cannot be broken, but rather more a collection of mutually (or not) 
agreed upon principles, which people are encouraged to uphold, but of which the underlying 
reality is far more questionable, and which are easily violated by individuals who either fail 
to understand them or simply choose to break the rules.  
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One seems to accurately reflect the way the universe is, whether we like it or not; in other 
words, whether or not we agree with the laws of thermodynamics, those are the laws that we 
are subject to in this universe. We may have inaccurate scientific models of course, at which 
point we rework our theories in the light of new evidence, but the underlying principle is that 
there exists a set of laws by which the universe operates, laws we cannot disobey, and which 
we access and gain knowledge of by applied mathematics, empirical evidence and abductive 
reasoning. The other seems to accurately reflect human needs and emotions, whereby we are 
driven by certain biological imperatives necessary for our survival, such as food, shelter or 
reproduction, but which must also be applied in a social environment. Human beings are not 
solitary animals, but rather live in often very large, highly complex social networks and 
systems built on interdependency. As such, we shape our psychological attitudes to ensure 
not only our own survival but also the survival of those that we depend upon. What is also 
very interesting is that in multiple animal species that live in social groups rather than as 
individuals, the needs of the group is often as important, or even completely overrides the 
needs of the individual9. This theory far better seems to fit the evidence observed in the 
biological sciences rather than it does moral realist explanations about moral disagreements.  
 
Now, where does my view differ from Harman’s? In chapter two I discussed the complexity 
of separating moral realism into one linguistic and one metaphysical claim via that kind of 
post mackian paradigm. By doing this I do place myself firmly towards the anti-realist side of 
the spectrum, but what I also hasten to add is that unlike Mackie or Harman, what I do not 
seek to do is to use my scepticism of moral properties to single handily take down moral 
realism. I would claim that it would be either difficult or even impossible to do so. In the 
following chapter, I will describe my non-realism as akin to a kind of agnosticism on the 
issue of whether moral properties are real or not. I would claim that moral properties are 
unknown, and in all likelihood unknowable. This does not mean that they are not there, but it 
does mean that we do not have access to them. Therefore, we are left with the following 
options. Either we can attempt to find access to them via epistemology, or, we can attempt to 
                                                          
9 Humans are by no means the only species to exhibit personal sacrifice, nor does it seem entirely accurate to 
say that reproduction of the individual’s genes is the only biological imperative. It is also clearly evident from 
individuals who choose not to reproduce that there exist other motivations besides continuing one’s own genes. 
However, what does appear constant (in all social animals) is the need to preserve the continuation of the social 
group, even if that requires the sacrifice of the individual. In particular, the needs and survival of offspring 
seems to be of paramount of importance. An example I use in section three on this very issue of animal 
‘altruism’ is a documented case of a pod of orcas hunting a grey whale calf and some fascinating behavioural 
anomalies in some nearby humpback whales (see section 3 chapter 3).  
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see if we can make sense of moral language without moral properties, the latter of which is 
what I am doing.  
 
So in summary, my concern is very similar to Harman’s argument from explanation in that 
there simply does not seem to be any special need to commit to the metaphysical claims of 
moral realism when there is a much simpler explanation for moral disagreements, one which 
far better fits the observable evidence provided in the biological sciences, and which has 
much more direct epistemological access to it by way of abductive reasoning. In other words, 
I am applying not only Ockham’s razor (choosing the simpler explanation over the more 
complex one), but also inference to the best explanation in lieu of what we can directly 
observe in nature. However, my account is also markedly different from both Harman and 
Mackie in that this is as far as I go in this particular direction, committing as I am to avoiding 
the claim ‘there are, therefore, no moral properties’. In other words, I attempt to leave the 
door open for moral realism by rejecting that moral predicates refer to moral properties (in 
the case of the fictionalist at least), but entirely withholding judgement on whether there are 
(or are not) moral properties. Much later on, in section three, I will develop this line of 
thought much further, and attempt to provide some theoretical accounts of how psychological 
attitudes may be translated into the kinds of ‘moral’ imperatives that we use in everyday 
situations. In my next chapter, however, I will do some useful sign posting as well as 
introducing something which has been alluded to more than once thus far, but has yet to be 
fully explored, and that is this notion of ‘agnosticism’ in regards to moral ontology.  
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Chapter 3: Non-Cognitivism, Expressivism, Projectivism and the 
notion of Agnosticism 
 
Having now looked a little at moral realism, let us now look more closely at both non-realism 
and anti-realism. The purpose of this chapter is not to provide any arguments for or against 
any particular, pre-existing philosophical perspective as such, rather it is to offer some useful 
sign posting for what is to come, as from this point on I will be relying on a lot of non-realist 
terminology, and, therefore, I would do well to illustrate what these terms mean (as I will be 
using them). Before I delve into the terminology, however, I will first explain a very 
important difference between two critical concepts which I will also come to heavily rely 
upon in later chapters, and that is the aforementioned difference between an anti-realist 
perspective and a non-realist perspective.  Anti-realism, in addition to standing in stark 
opposition to moral-realism, attaches claims about moral ontology (there are no moral 
properties). By contrast, non-realism differs from this slightly. Rather than declaring that the 
claims made by moral realists are false, a non-realist perspective is one which simply 
withholds judgment about the metaphysical claims (there are moral properties), creating a 
theory without relying in any way on those kinds of claims being true or false. In other 
words, rather than taking an ‘x is incorrect’ position, the non-realist instead takes a position 
akin to saying, ‘we have not, or cannot, establish that x is correct’. One makes an active 
counter claim about moral ontology in response to the ontological claims of moral realism, 
whereas the other merely regards those claims as unverified. In other words, anti-realism is 
the claim that, ‘morality does not exist’; non-realism is the claim that, ‘we have not, or 
cannot, verify the existence of morality’. 
 
There is a similar difference between theological positions like atheism and agnosticism. For 
instance, an atheist may claim, ‘I do not believe in god’, and in most cases, the negation is 
also true, ‘I believe there is no god’, thereby maintaining the law of excluded middle. God 
either does or does not exist, there is no middle ground. However, the spectrum of belief is 
not without varying degrees of certainty and confirmation. An agnostic, for example, may 
claim, ‘I am undecided as to whether or not there is a god’. Again, this is not the same as 
answering a binary proposition (is god real or not?) with something other than a yes or a no, 
thus violating the law of excluded middle. Instead, this position leaves the proposition 
entirely unanswered. In other words, there is an important difference between rejecting a 
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conclusion and embracing its negation vs. simply not embracing either the conclusion or its 
negation by simply walking away from the proposition. Nevertheless, I would argue that 
agnosticism still leans heavily on the atheistic side of the spectrum of belief, in this case, for 
the simple reason that to arrive at agnosticism (towards god) one has to begin from a position 
of scepticism; one has to at least doubt the existence of god in the first place. So even though 
agnosticism exists separately from atheism, and is distinct from it in the sense that one 
believes in the absence of something, and the other does not commit to any belief one way or 
the other, the two are nevertheless in a similar camp, as they both approach the same 
proposition from a position of doubt. The atheist, for instance, may well also claim that ‘there 
is no god’, is the default position accepted in lieu of an absence of any data one way or the 
other in regards to the existence of god. The agnostic, on the other hand, may counter this by 
claiming that the default position from such a situation is not to leap to any conclusions 
whatsoever in the absence of conclusive evidence, but rather accept that the truth is 
ultimately unknown.  
 
Now how does this relate to moral realism and anti-realism? As mentioned in the latter half 
of my previous chapter, moral realism seeks to connect moral language with moral ontology, 
and contests the treating of the two subjects as distinct issues, claiming rather that moral 
language is intrinsically linked to moral reality. This is similar to how the theist believes in 
god, claiming that the existence of God is intrinsic to how the universe works10. The anti-
realist is similar to the atheist, claiming that arguments for the existence of god do not hold 
up, and so the more logical explanation is that god does not exist, or, in the case of moral 
anti-realists like Mackie, whilst there is no issue with portraying moral language as 
descriptive, the notion that it is accurately descriptive (of moral reality) is far more doubtful; 
therefore, the much simpler explanation is that moral speakers are in error. My non-realist 
position, however, is a little different to both of these approaches. Whilst I agree with Mackie 
that moral language and ontology should be treated as separate issues, as complex as that may 
be, and whilst like Mackie I approach moral realism from a position of scepticism and doubt, 
placing myself firmly on that side of the spectrum of belief, I nevertheless believe that the 
more intellectually honest conclusion (on the reality of moral properties) is not to have one, 
                                                          
10 Unsurprisingly, the proliferation of philosophical arguments, in all fields of the subject, on the necessary 
existence of God throughout history is truly staggering, from Anselm’s ontological argument, Thomas Aquinas, 
Pascal’s Wager or William James’s ‘Will to Believe’, philosophers have never, and in all probability never will 
universally or even consistently agree on this subject; it is one of the most controversial issues in all of 
philosophy, much like the issue of whether moral properties exist or not (as found in Jordon, 2018).  
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not ultimately having any conclusive evidence with which to make one. In other words, just 
as the theological agnostic doubts the existence of god, but is ultimately undecided about 
whether to accept either the hypothesis of god’s existence or the null hypothesis, the 
experiment being incomplete, moral agnosticism comes from a similar position in regards to 
the existence of moral properties. To put things as basically and succinctly as I can, non-
realism and moral agnosticism come from a position of doubt in regards to moral realism; 
they do, therefore, place my own account (of expressive fictionalism) in a firmly separate 
camp from it, and unlike something like quasi-realism, the account does not try to give the 
hard realist everything that they want. What expressive fictionalism also does not do, 
however, is stand in direct opposition to moral realism, but rather stands entirely alternative 
to it. In other words, the thesis proceeds as follows:  
 
1. We have epistemological reasons to doubt metaphysical accounts of moral properties. 
2. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that we have not, or cannot, verify the reality of 
moral properties, moral language nevertheless sounds distinctly realist in nature 
(ergo, we are treating the two as separate issues). 
3. Given these two observations, can we still come up with a theory which explains how 
this works, without simply concluding, as the anti-realist does, that there are no moral 
properties, or that, therefore, moral language is altogether flawed? 
 
Without further diversion then, let us look at three more terms associated with non-realism 
that will come to be very useful in the next few chapters: non-cognitivism, expressivism and 
projectivism. First, let us look at non-cognitivism. All three of these concepts, as I will be 
treating them at least, will be specific to philosophy of language. Non-cognitivism, for 
instance, I am taking to mean a position that claims that moral sentences do not express 
propositions in the same way that more descriptive, fact oriented sentences do11. For most 
non-cognitivists, this also has the side effect of implying that ethical sentences are non truth 
apt (or at the very least, not truth apt in the same way as conventional propositional logic is). 
Another potential side effect of non-cognitivism, therefore, is also the preclusion of moral 
knowledge12. This is not to say at all that non-cognitivism claims that moral utterances are 
                                                          
11 This is, of course, how non-cognitivism usually manifests. However, there are contemporary non-cognitivists 
that do accept a notion of propositions on which moral sentences express propositions (as found in Plunkett and 
McPherson, 2018, see ch. 1-2 and 8).  




meaningless, but it does portray those utterances as non-declarative speech acts rather than 
fact asserting propositions. What these speech acts are exactly depends on the variety or 
flavour of non-cognitivism we are looking at, but one of the most notorious ones, and the one 
we will be looking at very closely from this point onwards, is expressivism.  
 
Other varieties of non-cognitivism include emotivism, which we can find in the works of A. 
J Ayer (Ayer, 1936, 106) and C. L. Stevenson (Stevenson, 1937, 83), which claims that moral 
sentences express emotional attitudes, and is colloquially known as the ‘boo! hurray! theory 
of ethics’, or its close cousin universal prescriptivism developed by R. M. Hare (Hare, 
1963, 10ff.) which likens ethical sentences to universalizable imperatives (those who make 
moral judgements are committed to those same judgements in other situations where similar 
facts obtain). Emotivism is particular, and as we discover later with Blackburn’s quasi-
realism, can also be seen as a form of expressivism, so let us for the moment focus on 
expressivism in its simplest form. Expressivism is the view that sentences which employ 
moral terminology, such as, ‘kicking cats is wrong’, are non-descriptive and that these moral 
adjectives are non-referential to any metaphysical or ontological properties or facts. The 
primary function of the moral speech act is not to make the listener aware of any particular 
information about the nature of things or of the ‘immoral’ act in question, but rather it is to 
express the evaluative attitude of the one speaking. In laymen’s terms, it is to more akin to 
expressing a feeling about something rather than describing how the thing really is in (purely) 
objective terms. Obviously, this has a variety of potential effects on the truth value and truth 
conditions of a given sentence using moral terminology. Some expressivists simply claim that 
moral sentences are not truth conditional and/or lack any truth conditional content. Others, 
Blackburn in particular, seek to provide alternative criteria for special, moral truth 
conditions, and there will be more on that in later chapters. The most important thing we want 
to remember about expressivism, however, is that it is non-cognitivist in the sense that it 
claims that ethical sentences are non-propositional, rather, they are expressive, and that this is 
a non-realist theory of moral language. Expressivism claims something about what ethical 
sentences do not do in relation to theories about the existence of moral properties (i.e. refer to 
them in any way), and this stands in stark contrast with more anti-realist theories like error 
theory, which do claim something about what ethical sentences do in relation to such theories 
(i.e. they do attempt to refer to them, and this is an error on the part of the speaker due to a 




Another important concept and one which will be vital to understand later on is the theory of 
projectivism. To simplify for future reference, this is what I call the ‘as if’ theory; in relation 
to moral language for instance, projectivism is the idea that speakers using moral terminology 
use those terms to ‘project’ certain qualities onto something ‘as if’ those qualities actually 
belong to it, even if actually they do not. As Hume describes it:  
 
Tis a common observation, that the mind has a great propensity to spread itself on 
external objects, and to conjoin with them any internal impressions, which they 
occasion, and which always make their appearance at the same time that these objects 
discover themselves to the senses. (Hume, 2016, 167) 
 
Projectivism comes in many forms and varieties as well, but in particular we will focus on the 
form of projectivism, as applied in meta-ethics, championed by Simon Blackburn and how he 
uses it in quasi-realism. Quasi-realism, as we will discover later, walks a very thin line 
between realism and non-realism. Rather than saying outright, for example, that moral 
sentences lack truth conditions or that there are no real moral qualities involved in the 
evaluation of an act as moral or immoral, Blackburn claims that moral qualities and moral 
truth conditions are actually constructed by the speaker, and that they are projected onto the 
world in a manner not unlike a light source projecting light onto a surface and creating a 
reflection13 (Blackburn, 1984, 174). So quasi-realism is not a realist theory, because it does 
not claim things about the actual nature of ethics so much as it claims things about the people 
making use of ethical terms, but it is also not strictly anti-realist either, because it does not 
claim that those people are not talking about something which in some alternative senses 
could be interpreted as ‘real’, hence ‘quasi’-realism. In laymen’s terms, I would describe 
quasi-realism as the theory that morals are real not because they exist out there in the world, 
but because we create them, and the method of that creative act is projectivism. In other 
words, moral language acts like a projector projecting images onto a blank wall for all to 
interpret. So to refine our light on the wall analogy, Blackburn does present this projection 
(i.e. the light) as a linguistic phenomenon rather than a purely cognitive one; it takes on the 
                                                          
13 Blackburn never actually uses this analogy to my knowledge, but as I understand the concept of projectivism, 
the analogy seems appropriate. In actuality, the analogy is not my creation either, but rather inspired by a scene 
in Michael Strasczynski’s Babylon 5, in which a character called G’kar takes a seemingly projectivist stance on 
his explanation of the nature of God; a lantern represents man’s search for God, creating a reflection on a wall 
(representing the universe) which the seeker interprets as God, not realising that the source of the reflection 
comes not from the wall but from seeker himself. Similarly, a person who does not carry a lantern, who does not 
search for God, sees nothing. (Babylon 5, series five episode fourteen (“Meditations of the Abyss”)) 
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shape of realist moral language, but the ultimate source of the (moral) utterance comes from 
the speaker, not what is being spoken about. What is interesting, however, is in how this ties 
in with expressivism. Recall that expressivism is the theory that the communicative speech 
act of ethical discourse amounts to expressing attitudes towards things we either approve or 
disapprove of. This may be achieved in a variety of ways, but according to quasi-realists like 
Blackburn, the method used is a form of projectivism, whereby we speak ‘as if’ things were 
right or wrong, thereby creating those kinds of qualities psychologically and projecting them 
from within ourselves out onto the thing that we are looking at.  
 
Later on in chapter five, I will explain this in greater detail, but before I progress onto that, I 
would also do well to outline some of the other forms of non-realism out there, and this will 
be the subject of my next chapter. I would also do well to talk a great deal about a particular 
threat to expressivism, and which is in no small way a contributing factor in the creation of 
quasi-realism, and this is the Frege-Geach problem. This, along with Blackburn’s response to 





Chapter 4: Alternative Non/Anti-Realist Approaches to Moral 
Language 
 
Throughout section one I will be focussing on a non-realist approach to moral language 
called ‘expressivism’, in particular Simon Blackburn’s quasi-realism, and in section two I 
will look at another approach called ‘moral fictionalism’, championed by Richard Joyce. 
Before continuing on with these approaches, however, it is worth briefly noting some of the 
alternative approaches that exist. In this chapter I will briefly explain some of these 
alternative approaches and attempt to place them within the context of the overall thesis. This 
is to eventually end up with a complete theory of moral language which is independent of 
additional philosophy in metaphysics or epistemology, and within that context why quasi-
realism and moral fictionalism are much more favourable candidates for this. What I mean by 
this is that the language theory should be adoptable not only by people who are hard anti-
realists in the sense that they do make the metaphysical commitment that morals are not real 
but also by people who are morally agnostic. In other words, to those who make no attempt 
to verify whether morals are real or not on a metaphysical level, the theory should be 
adoptable. However, just because an approach may style itself as anti-realist, does not 
necessarily mean that it needs to make that metaphysical commitment; what may appear an 
anti-realist approach may in fact be a non-realist approach in disguise, or at least open to 
adaptation towards this. With this in mind, I will focus on two very different kinds of self 
acclaimed anti-realist approaches in particular: error theory, as championed by J.L. Mackie, 
and “non-objectivism”, as described by Richard Joyce.  
 
First, let us take a closer look at error theory. This is the position championed by moral 
sceptics such as J.L. Mackie, and consists of three essential components: 
 
1. There are no moral features of the world – right or wrong. 
2. Therefore, no moral judgements are true; however, 
3. Our sincere moral judgements try, and always fail, to describe the moral features of 
things. (Shafer-Landau, 2010, 292) 
 
So there is a definite commitment here to an ontological claim, where all sincere moral 
sentences that assert moral facts about the world are mistaken, as there are no moral facts to 
which those sentences refer. This also leads to an epistemological commitment, whereby the 
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claim is that to have moral knowledge there must be some kind of moral truth. This comes 
from the cognitivist claim that moral sentences are truth apt assertions and combines it with 
the nihilistic claim that there is, ontologically, no such thing as a moral fact. As I will discuss 
later on in the thesis, conflating moral truth with moral fact can be a basis for objection to 
error theory, most notably from quasi-realists like Simon Blackburn. However, for now let us 
assume that there is a connection between an assertoric truth apt sentence and what is and is 
not considered factually accurate, constituted by what is real and that if that fact is absent, 
then the assertion proclaiming it to be true is by definition both false and mistaken. So for 
instance, ‘Hilary won the 2016 U.S. general election’ is a truth-apt sentence, but the fact of 
this occurring is absent (it did not happen), and this seems to have a clear effect on whether 
or not the sentence is true. However, there are alternative ways of looking at error theory. 
 
The most common form of error theory is what Joyce describes as the Global Falsity 
approach, which consists of the cognitivist stance that moral assertions are false in that they 
claim that moral facts exist when in reality they do not (as found in Joyce, 2007). J.L. Mackie 
in fact goes further and claims that moral assertions can only be true at all if there are moral 
properties that are intrinsically motivating (Joyce, 2007). This is something I mentioned 
earlier in my chapter on moral realism when I mentioned Mackie’s ‘Argument from 
Queerness’. However, there is also an alternative form of error theory that Joyce calls 
‘Presupposition Failure’ (Joyce, 2007). This means that moral sentences are neither true nor 
false but that the sentence is still thought to be somehow truth apt. The presupposition that 
moral facts exist leads to a semantic failure to communicate a normal proposition, in the 
same way that someone claiming that, ‘the present king of France is bald’ might do14. This is 
to say that a sentence may be truth apt in the sense that it has the logical form of an assertion, 
but cannot be properly determined as true or false in the same way as a normal assertion can 
be, because it presupposes facts that do not exist. This presupposition is in fact very similar 
to what Joyce talks about in his work, with the obvious difference that rather than such 
presupposition sentences leading to semantic failure, they are he argues a form of 
“fictionalism”, which of course I will be discussing at great length later on in section two.15 
However, presupposition failure, whether applied to moral discourse or not, is not without 
                                                          
14 This example is something of a can of worms, however, as it is not well established, philosophically, what 
someone who utters something like ‘the present king of France is bald’ is actually doing semantically. 
15 ‘Spiderman’s real name is Peter Parker’ can be interpreted either as a contextual, truth apt assertion about the 
canon Marvel Universe, or, as Joyce would put it, it can be seen as a non-truth apt (but still treated as such) 
‘pretence’ assertion, which is dependent on a shared, cooperative understanding of that universe and its fictitious 
nature (see section 2 chapter 7 for my account of Joycean ‘fictionalism’).  
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considerable debate. Strawson, for example, argues that there are grounds to determine that 
such sentences as, ‘the present king of France is bald’, are false (as seen in Beaver, 2007).  
 
The issue I have with any kind of error theory of course is that it constrains us to nihilistic 
ontological commitments, where my aim in this thesis is to construct a non-realist position 
which can be championed by the moral agnostic, in other words, one who does not attempt to 
verify whether or not moral facts do or do not exist. My aim here is to see if a non-realist 
argument can indeed be constructed independently [through the language]. As such, error 
theory, whilst interesting, is lacking in the specific characteristics required for doing this.  
 
Having said this, there are also alternative non-realist accounts to be found in the debate over 
whether ethical sentences are cognitivist or non-cognitivist, or whether or not moral claims 
are truth apt assertions that can be used to express the subject’s moral beliefs (cognitivism) or 
whether they have a different, non-cognitivist function. Both forms of expressivism and 
moral fictionalism that I will be focussing on are portrayed as non-cognitivist. Whilst moral 
sentences may appear to be and even be treated like or ‘as’ assertions, they ultimately are 
not, rather they are some other means of communicating some other kind of important 
information. This is because most theories which use a cognitivist approach, such as error 
theory, constrain us to an ontological commitment, in this case that when ethical sentences 
are uttered, assertions are being made about how the world ‘really’ is.16 This is not to say that 
the cognitivist necessarily does this. For example, as we will discover much later, one brand 
of fictionalism, the ‘tacit operator approach’, cleverly avoids this by saying that the semantic 
content of a fiction statement translates to “within the context of x, x is true”; I will discuss 
this at considerable length in my second section. Aside from such exceptions, however, most 
cognitivists on moral language do appear to agree that moral assertions do attempt to refer to 
real phenomena, successfully or not. This is with one possible exception: what Joyce 
describes as “non-objectivism”. 
 
In Joyce’s words: “...“moral non-objectivism” denotes the view that moral facts exist and are 
mind-dependent (in the relevant sense), while “moral objectivism” holds that they exist and 
are mind-independent.” (Joyce, 2007) Whilst this seems to give us a succinct answer to what 
                                                          
16 If we want to create an independent non-realist moral language theory, that is one which does not supervene 
upon metaphysics, then most forms of cognitivism are automatically unattractive, because they rely on the 
premise that when moral sentences are uttered, they refer to real, metaphysical phenomena.  
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non-objectivism is, it does also leave it open to debate what exactly is meant by a ‘mind-
dependent’ fact. 
 
As a non-realist account, non-objectivism is also dubious, because it is not strictly speaking 
non-realist per se but rather a form of minimal realism (proposing that moral facts do exist 
albeit mind dependently). In other words moral features are not “objective” in the sense of 
them being (mind) independent, rather they are, at least partly, constituted by features of the 
mind. This is, however, not to say that they are not in some senses real. The basic idea here is 
to emphasise the dependence of moral ‘goodness’ on mental activity, for instance: 
 
X is good iff John approves of X 
X is good iff John would approve of X (in such-and-such circumstances)  
X is good iff X merits John’s approval 
 
According to Joyce, it is difficult in this sense to find a successful description of X that is in 
no way dependent on mental activity, and this catalogue can conceivably be much longer 
depending on whether we treat ‘iff’ as necessary or contingent, a priori or a posteriori (Joyce, 
2007).  
 
The question I would ask is what exactly is the semantic content of these kinds of moral 
sentences and how are they interpreted propositionally. Can we make inferences from them? 
The cognitivist, for instance, subscribes to the theory that moral sentences like ‘kicking cats 
is morally wrong’, can be true. If non-objectivism says this also, then this becomes very 
confusing. As we will discover later on, quasi-realists like Blackburn describe moral 
discourse in a similar way, including an account which describes how moral sentences may 
be interpreted as true in virtue of mental state(s) of the speaker rather than on any objective 
features of the world. The difference, however, is that Blackburn’s account is distinctly non-
cognitivist; it involves attitudes being ‘projected’ onto the world via moral utterances 
(projectivism), and as we will discover towards the end of section one and the beginning of 
section two, it leads him into multiple difficulties. It is not entirely clear what non-
objectivism has to account for this question.   
What is important for us to decipher here is whether or not non-objectivism is viable as a 
non-realist metaethical theory, and even if it is whether or not, on inspection, it merely 
collapses into a slightly different, more cognitivist form of quasi-realism. To do this, we must 
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first defuse any contention of this by drawing a distinction between the objective and the non-
objective. Unfortunately, if dealing with anything in philosophy leads us to opening up a can 
of worms then it is this. There are innumerable different ways to draw a distinction between 
the objective and the non-objective, and none of them are without objection(s). What we can 
do, however, is to look at the kind of argument that some philosophers have put forward 
towards this.  
 
For example, one fairly novel argument from Crispin Wright involves discriminating between 
phenomena that play what he calls a “wide cosmological role” and those that play a more 
narrow one; this is also similar to Harman’s argument which we have previously cited 
(Wright, 1988, 197-198). This argument is largely based on an analysis of the contextual 
nature of explanatory power that the subject matter possesses. For example, there is a great 
deal that the rectangular shape of a door explains, including our tendency to see it and think 
of it as rectangular, the shadow it casts and the absence of draft in the office when shut. In 
this case it appears that the object of the discussion, the geometric shape of the door, 
determines how we perceive it. By contrast, a value, such as funniness, seems to play a much 
narrower cosmological role in that it explains very little about any object so much as it 
explains how we react to it. The main difference seems to be that whilst we may refer to 
objects which have this property of funniness; it is difficult to imagine that the funniness of 
something can explain the occurrence of any other phenomena without our tendency to see it 
as funny playing an intermediary role (Wright, 1988, 197-198). In other words, whilst the 
geometrical shape of an open door way may help to explain the draft in the office, and 
thereby other physical phenomena besides, the funniness of a joke does not seem to explain 
anything if we do not perceive the joke as funny.17 Wright believes that morals have a 
similarly narrow cosmological role; morality does not explain any phenomenon without the 
intermediary explanation that people react to things in a particular way, and so it is not, in the 
sense that Wright portrays it, mind independent, and so it is portrayed as non-objective. 
(Wright, 1988, 197-198)  
                                                          
17 To begrudgingly use a cliché thought experiment here: if the door is open, but there is nobody in the office, is 
there a draft in the office? Alternatively, if a joke is uttered by a machine, but nobody, including the machine 
(lacking self awareness), is listening, is the joke funny? Whilst this is not exactly what Wright is driving at, it 
may help to conceptualise that there is a difference between the two occurrences if we look at it in terms of 
explanations of things happening. We might explain physical phenomenon, such as somebody’s tea getting cold, 
via the fact that there was a draft in the office, because the door was open. This could be true whether there was 
somebody in the room or not. However, if we were to explain that somebody spilled their tea because they were 
laughing at an amusing joke, then this is far more person oriented in the sense that this could not have 




However, we would do well to remember that what we are looking for is an account of moral 
language and not of morality itself per se. In terms of moral language, how does non-
objectivism translate? If, as Wright claims, it is a form of anti-realism, then we ought to take 
a moral statement like, ‘kicking cats is morally wrong’, as not referring to or explaining any 
real moral properties. That the act is morally wrong is far more open to interpretation if we 
believe that moral qualities, including condemnation, are not intrinsically linked to these 
facts. However, if this is true, then why does the sentence appear to resemble any other 
assertion, e.g.: there does not appear, at face value, to be any distinct difference in semantic 
form between ‘kicking cats is morally wrong’ and ‘the door is rectangular’. There are 
differences in how we perceive these properties and how they relate to how we explain other 
phenomena, but as regards the semantics of these sentences themselves, merely saying that 
the content of one is more ‘objective’ than the other does not strike me as quite enough to 
explain why they are formed and treated so similarly and yet are viewed so differently by 
anti-realists, unless there is more to this.  
 
Ultimately, this kind of approach to moral discourse does in fact seem to, as far as I can tell, 
eventually collapse into a kind of quasi-realism (which I will outline in my next chapter) 
when we attempt to explain how it is that these statements can be treated as truth apt in the 
absence of truth conditional content. This is because the more we press “non-objectivism” on 
how these seemingly truth apt sentences are being treated, the more it seems that there is a 
resemblance in the account of speakers ‘projecting’ their attitudes by making the utterance 
than the utterance genuinely reflecting the world it appears to describe.  For example, if we 
look again at statements like “X is good iff John approves of X”, and this emphasis on moral 
quality being conditional on approval or disapproval, then striking parallels between this, and 
what I will be discussing at length in my next few chapters about expressivism and quasi-
realism begin to surface. Eventually, both appear to boil down to the same premise, which is 
that a moral sentence may allude, or even refer to real phenomena, but the moral 
component(s) of these utterances are ultimately constituted not by these phenomena but by 
mental activity in reaction to them.  
 
To summarize, error theory is useful in that it gives us grounds to doubt moral realism and 
thus provide a platform for non-realist moral discourse. However, it is lacking in the specific 
criteria that I am looking for, that being a non-realist thesis that can be adopted by the moral 
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agnostic, and it lacks this because it is by its very nature committed to the theory that there 
are no moral facts. This dependence on additional ontology also applies to most forms of 
cognitivism, this is with the possible exception of presupposition failure (a subdivision of 
error theory), but which may easily collapse into a form of moral fictionalism when pressing 
for a more thorough explanation. Similar issues are present when we look to non-objectivism, 




Chapter 5: Simon Blackburn & Quasi-Realism 
 
The origins of quasi-realism can be found the 1984 book Spreading the Word: Groundings in 
the Philosophy of Language by Simon Blackburn. Quasi-realism is a position in meta-ethics 
which holds that ethical statements do not express propositions; rather they project emotional 
attitudes onto the world as we speak, ‘as if’ they were objective properties.  Blackburn 
describes quasi-realism as a project which aims to explain why we appear to use moral 
language in an objective manner (Blackburn, 1984, 170-171). In STW, Blackburn introduces 
this project during his discussions on key issues within the philosophy of language, namely 
his discussions on language and realism in his fifth chapter, which he expands upon in his 
sixth and seventh chapter. In his fifth chapter, ‘Realism and Variations’, Blackburn discusses 
moral realism as he provides evidence for and against various forms of both this and anti-
realism, as well as cognitivism and non-cognitivism. Recalling back to chapter three of this 
section, some questions we would do well to remember here are the following: do moral 
sentences express propositions? Can such propositions be true? If so, are such true 
propositions made true by objective features of the word? As we also discussed in chapter 
two of this section, we are treating ‘moral realism’ as a claim about moral language (that 
moral utterances are assertions about objective moral features of the world). Blackburn 
appears to treat these terms in much the same way as well.  
 
The most important factor in the quasi-realist project is Blackburn’s ‘projectivism’, the 
process by which we project attitudes onto states of affairs or objects. Blackburn argues that 
moral claims can be best understood as projections of our emotional attitudes (Blackburn, 
1984, 170-171). Blackburn begins to defend projectivism in his sixth chapter, ‘Evaluations, 
Projections and Quasi-Realism’, as he explains how and why qualities, such as right or 
wrong, may be projected onto certain actions ‘as if’ they were objective properties. He then 
outlines a particular crisis that arrives from this. In order to maintain this view, the 
projectivist seems committed to declaring that all moral discourse is subject to a pervasive 
error. Why do we say “ⱷ is wrong”, rather than, “I disapprove of ⱷ” if that is what we mean, 
unless our moral language is somehow broken? The quasi-realist project’s aim is to 
demonstrate that a projectivist can avoid committing to either moral realism, or an error-
theoretic account of moral language. The phenomenon that we must then investigate is why, 
when we use language within the context of ethics, we use seemingly truth-conditional claims 
in the absence of truth conditional content. This is the central issue Blackburn deals with in 
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the end of his sixth chapter, and in his seventh chapter, ‘Correspondence, Coherence and 
Pragmatism’. In my following chapters in this section, I will also discuss how Blackburn 
confronts the Frege-Geach problem and then goes on to use that line of reasoning to account 
for notions of moral sensibility, moral improvement, and the beginnings of a notion of moral 
truth. Blackburn’s aim is to provide evidence for the quasi-realist project’s potential for being 
a complete and comprehensive account of the semantics of moral language. Unlike 
conventional expressivism, however, quasi-realism is also aimed at providing the moral 
realist with everything that they want to hear without supervening in any way on any 
metaphysics or epistemology regarding the objective existence or accessibility of moral 
truth(s) or moral properties. As such, quasi-realism looks like a tempting candidate as the 
kind of non-realist account of moral language that I am ultimately searching for.  
 
Towards the end of his fifth chapter, ‘Realism and Variations’, Blackburn introduces us to the 
kind of non-cognitive expressivism he favours, i.e. regarding some kinds of utterance as 
expressive (of emotion) rather than descriptive (of fact). Blackburn claims that moral views 
are best understood not as beliefs, but as attitudes. As A.J. Ayer puts it:  
 
The presence of an ethical symbol in a proposition adds nothing to its factual content. 
Thus if I say to someone, “You acted wrongly in stealing that money”, I am not stating 
anything more than if I had simply said, “You stole that money”. In adding that this 
action is wrong I am not making any further statement about it. I am simply evincing 
my moral disapproval of it. (Ayer, 1971, 107) 
 
This is sometimes dubbed the ‘boo-hooray’ theory of ethics. Where realism must account for 
the metaphysical nature of alleged ‘moral properties’ present in the world, expressivism does 
not, rather it simply makes the case that certain facts or actions evoke certain emotions within 
individuals. Something that Blackburn hastens to add, however, is that a moral claim may not 
form a factual account of an event, but it does not, therefore, follow that it is devoid of truth 
conditions.  
 
There is no inference of the form ‘this attitude is expressed, so these remarks have no 
truth conditions’, but only ‘this attitude is expressed; if we see the remark as having no 
truth conditions the philosophy improves; so let us see the remark as expressive rather 




Furthermore, it does not matter if an utterance is descriptive as well as expressive if its 
distinctive meaning is expressive. Next, Blackburn introduces us to his take on projectivism,  
 
Suppose that we say we project an attitude or habit or other commitment which is not 
descriptive onto the world, when we speak and think as though there were a property of 
things which our sayings describe, which we can reason about, know about, be wrong 
about, and so on. (Blackburn, 1984, 170-171) 
 
In the context of moral language, let us say that I condemn Erwin Schrödinger for putting a 
real life cat in a real life box to test his theories about quantum super positioning. Were he to 
put his cat in a box, then by Blackburn’s account this is answered by my projecting the 
quality of ‘wrongness’ onto that action, rather than that action holding that quality as an 
objective property irrespective of my view. To the contrary, one might say that putting cats in 
boxes is wrong specifically because I think that it is wrong. However, as J.L. Mackie points 
out, this seems to imply that our ordinary use of moral predicates involves a pervasive error, 
because whilst we claim one thing, another is the case: I claim that putting cats in boxes is 
wrong, even though it is not (Mackie, 1977, 30-35). This alone reveals how expressivism can 
lead to an error-theoretic account of moral language, or that our language is somehow broken. 
It falls then to quasi-realism to account for why moral language is used in the way that it is, 
which Blackburn begins to explore in his sixth chapter, ‘Evaluations, Projections, and Quasi-
Realism’. According to Blackburn, there is no error being committed on my part when I 
accuse Schrödinger of doing something immoral with his cat. Blackburn’s projectivist 
account has three significant promises. 1) It has metaphysical and epistemological simplicity; 
projectivism offers an explanation for moral discourse that is not reliant on any complex 
metaphysical account(s), or any special epistemological faculties for knowing of them, and 
allows for a naturalistic account of reality that does not contradict its account of morality. 2) 
It is an explanation of the supervenience of moral qualities. (I will discuss this in a moment) 
3) It accounts for the intimate connection between moral belief, and motivation towards that 
belief (Blackburn, 1984, 183). This all sounds promising, provided that quasi-realism can 
actually deliver on what it promises.  
 
In the interest of clarity, I should briefly discuss the notion of supervenience. 
“Supervenience” is the name of a certain kind of relation between two sets of facts, which we 
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can call A-facts and B-facts. A-facts supervene upon B-facts if any change in the A-facts 
requires that there must have been a change in the B-facts. For example, it is sometimes 
asserted that facts about mental phenomena supervene upon facts about physical phenomena: 
if there is a difference between two sets of mental facts, then there must also be a difference 
between two corresponding sets of physical facts. No change at the mental level is possible 
unless there is a change at the physical level. Just how Blackburn thinks projectivism is at an 
advantage in explaining the supervenience of the moral facts on the non-moral facts is 
complicated, and I will return to this element of his argument later. In a language context, 
however, projectivism suggests that moral properties are directly related to our linguistic 
interactions with our perceptions of actions. For example, the action of putting a cat in a box I 
may describe as having the quality of ‘wrongness’. This is directly related to my linguistic 
utterance of ‘wrong’ being a projection of my perception of that action. In saying that putting 
a cat in an air tight box is ‘wrong’, I indicate that I understand the meaning of ‘wrong’ by 
whatever criteria I use to judge this action, and that I am projecting that property onto that 
action.  
 
Moral sentiments are by no means the only projections that people make; sentiments relating 
to aesthetic taste may work in a very similar way by this logic. For example, if I was to 
compare Beethoven’s Pastoral Symphony with, for example, the song ‘One Time’ by Justin 
Bieber, then I would judge Beethoven’s music to be of significantly higher quality in a wide 
variety of ways. For example, one way of judging the two songs would be to compare the 
level of emotional impact that the two convey to the listener. As the two are perceived by me, 
the Pastoral Symphony seems to take the listener on an emotional journey, venturing through 
joy, excitement and wonder in some places to profound tranquillity and serenity in others. In 
contrast, Bieber seems to completely ignore the emotions of his audience in favour of 
repeatedly telling them what he claims he is experiencing, which is utterly impossible for me 
to take seriously, let alone identify with. Simply put, Beethoven demonstrates a far more 
profound empathy with his audience, not to mention a much more sophisticated 
understanding of human emotion and artistic expression. However, it is only because my 
perception of what qualifies as ‘good music’ supervenes on these kinds of sentiments that I 
feel at all qualified to make linguistic utterances such as, “Beethoven’s music is better than 
Bieber’s”. This, of course, makes it questionable whether my perception of the two songs 




As stated earlier, this refers us back to the dilemma that expressivism faces when talking 
about subjective qualities in an objective manner. Why do I say that putting a cat in a box is 
wrong, ‘as if’ it was wrong no matter what I or anyone else thought, when in fact ‘wrong’ 
refers to my perception of the act, rather than an objective property of the act? What happens 
if I change my mind? What happens when I cease caring about the plight of cats and begin to 
see no problem with putting them in boxes? Is it still wrong then? One way we could answer 
this is by considering the following, “I believe that energy is equal to mass times the speed of 
light squared. I believe this to be a universal constant. I believe that one day; a scientist will 
validly prove this principle to be false.” Surely, at least one of these statements must be false. 
If one sincerely believes that something is true, one cannot believe it is possible to prove it 
false, any more than one could prove something true when it is in fact false. When it comes 
to things like ‘rules’, if one believes a rule to be overly susceptible to change, then one surely 
does not believe in the ‘ultimate correctness’ of that rule. I may change my mind with the 
acquisition of additional evidence, but that does not change the fact that originally, I did not 
foresee that I would. For instance, I accept the possibility that at some point in the future, 
someone may find evidence to doubt that E = mc². However, as of this moment, I do not 
believe that that will happen. Surely this is what it means to believe that something is 
ultimately ‘correct’ in virtue of fact.  
 
When dealing in quasi-realist moral discourse, however, we are working not with moral facts 
but with something else entirely. For example, for the majority of history, it was not generally 
held that women should have the right to vote18. Similarly, it was not held that a desk 
consisted of mostly empty space. However, with an increased understanding of the structure 
of atoms, it is a view that is now commonly held, just as increased considerations of women’s 
rights, at least partially, led to the suffragette’s movement. That a majority of history consists 
of not believing that women should have a vote, does not, and should not change the fact that 
I currently believe that they should, any more than it should change my belief that energy 
equals mass times the speed of light squared, when for most of history, nobody believed that. 
The difference, however, as the quasi-realist portrays it, is that whilst I assert that E = mc², 
and this is a universal constant, a fact, one that would be the case even if I did not believe it, 
there is something very different about when I seemingly assert that, ‘women should be 
                                                          
18 In fact, for a majority of human history, neither men nor women were allowed to vote, as most historical 
civilisations have not been democracies at all, and most of those that have been have limited democratic rights 
only to minority social elites. 
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allowed to vote’, ‘as if’ it were a reference to a fact of that same, scientific variety. In the 
latter case, that quasi-realist claims that my belief/attitude towards it is fundamental to its 
truth value. To a quasi-realist this is a very different kind of assertion, if indeed an assertion 
at all. Where fact meets truth is a contentious issue at the best of times in philosophy, but 
where expressivist moral utterance meets moral truth for the quasi-realist is even more so, 
and sure enough it meets opposition. The most notable objection to the quasi-realist project’s 





Chapter 6: The Frege-Geach Problem 
 
The Frege-Geach Problem is an issue related to expressivism in moral discourse and an issue 
which Simon Blackburn attempts to deal with in STW (1984), by developing a more 
sophisticated version of expressivism that he calls quasi-realism, which we began to look at 
in the previous chapter. In this chapter I will describe in detail what exactly the Frege-Geach 
Problem is, why it is seen as so problematic for expressivists and explore Blackburn’s 
responses to this problem.  
 
In its most basic form, the Frege-Geach Problem demonstrates a hole in the expressivist 
account of moral language, where expressivists are unable to account for how expressive 
utterances are able to function in unasserted contexts. It was famously proposed by Peter 
Geach who developed it from the works of Gottlob Frege in ‘Assertion’, Philosophical 
Review (1964) (Blackburn, 1984, 189). The Frege-Geach Problem is as follows: if 
expressivism is true, then moral claims, e.g. “stealing is wrong”, function as expressions of 
attitudes, similar to saying, “boo! stealing!”. In speaking like this, the speaker expresses their 
disapproval of stealing. However, there are some situations in which these same utterances 
appear to work differently, and it is this peculiarity that the Frege-Geach Problem focuses on. 
For example, imagine I was to say, “if stealing is wrong, then arresting a thief is right”, in 
other words I use the same expressive utterance as the antecedent of a conditional claim. 
However, in doing so, I reveal a significant problem. If we break the claim down and focus 
on the antecedent, “if stealing is wrong...” then we should notice that I am not actually 
asserting that stealing is wrong or right nor am I expressing any attitude whatsoever, 
condemnatory or otherwise. I am merely saying that if stealing is wrong, then arresting a thief 
is right. This is what is called an unasserted context. The expressivist has an account of the 
function of such expressions when they are asserted, (e.g. ‘Stealing is wrong’ = ‘boo! 
stealing!’), but does not have an account of how they can function in unasserted contexts like 
these. So there is a mismatch here. According to expressivists, moral judgements, e.g. 
“stealing is wrong”, express emotions, yet in conditionals, they do not, or at the very least if 
they do then we do not know how they work like we do with asserted contexts, and this 
mismatch is but one example of the Frege-Geach Problem. More broadly, the problem is 
defined by a general discontinuity associated with how moral judgements function on their 
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own compared to how they function in unasserted contexts. Conditionals are a useful 
example of this. For example, if we were to propose a simple modus ponens argument:  
 
1) if {stealing is wrong}, then arresting a thief is right 
2) {stealing is wrong} 
C)  therefore, arresting a thief is right 
 
...then we have a serious problem when we also claim that the moral judgement, “stealing is 
wrong”, is really an expression of an attitude. To help explain this dilemma, notice that I 
have placed the significant utterance in curly brackets {}. The problem is that the phrase 
within {} appears to hold two different meanings in (1) and (2), leading to a fallacy of 
equivocation. This is akin to the kind of problem encountered in arguments like: laws imply 
lawgivers, there are laws in nature, and therefore nature must have a lawgiver. The argument 
is fallacious, because a key term or phrase within that argument (in this case the use or 
meaning of ‘law’) is being used in an ambiguous way, in other words it holds one meaning in 
one part of the argument and a different meaning later on. Another example might be to say 
something like, nothing would be better than having world peace, a ham sandwich is better 
than nothing, and therefore a ham sandwich would be better than having world peace. To 
explain why this is so problematic in the Frege-Geach problem, when using inferences like 
modus ponens, it is important that all of the premises match up, and that meanings of words 
are not changed mid-way through the argument, otherwise we get exactly this kind of fallacy 
of equivocation. In (2), ‘stealing is wrong’ holds a different meaning to how it is used in (1) 
by simple virtue of the fact that in (1) it is a conditional proposition, conditional on whether 
or not it is the case that ‘stealing is wrong’, which (2) does not provide. (2) does not assert 
that ‘stealing is wrong’ is the case, it merely translates to ‘boo! stealing!’, which in (1) it 
does not, or at the very least not clearly so. This creates a discontinuity between the two 
utterances as they are used in the standard modus ponens argument.  
 
Another problem lies in how the argument can be interpreted as valid or invalid. In other 
words, there seems to be a problem with the truth aptitude of what lies within {}. In order for 
modus ponens to work as a valid argument, it is imperative that what lies within the brackets 
in premise (1) is the same as what lies in the brackets in premise (2). In a valid modus ponens 
argument, were we not to use an expressivist analysis but rather treat all premises as moral 
realists would have us do (i.e. ‘stealing is wrong’ is truth apt), it cannot on pain of logical 
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contradiction be false that arresting a thief is right if the first two premises are true. This is a 
good truth functional analysis of logical connectives (and, if-then etc.) However, if we do 
use an expressivist analysis and assume that ‘stealing is wrong’ = ‘boo! stealing!’ or 
something similar, then these logical connectives become immediately unusable, because on 
the expressivist account, (2) is not truth apt, and the status of (1) is unclear at best.  
 
Therefore, the expressivist must give an account of what is going on, or else their attempt to 
explain moral discourse is either incomplete or simply flawed. When I say, “if {stealing is 
wrong}...”, then no matter what content lies within the brackets, I am neither asserting nor 
expressing anything whatsoever. However, if the terminology is that of a realist, then there is 
clear, truth conditional content to work with, but if the terminology is that of an expressivist, 
then it is simply not clear what someone making such an utterance in a conditional is doing. 
One possible way an expressivist might try to analyse the utterance that I can suggest could 
be to look at premise (1) in its entirety and then claim that the holistic sentence comes across 
as an assertion regardless of the content of the brackets. If I were to literally say, “if {Boo! 
Stealing!}, then {Hurray! Arresting a thief!}”, this could still be taken as an assertion, for I 
am still communicating information about a state of mind that is conditional on another state 
of mind. However, this still makes premise (1) too different from premise (2) for modus 
ponens to properly function, in other words we are still left with the equivocation fallacy. In 
premise (2), “stealing is wrong”, is an expression of an emotion, not an assertion. If we care 
to translate the entire argument into an expressivist analysis, we might get something like 
this: 
 
1) if {Boo! Stealing!}, then [Hurray! Arresting a thief!] 
2) {Boo! Stealing!} 
C)  therefore, [Hurray! Arresting a thief!] 
 
Whilst at first glance this seems to be logically consistent, when we examine the semantics of 
this kind of propositional logic, it soon becomes apparent that it is not. When utilizing a 
conditional claim, the only official analysis we have of how this works in something like a 
modus ponens argument is a truth functional one, in which if and then should be understood 
as, “if it is the case that x, then it is the case that y”. The same should be understood from 
therefore. This demands semantic content that is truth apt. So now let us compare the two 
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rival content analyses, truth apt and expressivist, in modus ponens, where each contains an 
unasserted context in the antecedent of premise (1) in greater detail: 
 
- Truth Apt Content 
1) if it is the case that {stealing is wrong}, then it is the case that [arresting a thief is 
right] 
2) it is the case that {stealing is wrong} 
C)  therefore, it is the case that [arresting a thief is right] 
           Valid Argument 
 
- Expressivist Content 
1) If it is the case that {Boo! Stealing!}, then it is the case that [Hurray! Arresting a 
thief!] 
2) {Boo! Stealing!} 
C)  therefore, it is the case that [Hurray! Arresting a thief!] 
      Invalid Argument*---Whilst we may infer observationally that it is the case that 
{Boo! Stealing!}, as the speaker has expressed that emotion, we cannot infer this as part 
of a deductive, propositional argument unless (2) is overtly asserted, otherwise premise 
(2) is incompatible with the antecedent of premise (1). It is also difficult to tell whether ‘it 
is the case that {Boo! Stealing!}’, even makes sense as an assertion.  
 
It seems clear that expressivists and quasi-realists cannot escape the Frege-Geach problem 
through propositional logic, and it is for this reason that Simon Blackburn attempts to escape 
by instead attempting to construct a ‘logic of attitudes’. Blackburn conducts a thought 
experiment in STW (1984), which explains how he attempts to do this. It is not a great stretch 
to imagine having attitudes to one’s own attitudes. So, imagine that a language, which we call 
Eex, contains no evaluative predicates and contains the same ‘hooray’ (H!) and ‘boo’ (B!) 
operators as ordinary expressivism. It may then contain the following semantic structure in 
regard to moral attitudes: H! (|H! (Tottenham) | ; | H! (Arsenal) |), H! (|B! (lying) |;| B! 
(getting brother to lie)|). Here we see how in Eex one may endorse attitudes which, if they 
endorse Tottenham, also endorse Arsenal, such that to express that Tottenham is a good team 
is to do so for Arsenal. This is similar to an ordinary conditional. However, the difference is 
that Blackburn treats the conditional itself as expressing an emotional attitude of approving 
the conjunction of approval of Tottenham and approval of Arsenal. The equal and opposite is 
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done in condemning lying and also condemning getting one’s brother to lie, the example that 
Blackburn later uses (Blackburn, 1984, 193-195). Blackburn wants to compare Eex to the 
language of expressivists. Imagine then that when I argue that ‘it is because stealing is wrong 
that a thief should be arrested’, I am utilizing the language of Eex: H! (|B! (Stealing) | ; | H! 
(Arresting a Thief) |). As an expressivist, I am expressing my approval of a certain 
combination of attitudes, those being a disapproval of stealing and an approval of arresting a 
thief. (Blackburn, 1984, 193) 
 
In order to further explain the somewhat convoluted semantics of Eex, Blackburn provides a 
simple analogy. Say I project a negative attitude ‘boo’, (B!), onto the act of lying (L), so 
B!(L), and I also project this negative attitude onto the act of getting my brother to lie (BL), 
so B!(BL). These are first order attitudes; they are emotional reactions in response to an 
occurrence whether it be lying or getting one’s brother to lie. Blackburn then asks us to 
examine second order attitudes, emotional reactions to first order attitudes (Blackburn, 1984, 
195). For instance, I may approve of my own moral condemnation of stealing, lying or 
inflicting violence, or I may disapprove of my condoning those things. Whilst the latter may 
seem strange, it is important to recognise, for example, that I may follow a line of logical 
reasoning that leads me to conclude that violence against children is acceptable under certain 
circumstances, against my ‘gut instinct’. I may, however, avoid this, owing to the realisation 
that I cannot possibly approve of any line of reasoning that leads me to conclude that violence 
against children is acceptable. Blackburn later calls this kind of attitude ‘fundamental’ (I will 
discuss this further in my next chapter), and it is a significant component of Blackburn’s 
response to the Frege-Geach problem. For example, say I project a positive attitude ‘hurray’, 
(H!), onto my first order attitude towards lying, H!(B!(L)). Blackburn then asks us to 
examine the second order attitude towards a conjunction of first order attitudes, H!(B!(L) ^ 
B!(BL)). Here I approve of the conjunction of first order attitudes B!(L) my negative attitude 
towards lying and B!(BL) my negative attitude towards getting my brother to lie. Crucially, 
this kind of reasoning appears only to work under a truth functional analysis, particularly 
where the conjunction ‘^’ is concerned. In propositional logic, a conjunction is true if and 
only if both of its conjuncts are true: ‘A^B’ is true if and only if both ‘A’ is true and ‘B’ is 
true. Expressivist semantics must deal with this, because otherwise ‘A^B’ cannot be 
functional in the same way, because ‘A’ & ‘B’ are not truth apt; they are expressions of 
emotions. However, according to Blackburn, if I were to commit myself to B!(L) and to 




2) H!(B!(L) ^ B!(BL)) 
3) B!(BL) 
 
According to Blackburn, someone who makes commitments to (1) and (2), but fails to accept 
(3) is exhibiting a kind of inconsistency: 
 
Disapproval of lying, and approval of making (disapproval of getting little brother to 
lie), follow upon (disapproval of lying). Anyone holding this pair must hold the 
consequential disapproval: he is committed to disapproving of getting little brother to 
lie, for if he does not his attitudes clash. He has a fractured sensibility which cannot 
itself be an object of approval. The ‘cannot’ here follows not (as a realist explanation 
would have it) because such sensibility must be out of line with the moral facts it is 
trying to describe, but because such a sensibility cannot fulfil the practical purposes for 
which we evaluate things. (Blackburn, 1984, 195) 
 
How does this deal with the Frege-Geach problem? The original problem is that an 
expressivist analysis of moral language lacks a story about how moral claims function in 
unasserted contexts e.g. ‘if stealing is wrong, then arresting a thief is right’. Blackburn’s 
response is to avoid having to ‘correct’ the language of propositional logic and instead 
provide an alternative language, specifically for moral discourse, which mimics the function 
of modus ponens. In the quasi-realist language of modus ponens, Blackburn treats the 
conditional as itself expressing an attitude: approving of the conjunction of two disapproving 
attitudes. In doing so, Blackburn seems to provide a plausible account of how expressive 
utterances function by providing a non-truth functional, expressivist way of understanding 
this particular unasserted context. So if we return to our stealing dilemma, to reiterate, a 
realist may read the following argument as follows: 
 
- Realist Content 
1) if it is the case that {stealing is wrong}, then it is the case that [arresting a thief is 
right] 
2) it is the case that {stealing is wrong} 
C)  therefore, it is the case that [arresting a thief is right] 
           Valid Argument 
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If we listen to Blackburn, however, then a quasi-realist would read that same argument more 
like this: 
 
- Quasi-Realist Content 
1) B!(Stealing) 
2) H!(B!(Stealing) ^ H!(Arresting a thief)) 
C)  H!(Arresting a thief) 
     Valid Argument*---According to the context of Blackburn’s ‘logic of attitudes’ 
 
In the quasi-realist analysis, (2) effectively fulfils the equivalent role of a conditional. If we 
accept this analysis as functional, then the Frege-Geach problem ceases to apply to it. The 
semantic content of B!(Stealing) is the same in premise (1) as it is in (2), and there is no 




Chapter 7: Blackburn’s Logic of Attitudes 
 
As discussed in chapter six, one of the most famous arguments against expressivism is the 
Frege-Geach Problem, famously proposed by Peter Geach who again developed it from the 
works of Gottlob Frege (Blackburn, 1984, 189). To recap, it raises the following issue: does 
the meaning of the utterance “It is wrong to tell lies” differ when it is embedded in a 
conditional “If [it is wrong to tell lies], then it is wrong to get your brother to lie”, because if 
it does, then expressivism is inadequate as an account of moral discourse. Through modus 
ponens one should be able to deduce in the following manner: 1) It is wrong to tell lies 2) If 
[it is wrong to tell lies], then it is wrong to get your brother to lie 3) Therefore, it is wrong to 
get your brother to tell lies. The utterance of the italicized words in premise two are the same 
as those of premise one, yet in premise two, they are not asserted. It is the antecedent of a 
conditional and thus the introduction of a supposition. However, they nevertheless must mean 
the same thing if the rule of modus ponens is to work and to avoid a fallacy of equivocation. 
For example, one might argue that “He is working at the bank; if he is working at the bank, 
then he must have his feet in the river; so he must have his feet in the river”. If ‘bank’ in the 
first premise has a different meaning (e.g. a money bank) to the ‘bank’ used in the second 
premise, then the rule of modus ponens ceases to apply. According to Geach, the expressivist 
fails in the second statement in that they are asserting only the hypothetical premise and is 
expressing no moral position towards lying, condemnatory or otherwise. The expressivist 
cannot account for the meaning of moral language in an unasserted context. In the following 
chapter, I will go over how Blackburn develops quasi-realist semantics from dealing with 
these kinds of issues.  
 
Before we continue, let us recap again on how Blackburn counters this by conducting the Eex 
language thought experiment seen in chapter six. In the interest of clarity, I will abandon 
discussing Tottenham and Aresenal and focus the logic of attitudes directly on the lying 
brother thought experiment, using the following terminology: (H!) = Hurray!, (B!) = Boo!, 
(L) = Lying & (BL) = Getting little brother to lie. First, we project a positive attitude 
‘Hurray!’, (H!), onto a first order attitude towards lying: H!(B!(L)). Then we examine the 
second order attitude towards a conjunction of first order attitudes: H!(B!(L) ^ B!(BL)). So I 
approve of the conjunction of first order attitudes, that is B!(L) (my negative attitude towards 
lying), and B!(BL) (my negative attitude towards getting my brother to lie). However, 
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according to Blackburn, if I were to commit myself to B!(L) and to H!(B!(L) ^ B!(BL)), then 
I ought to also accept B!(BL): 
 
1) B!(L) 
2) H!(B!(L) ^ B!(BL)) 
3) B!(BL) 
 
According to Blackburn, someone who makes commitments to (1) and (2) but fails to accept 
(3) is exhibiting a kind of inconsistency (see chapter six). 
 
Now let us take this line of thought further. Consider the following thought experiment19: 
Blackburn asks us to imagine we have something called a moral sensibility (M), (M) being 
the set of all our moral attitudes and sentiments. Now suppose I had a markedly different 
upbringing to the one that I had and that (M) is thus markedly different. For instance, (M) 
includes the sentiment (S), that is, for example, an approval of kicking cats. Now let us apply 
a kind of Blackburn[esque] interpretation of this: H! (S) ∈ (M). In other words, approving of 
holding the sentiment (S) is a member of (M), appealing to set notation; I approve of having 
the moral sentiment (S) in which I approve of kicking cats, and this approval is a member (or 
element) of (M) my moral sensibility. Intuitively, we want to say that this is in some way 
problematic. One means of doing this, for example, might be to argue that this makes moral 
language too relativistic. As quasi-realists we would do well to be very careful of saying that 
all moral utterances are reduced to is blind attitudes alone or imply that all moral opinions are 
equally valid no matter what the content might be, otherwise any notion we might have about 
moral fallibility, moral improvement or moral truth conditions become very difficult to 
account for without simply appealing to error theory. Whilst this may not be a problem for 
some expressivists, for quasi-realists like Blackburn this is a serious problem if they want to 
gain entitlement to give the moral realist in the room everything they want to hear and more 
about the qualitative content of moral arguments.  
 
Another issue is a more a general worry we may have about endorsing specific moral 
sentiments by virtue of endorsing more general moral principles. In other words, views about 
general moral principles may not necessarily lead to desirable conclusions or views about 
                                                          
19 The following thought experiment is, I believe, a unique interpretation of Blackburn’s position on moral 
improvement, as I see it, but which introduces notation of my own in an attempt to better understand it.  
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specific matters. I may approve of an overall moral principle and yet still render myself with 
a serious problem when I act in accordance with that maxim in every conceivable situation 
e.g. if I kissed my girlfriend in public in Dubai, because I believe in the general principle of 
liberty in regards to public displays of affection and utterly fail to consider the specific 
cultural context of the setting in which I do so. I may agree with a moral principle and yet 
disagree with certain conclusions of it when applied to certain situations. This seems to raise 
the question of whether I disapprove of kicking cats because I have the general moral 
principle about kicking living creatures that I have, or, whether I disapprove of the act in 
virtue of my perception of the fact itself. Do I hold specific views about specific situations? 
Or general views based on general principles?  
 
Returning to the matter at hand, however, what we want is to provide logical reasons for 
rejecting this kind of coupling of first and second order attitudes and accepting their negation, 
(¬ H! (S)); that is to say, ‘it is not the case that I approve of sentiment (S) in which I approve 
of kicking cats’. This brings us to Blackburn’s interesting account of moral improvement, 
which I will attempt to explain in the following way20. In constructing an account in which 
we project second order attitudes onto first order attitudes, and so on and so forth, we can, in 
theory, account for the changing nature of moral sentiments. So once again, say I have a 
moral sentiment (S), but I admire an alternative sentiment, let us call this (S+) more than (S). 




|H!(ⱷ|,|B!(|H!(ⱷ)|)| ^ |H!(|B!(ⱷ)|)| 
 I approve of ⱷ 
 I disapprove of approving of ⱷ 
 ...and...I approve of disapproving of ⱷ 
 
I then transition to (S+), which contains: 
|B!(ⱷ)|,|B!(|H!(ⱷ)|)| ^ |H!(|B!(ⱷ)|)| 
 I disapprove of ⱷ 
 I disapprove of approving of ⱷ 
                                                          
20 Once again, I reiterate, the following analysis is not a direct quotation of Blackburn’s words, but rather my 
interpretation of what appears to be going on.  
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 ...and...I approve of disapproving of ⱷ 
 
As we can see, in (S) we are left in a state of second order disapproval [towards first order 
approval of ⱷ], and unfulfilled approval of the opposite, a disapproval of ⱷ. By contrast, in 
(S+) that second order approval [towards first order disapproval of ⱷ], is fulfilled.  
 
Now, how does this help us with (M)? To recap: 
H! (S) ∈ (M).  
(S) = H! |H!(kicking cats) | 
 
We now have a discontinuity between this second order disapproval of ⱷ, and the state of 
approval over (S) expressed in (M). This facilitates a similar transition to what we will for the 
moment call (M+): 
 
(M+) = H! (||we have sentiments S+||;|H!(B! (kicking cats))|)  
 
In other words, I approve of having the sentiment S+ in which I approve of my disapproval 
of kicking cats. Now let us say that this results in the following attitude: [H! (ⱷ > ¬ ⱷ)], i.e. ‘I 
approve of ⱷ being greater than ¬ ⱷ’. We may then gloss the two following propositions 
regarding its improvement... (I): (S+) is an improvement over (S), (I+): H! (S+  > S). So in (I) 
we have a preliminary recognition of (S+) being greater than (S), and then in (I+) we have a 
fulfilled approval towards this recognition.  
 
So to translate in more laymen’s terms what is going on here, as I understand it, we can 
account for the changes in people’s moral sensibilities by accounting for how individuals 
continuously analyse their own attitudes and have second order attitudes towards them. When 
we admire moral sentiments that we perceive as somehow superior to our own, we inevitably 
seek to assimilate those sentiments into our own in order to adapt our overall moral 
sensibilities to additional ways of perceiving things.  For example, I may at one point believe 
that it is wrong to kick people, but it is ok to kick animals. I may then begin to admire an 
alternative way of looking at things. For example, I may recognise that if the reason for my 
condemnation of kicking people is because they experience pain, then that should not 
52 
 
discount animals from a similar moral sentiment, as animals are also capable of experiencing 
pain, and so on and so forth.  
 
Now that we have that understanding, let us return to Blackburn’s words more directly. 
Suppose once again that I hold a moral sensibility (M) where (M) is the set of all my moral 
attitudes and sentiments. Now take (M*) to be the best possible set of attitudes, that is, “the 
limiting set which would result from taking all possible opportunities for improvement of 
attitude” (Blackburn, 1984, 198). Now let us say that, ‘m is a commitment expressing an 
attitude U’ (Blackburn, 1984, 198). Blackburn makes the following claim that:  
 
m is true = U is a member of M* 
 
So according to Blackburn, a quasi-realist can even lay claim to a notion of moral truth. 
This of course raises a very big question. How do we know that there is such a thing as a 
unique best possible set of attitudes and what exactly does that mean? Naturally, Blackburn 
attempts to explain this by conducting another thought experiment. Of two literary critics, 
one prefers Ovid, and the other prefers Tacitus. Over time, the one who prefers Ovid 
improves his literary sensibility into M*o, and the one who prefers Tacitus improves his into 
M*t. Taking this into account, can we then accept the following three sentences 
simultaneously? 21 
 
(1) M*o →  it is true that Ovid is better than Tacitus. 
(2) M*t  →  it is true that Tacitus is better than Ovid. 
(3) There is no possible improvement on either M*o or M*t. 
(Blackburn, 1984, 200) 
   
Blackburn insists that we cannot. If we begin to accept that a case, such as M*o, with this 
kind of structure applies, then we must also accept that the same is true of M*t, because it has 
the exact same structure (Blackburn, 1984, 200). To help Blackburn out here, let us consider 
the following. During my English Literature under graduate years in Aberdeen, I read far 
more, and in greater depth, of Shakespeare’s plays than I did of Marlowe’s. I thus have a 
                                                          
21 It is not entirely clear why Blackburn uses (M*), the same notation he uses for moral improvement, for what 
seems to be a reference to aesthetic improvement/comparison between Ovid and Tacitus; nevertheless, I am 
using the notation that is given.  
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superior scope of Shakespeare’s literary style than I do of Marlowe’s, and that being the case 
might lazily conclude that Shakespeare is a better playwright than Marlowe. However, I 
would not approve of such a conclusion, because I believe that had I as great a knowledge of 
Marlowe’s work as I do of Shakespeare’s, then I may well be making the equal and opposite 
argument for Marlowe. The only way I could say with any real confidence that Shakespeare 
is a better playwright is if I had an idealised knowledge of both their literary styles, which I 
do not have. So, in the absence of idealised knowledge of this or any real life matter 
warranting artistic or moral judgement, how are we to determine a unique best possible set of 
attitudes?  
 
One possible solution to this issue is what Blackburn’s describes as branching (Blackburn, 
1984, 199). Branching is the process by which a moral sensibility breaks down as it confronts 
a wide variety of situations and matters and alternative ways of perceiving them; the 
illustration Blackburn uses is literally of something resembling a tree that branches out in 
many different directions, yet all originate from the same trunk. This is analogous to how 
subjective attitudes develop, growing from a singular point yet ending up in many different 
places. However, what criteria do we have to deem one branch in any way superior to 
another? Blackburn’s proposed solution is to attempt to look more closely at the concepts of 
obligation and permissibility (Blackburn, 1984, 201). Suppose we symbolise a moral 
sentiment that ‘it is obligatory to A’ by OA, and another that ‘it is permissible to avoid A’ by 
P ¬A. Logically, OA and P ¬A are in direct conflict. Now imagine the following: 
 
1) M*1 → OA 
2) M*2 → P ¬A 
3) There is no possible improvement on either M*1 or M*2. 
 
This is consistent with the aforementioned tree structure. However: 
 
4) (3) implies that it is permissible to hold M*2; this implies it is permissible to hold that 
¬ A; this implies that ¬ A is permissible. 
5) If (4), then any view such as M*1 which implies the reverse is wrong, and ipso facto 
capable of improvement.  




Here we have a means of transcending the tree structure, and Blackburn goes on to claim that 
if we have a prima facie case of (1), (2) and (3), then it is likely to be the obligation that is the 
more threatened: 
 
(4’) (3) implies that it is permissible to hold M*1; this implies that it is permissible to hold 
that OA; this implies that OA. 
(Blackburn, 1984, 202) 
 
The problem that (4’) faces that (4) does not, is that we need an entirely different reduction 
principle to conclude that (A) is obligatory by virtue of being permissible. In other words, 
Blackburn claims that we can escape the inconsistency by seeing that M*1 at least, is capable 
of improvement (Blackburn, 1984, 202). So, to apply this to our Shakespeare vs. Marlowe 
case; if I was to hold that it was some kind of moral or aesthetic obligation or duty to prefer 
Shakespeare to Marlowe, rather than to simply claim that it is permissible to do so, then it 
would likely be the obligation that would require some form of improvement.  
 
In conclusion, Blackburn not only attempts to circumvent the Frege-Geach problem by 
constructing a logic of attitudes, but he also develops this logic to an extent that he claims 
entitlement to an account of moral improvement and even moral truth, and this is achievable, 
such is the claim, through a combination of some ingenious semantics and set notation. By 
doing so, the aim is to gain entitlement to give moral realists all that they want to hear about 
the nature of moral language, but it is important to maintain for a quasi-realist that doing this 
is sufficiently different from simply being a particularly abstract form of moral realism. To 
do this, quasi-realism must make no compromises on what it claims about the ultimate nature 
of moral qualities and to maintain that they are accountable through projectivism, moral 
psychology and philosophy of language rather than by metaphysics or epistemology. 
Moreover, the quasi-realist must maintain a position of non-realism. This is an important 
distinction that must be made in order to separate the quasi-realist from the realist. This is 




Chapter 8: Andy Egan 
 
Having now explained the basics of Simon Blackburn’s quasi-realism, we can now start to 
look at the objections to quasi-realism that start to occur as the project continues. In 
Blackburn’s 1998 work Ruling Passions, Blackburn discusses his account of moral fallibility, 
an integral component of the wider notion of moral improvement, which is vital to the quasi-
realist project as discussed in my previous chapter. In 2007, Andy Egan challenged this 
account of moral fallibility in his paper ‘Quasi-Realism & Fundamental Moral Error’. In the 
following chapter, I will discuss Blackburn’s account of moral fallibility in Ruling Passions, 
Egan’s challenge and finally Blackburn’s response to Egan in 2009. I will then discuss the 
reasons why I have concluded that while Blackburn’s response to Egan does ‘in principle’ 
refute Egan’s argument, there nevertheless remains the problem of asymmetry between the 
way the subject views others and the way they view themselves. This line of thought will also 
bring us to a further, far more recent paper written by Nicholas Smyth called ‘Resolute 
Expressivism’, which does appear to engage with this dilemma, which I will discuss in 
chapter nine. The task then is to ascertain whether Smyth’s account is in any way compatible 
with Blackburn’s, or whether we need to look at the two as wholly different.   
 
According to Blackburn in Ruling Passions, there are always particular values that the moral 
subject admires (e.g. information, sensitivity, maturity, imagination, coherence etc), and the 
subject knows that other people may have particular difficulties with these values (Blackburn, 
1998, 318). For example, there is being immature, insensitive, incoherent, overly predictable, 
ignorant etc. The subject also knows that they themselves are not exempt from having these 
difficulties. This is what Blackburn calls ‘Moral Fallibility’; it is the acknowledgement that 
the subject is imperfect.  
 
Of course there is no problem thinking that other people may be mistaken, or are 
indeed mistaken. Anyone thinking that kicking babies for fun is OK is mistaken. 
The real problem comes with thinking of myself (or of us or our tradition) that I 
may be mistaken. How can I make sense of fears of my own fallibility? 
(Blackburn, 1998, 318) 
 
So to reiterate what Blackburn is saying here, it is not whether or not the subject is really 
mistaken about their moral belief that is of concern per se; to suppose such would surely be a 
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realist claim after all. Rather, it is whether or not the subject can make sense of having a 
moral belief whilst believing that that same belief is possibly false. Enter Andy Egan, who 
claims that this is indeed problematic. According to Egan, we ought to be able to logically 
say something like ‘I believe that kicking babies is wrong, but I could be wrong about that’ 
(Egan, 2007, 12). However, quasi-realism does not appear to deliver this. This is because 
certain strongly held beliefs, such as ‘kicking babies is wrong’, are what Egan calls ‘stable’:  
 
Call a belief stable just in case no change that the believer would endorse as an 
improvement would lead them to abandon it. Call a belief unstable just in case it’s 
not stable; that is, just in case it would be abandoned after some change that the 
believer would endorse as an improvement. (Egan, 2007, 12) 
 
In other words, a stable moral belief is one that is entrenched in such as way that no change in 
any of the subject’s beliefs that led to a change in that belief, and which the subject would 
endorse as an improvement, could ever be seen by the subject as a moral improvement. For 
example, even if I had a change of heart about the morality of causing unnecessary harm 
(which is possible but unlikely), I still could not ever see that as a moral improvement if it 
leads me to conclude that kicking a cat (or any other sentient being) is not wrong. I 
fundamentally believe that kicking cats is wrong; therefore, any change in my morality that 
leads me to a conclusion that contradicts this is something I will always see as a moral 
regression rather than a moral improvement. Interestingly, this raises an important question. 
Is the subject prior to the change in values the one endorsing (or refusing to endorse) that 
change, or is it the subject after the change doing so? The answer to this question would go a 
long way to explaining the meaning of Egan’s notion of ‘stability’ here. Egan does not 
explicitly clarify which one this is, but I suspect that it is the subject prior to the change that 
refuses to accept an endorsement of any change which leads to the contradiction of a 
fundamental moral conviction.   
 
While at first this may not seem like a difficult issue, it becomes so when we consider this in 
the context of a certain kind of quasi-realist subject. To explain why this is such a problem 
for the quasi-realist, suppose that the subject’s moral sensibility can be demonstrated to work 
something like a ‘web of attitudes’, this being the best way to explain the process that I have 
at this stage. The web of attitudes, as I have chosen to call it, looks not unlike a food web in 




 Suppose the subject has attitude P (P: Boo! (homosexuality)) i.e. the subject 
disapproves of homosexual behaviour and/or people.  
 Now suppose that the subject later develops attitude P’ (P’: Boo! (P)) i.e. the subject 
disapproves of their previous negative attitude towards homosexuality.  
 
These kinds of attitudes towards attitudes are how Blackburn proposes to solve the problem 
of moral fallibility22. To explain how this works it greater detail, we can picture the 
following: 
 
 Suppose at t1 (time index 1), the subject has the following group within their web of 
attitudes: 
 
t1 {P, Q, R, S, T, U...} where P is (P: Boo!  (Homosexuality)), and Q, R & S etc are 
all other attitudes that are linked to P, e.g. Q is (Q: Hurray!  (Perceived natural order)) 
and R is (R: Hurray! (Traditional gender roles)). 
 
 Now suppose at t2, the subject’s attitudes have changed: 
 
t2 {P, Q, ~R, S, T, U...} where R has changed to ~R, where ~R is (~R: Boo! (R)).  
 
So suppose here that the subject’s perspective on gender roles and gender stereotypes 
has changed. This leads to a kind of quasi-realist inconsistency with P, not unlike 
disapproving of lying, yet approving of conjunctions involving getting one’s brother 
to lie (see ‘chapters five and six’).  
 
 As a result, we then progress to t3, where the subject views themselves as having 
made a moral improvement: 
t3 {~P, Q, ~R, S, T, U...} where ~P is equivalent to P’ i.e. the realisation of moral 
fallibility and need for moral improvement, (~P: Boo! (P)) 
 
                                                          
22 This is very similar from the first and second order attitudes described in chapter seven. 
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There may even be a t4 {~P, ~Q, ~R, S, ~T, U...}, where a change in R has resulted in 
a similar change to several of the attitudes that are linked to R, including P, within the 
web of attitudes. 
 
Egan’s challenge is simply that there may be instances where P’ is not present, and this 
creates a dangerous asymmetry between the way the subject views themselves and the way 
they view others. In order for there to be room for improvement, that is to be morally fallible, 
we must allow for the subject to believe that it is possible they are mistaken on some level. 
This is problematic, because for the subject to believe they may be mistaken, their belief must 
be unstable. Egan claims that for the subject to believe they are fundamentally in error, they 
need some moral view that is both stable and yet believe that are possibly mistaken, and that 
this is impossible under Blackburn’s account of moral error (Egan, 2007, 212). According to 
Egan, for a moral belief to be stable, it must be impervious to ‘improvable’ change (i.e. 
change the subject would approve of). For a moral belief to be fallible, the belief must be 
subject to improving change that could lead the subject to abandon it. On Blackburn’s 
account, Egan claims, a moral belief may be fallible if and only if it is not stable, so for the 
subject to believe they could be fundamentally in error, the subject must have some moral 
view that is stable yet not stable. In other words, a reflective quasi-realist cannot believe 
themselves to be fundamentally morally mistaken. This is clearly unacceptable (Egan, 2007, 
212). The subject ought to be able to logically think, ‘I believe that x, but I may be wrong 
about that’, in any and/or all cases. However, where x is stable, i.e. ‘I believe that x, because 
x is fundamental, and I could never view any change that leads me to ~x as an improvement’, 
here, according to Egan, it cannot make sense to believe that x may be mistaken. What we 
need is to be able to logically say, ‘I believe in x, and I could never endorse any change that 
leads me to ~x as an improvement, but I may be wrong about x.’ According to Egan, quasi-
realism fails to deliver this. 
 
 So let us look once again at t1 within this context, where K is something far less 
controversial and fundamental like (K: Boo! (Kicking Cats)), and where Q, R & S etc 
are all the attitudes that are linked to K: 
 
t1 {K, Q, R, S, T, U...} Call K stable; there is no way to change K that the subject 




 Now suppose that, as above, at t2 some attitude that is linked to K, e.g. T, has 
changed: 
 
t2 {K, Q, R, S, ~T, U...} Where T is e.g. (T: Boo! (Causing Pain)), and ~T is (~T: 
Boo! (T)) [This is not inconceivable, there are instances where causing pain may be 
seen as morally acceptable e.g. if it is an inescapable result of a necessary medical 
treatment]. 
 
 This could, in theory, then lead the subject to t3: 
 
t3 {~K, Q, R, S, ~T, U...} where ~K is (~K: Boo! (K)) i.e. the subject disapproves of 
their previous negative attitude towards kicking cats.  
 
The problem is that whilst this change in K uses the exact same mechanism as the previous 
change in P, it is unlikely that any sane individual would see any change in T as a moral 
improvement if it leads to a change in K, K being a fundamental belief. In the first instance, 
the subject comes to a conclusion of ~P i.e. they abandon their previous negative attitude 
towards homosexuality, and this is seen as a moral improvement by the subject. In the second 
instance, the exact same mechanism is used, but in this case it leads not to a moral 
improvement but rather a moral regression, where the subject abandons their fundamental 
attitude that kicking cats is immoral. This seems to demonstrate quite clearly that Blackburn’s 
mechanism for moral fallibility does not work in all instances. So either we need an account 
where T is allowed to change without changing K, or an account where any change in T that 
results in a change in K is seen as regression rather than improvement. The problem is that 
Blackburn’s mechanism for moral improvement ought to be universally applicable, but as we 
can see, this does not appear to be the case.   
 
Egan’s argument seems to be that a subject can believe that a given belief of theirs might be 
mistaken if and only if it is not stable. A belief is stable if the subject cannot bring themselves 
to accept that it could be false, whether it is in fact false or not. The dangerous asymmetry 
comes from the fact that it should at least be possible, according to Egan, to think that one 
may be mistaken in any and/or all case(s). If Egan is correct, however, then quasi-realism 
does not allow for this possibility in all cases, specifically where stable beliefs are concerned. 
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It is more likely that the subject will define their own beliefs as stable than those of other 
people, having a higher degree of confidence in their own attitudes. This is because their own 
attitudes inevitably influence their perceptions of both themselves and others. Put simply, it is 
easy to find room for improvement in the beliefs of others, because one has an outsider’s 
perspective. It is much harder to form such evaluative judgements about one’s own beliefs, 
because the apparatus of one’s evaluative judgements rely on the very beliefs that one is 
trying to evaluate. Herein lays the dangerous asymmetry. In other words, Egan highlights the 
issue that a moral belief, whether truthful or mistaken, may be impervious to improvable 
change and thus be defined as stable under a quasi-realist context.  
 
Blackburn attempts to refute Egan by clarifying the notion of stable & unstable moral beliefs. 
According to Blackburn, Egan targets the following; (M) if something is entrenched in my 
outlook, in such a way that nothing I could recognise as an improvement would undermine it, 
then it is true (Blackburn, 2009, 204). Egan targets (M) in the belief that (M) is something 
that Blackburn asserts. In fact, Blackburn agrees with Egan on this point, but (M) is not a 
claim Blackburn ever wanted to defend. Blackburn claims that (M) is clearly false. I can 
believe kicking babies for my amusement is morally permissible, & I can fail to recognise 
any improvements to my values that would undermine this belief. Instead Blackburn asserts: 
(I) if something is entrenched in my outlook, in such a way that nothing that is an 
improvement would undermine it, then it is true. According to Blackburn, Egan’s attack on 
(M) leaves (I) unscathed. (I) does not have the same problematic asymmetry as (M), because 
(I) is a claim for which the impersonal holds the same logical structure: (I’) if something is 
entrenched in anyone’s outlook, in such a way that nothing that is an improvement would 
undermine it, then it is true. (Blackburn, 2009, 204) 
 
While this does in principle refute Egan’s argument, Blackburn later concedes that there 
nevertheless exists an asymmetry between the subject and others, but in a relatively benign 
way, and this seems to be largely to do with the notion of bias (Blackburn, 2009, 213). It is 
impossible for the subject to make an evaluative judgement on their own beliefs and opinions 
without employing those same personal beliefs and opinions to do so. However, it is in 
principle possible to make evaluative judgements about the views of others without 
employing the others’ views, thereby giving an outsider’s perspective. One must concede, 
however, that any such evaluative judgement is, like any other given by the subject, not free 
from the bias of their own personal opinions. In other words, in real life, there is no such 
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thing as an unbiased opinion. There is also another major issue with Blackburn’s response. 
Egan writes of what the subject would see as an improvement. Blackburn in (I) writes of 
what is an improvement. Is Blackburn entitled to do this? It does seem as though Blackburn 
has a tendency to slide between ‘quasi’ and ‘realist’ at times. As I mentioned at the end of 
chapter seven, it is very important for the quasi-realist not to stray into becoming merely an 
abstract form of moral realism, but rather be a non-realist account of moral language that 
happens to deliver all that moral realism does with the exception of saying that moral terms 
refer to moral qualities which are real (ontologically/metaphysically). I also mentioned that 
this danger will return to haunt the quasi-realist in section two when we attempt to pin down 
the quasi-realist on what exactly the quasi of quasi-realism means, and how exactly it is 
different from moral realism.  
 
Blackburn’s response may successfully refute Egan’s challenge in the sense that the 
dangerous asymmetry appears, at first glance, to have been dealt with, but only if he is 
entitled to make the move that we have just raised questions about. However, doing so 
depends on what exactly Blackburn means when he says ‘nothing that is an improvement’. If 
we look at this response in the realm of moral realism, it is clearly successful; a belief that 
kicking cats is morally permissible is objectively wrong; therefore, the fact that a person may 
hold to it merely means that they are fundamentally in error. However, quasi-realists 
specifically want to avoid making those kinds of commitments. On the other hand, if we look 
at the response from a non-realist/expressivist perspective, then it becomes more difficult; if a 
person is not asserting anything about the metaphysical nature of morality but rather are 
expressing their approval of kicking cats, where others are expressing their disapproval, can 




Chapter 9: A Defence by Nicholas Smyth 
 
In the last chapter, we discussed how Egan’s challenge of moral fallibility and Blackburn’s 
subsequent response seems to put pressure of the successfulness of the quasi-realist project. 
The whole purpose of quasi-realism after all is to give moral realists everything that they are 
seeking without having to make any metaphysical commitments. Therefore, it is absolutely 
vital that the quasi-realist has a clear definition of what is meant by moral utterances like ‘ⱷ is 
wrong’, and how the content of those utterances function semantically. Enter the resolute 
expressivist. In Nicholas Smyth’s 2014 paper, ‘Resolute Expressivism’, we are introduced to 
a unique approach to this conundrum; Smyth attempts to defend quasi-realism by painting it 
as a pragmatist method rather than any kind of metaphysical one. This is particularly 
intriguing, because it brings us squarely back to the method of using pure philosophy of 
language as our primary tool in explaining how the quasi-realist project may be successful.  
 
Over the years, we have witnessed the rise of a metaethical cottage industry 
devoted to claiming that expressivist analyses cannot capture some allegedly 
important feature of moral language. In this paper, I show how Simon 
Blackburn’s pragmatist method enables him to respond decisively to many of 
these objections. In doing so, I hope to call into question some prevailing 
assumptions about the linguistic phenomena that a metaethical theory should be 
expected to capture. (Smyth, 2014, Abstract) 
 
After giving us first a recap on Blackburn’s position and then Egan’s challenge, Smyth 
begins by stating that it is actually rather difficult to imagine the kind of stable belief that is 
immune to ‘improvable’ change that Egan cites as a problem (Smyth, 2014, 7). One possible 
candidate is what Smyth refers to as (E). The content of (E) is that if an action would cause 
human suffering, then this is a consideration that counts against performing that action; this 
is hard to disagree with. This indeed seems a worthy candidate for the kind of stable belief 
that Egan needs for his objection to stand. It is difficult to imagine any change in our beliefs 
that would lead us to abandon the idea that human suffering is an important thing to consider 
in any applied ethical issue that we could then endorse as a moral improvement. However, 
Smyth confronts this by offering the following thought experiment. How would we actually 
respond, as moralizers committed to (E), to an encounter with someone who could not in 
any way be brought to accept it? (Smyth, 2014, 8) This does indeed occur in the case of 
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sociopathy. In such cases, we usually declare the views of any opponents of (E) false by fiat. 
However, this is surely a response that we would do well to preclude, as this is dangerous; 
this seems very much like the kind of metaphysical commitment that we want to avoid: 
 
The opponent of Quasi-Realism may try to strengthen (E) to preclude this kind of 
response, but this move will almost certainly render the attitude in question non-stable. 
The more content we pack into the relevant ethical attitude, the more likely it is that 
some other attitude will bear on its possible revision. The less content we pack into it, 
the more likely we are to judge that a person who could not accept it is fundamentally 
morally defective. (Smyth, 2014, 8) 
 
It seems then to be the case that Smyth, like Blackburn himself, agrees with Egan in that a 
stable moral belief (such as ‘kicking cats is wrong’) may be immune to the kind of change 
that the subject could endorse as a moral improvement. Unlike Blackburn, however, 
Smyth’s response to this is not to attempt to refute Egan’s argument by claiming that Egan 
has missed his mark by targeting (M) instead of (I), but rather to pull the rug from under 
Egan’s feet by claiming that the problem of having stable moral beliefs is not really any 
problem at all: 
 
I may quite naturally think that I am immune from error. Now, this account of an 
ordinary response to fundamental disagreement is undeniably speculative, and I do not 
claim that this would be every person’s response to fundamental disagreement. 
However, it would be unpardonably smug of Egan to claim sole right to armchair 
sociology. He, like many other critics of expressivism, freely speculates about “our 
ordinary ways of thinking about morality,” yet it is not at all obvious that his claims 
about ordinary practise hold up once we appreciate how profound fundamental 
disagreement actually is. (Smyth, 2014, 9) 
 
Smyth’s approach is to consider normative moral discourse and how we use moral language 
pragmatically. Egan’s challenge depends on the premise that we ought to be able to logically 
say things like ‘I believe that kicking cats is wrong, but I could be wrong about that’. Quasi-
realism he says does not deliver this; you cannot be wrong about something that is an 
expression of your own disapproval. I disapprove of kicking cats; I cannot be wrong about 
that. Any change in my moral sensibility that leads me to approve of kicking cats is 
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something I would always consider a regression rather than an improvement, because my 
disapproval of kicking cats is fundamental. According to Smyth, none of this is problematic. 
His response is that the descriptive claim at the heart of Egan’s challenge is false. That 
quasi-realism does not deliver a means of logically saying things like ‘kicking cats is wrong, 
but I could be wrong about that’ is irrelevant, because that is not something quasi-realism 
needs to deliver. This is where the resolute expressivist digs their heels in. They have, in a 
‘pragmatist spirit’, explored what actually occurs in the alleged counter example and 
examined our moral practice from the perspective of a participant. In other words, Smyth 
attempts to overturn an underlying presupposition that ordinary discourse is robustly realist, 
and that ‘the revisionist in the room is usually the expressivist’ (Smyth, 2014, 10). 
 
So let us look again at the original dilemma by using a more pragmatic approach. I claim 
that ‘ⱷ is wrong’. Whether or not ⱷ is wrong is up for debate, though the quasi-realist may 
well claim that the ‘assertion’ that ⱷ is wrong is really a projection of their disapproval of ⱷ, 
which would be a member of the unique, best possible set of attitudes (i.e. is also true in a 
quasi-realist sense). This may be the case were the quasi-realist’s belief that ‘ⱷ is wrong’ 
stable i.e. no change in their moral sensibility that led them to abandon this belief could ever 
be endorsed as an improvement. However, not knowing the unique, best possible set of 
attitudes, the quasi-realist is not exempt from moral fallibility. In fact, I would even argue 
that it is necessary for any sensible notion of moral improvement. We then raise Egan’s 
challenge. How can the quasi-realist make sense of the fact that they are morally fallible 
given that their belief that ‘ⱷ is wrong’ is stable? Smyth’s response is simply to say that they 
cannot, but that is fine, because they do not need to. In other words, we indeed conclude that 
the quasi-realist, in the case of stable moral beliefs at least, may be immune to the belief that 
they are fundamentally in error.  
 
To test this, let us provide ⱷ with some content e.g. ⱷ [homosexuality]. Suppose then we have 
a homophobic quasi-realist who fundamentally believes that homosexuality is wrong. No 
change in their belief system that led them to approve of homosexuality could ever be 
endorsed as an improvement by them; their belief that it is wrong is so entrenched. Many 
examples of this kind of homophobia do indeed exist, and interestingly when we look at these 
cases in real life, rarely does such an individual consider that they might be wrong about 
homosexuality. The question we are interested in, however, is whether such an individual 
needs to consider this in order to have such a view. The answer would clearly appear to be 
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no. Many people recognise that they are morally fallible in a ‘we are all sinners’ kind of way, 
but that does not stop many people having beliefs that are so entrenched in a fundamental 
way that they would never consider that they are wrong about them. So both philosophically, 




Chapter 10: Initial Conclusions 
 
As mentioned in my introduction, the aim of the thesis is to eventually arrive at a non-realist 
theory of moral language which can account for realist sounding discourse without 
compromising its own non-realism, and which avoids the Frege-Geach problem. I began by 
examining the case against moral realism and for non-realism, some of the alternative 
non/anti-realist approaches, including error theory, and I have decided to look at expressivism 
in particular. In doing so, we have explored non-cognitivism and projectivism, the Frege-
Geach problem and Blackburn’s quasi-realism. Thus far in the thesis, it looks as though 
quasi-realism is the most promising of the non-realist approaches. Quasi-realism aims to give 
any realist in the room all that they want to hear about the nature of moral language, but it 
does this in a different way to what traditional moral realism offers. Rather than claiming that 
moral adjectives refer to moral qualities present in the world and in the moral acts 
themselves, quasi-realism claims that moral adjectives are projections which function very 
similarly to standard, fact oriented assertions, and this is accountable via a special logic of 
attitudes. Using this logic, Blackburn then goes some stages further, offering a quasi-realist 
account of moral fallibility, moral improvement and even moral truth.  
 
We then looked at some of the problems with quasi-realism, in particular those brought up by 
Andy Egan, who targets Blackburn’s claim of being able to account for moral fallibility. This 
is a particularly critical target, as without this account his ability to account for moral 
improvement and moral truth also fall apart by chain reaction. Here we see Nicholas Smyth 
enter the debate with his own take on quasi-realism, and who claims a form of resolute 
expressivism is a solution to Egan’s problem. He does this by challenging the assumption that 
a quasi-realist must be able to recognise a seemingly stable moral attitude as fallible. I am 
inclined to agree with this approach, because it seems entirely plausible that someone with an 
attitude sufficiently entrenched may be disinclined, or even completely unable to seriously 
contemplate the fallibility of that attitude. However, my worry here is that this approach may 
or may not be consistent with Blackburn’s own views on quasi-realism, and it is these kinds 
of uncertainty that will in section two prove detrimental to quasi-realism’s survival. 
 
Moreover, it is not entirely clear whether resolute expressivism is really quasi-realism. In the 
question of what exactly the quasi of quasi-realism means, it is clear that under resolute 
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expressivism, quasi-realism is not merely an abstract form of moral realism, but rather a form 
of hyper sophisticated and projectivist expressivism. However, in order for quasi-realism to 
escape the Frege-Geach problem, we need to look at Blackburn’s account and his logic of 
attitudes, and this includes his account of attitude inconsistency and quasi-logical moral truth 
conditions. It is these elements in particular in which it is unclear whether or not they are 
consistent with resolute expressivism, because these elements seem to push quasi-realism 
beyond simple expressivism and towards something else, and it is frustratingly ambiguous 
what that thing ultimately is.  
 
So in conclusion thus far, quasi-realism does look very promising on paper, and from what 
we have looked at thus far it certainly looks like a good account of non-realist discourse. 
However, we leave section one with some worries, namely as to what exactly quasi-realism 
means, how is it sufficiently different from realism, and in what ways does it offer a realist 
what they want without compromising its own non-realism. These are questions I will tackle 
in my next section, where we begin to look at more problems for quasi-realism and what 
ultimately compels us to leave quasi-realism in search of another semantic explanation of 
moral discourse: moral fictionalism. However, it is important that we understand as much as 
we possibly can about quasi-realism here in section one, because as we will begin to see by 
the end of my next section, moral fictionalism is lacking in some important areas (more on 
that in section two), and there are key elements which we have looked at from quasi-realism 
which might be able to augment it significantly. It is the task then of section three to marry 
the two accounts together and prove that they are not quite as mutually exclusive as one 






Section 2: Quasi-Realism vs. Moral 
Fictionalism 
 
Chapter 1: Quasi-Realism & Moral Fictionalism 
 
In section one, ‘Non-Realism, Expressivism and Quasi-Realism’, I have outlined the aim of 
the thesis, some of the useful terminology used and have outlined some of the different non-
realist approaches to moral language, the nuances of expressivism and projectivism and have 
gone into considerable detail about The Frege-Geach problem and Simon Blackburn’s quasi-
realism, as well as some objections to it. The aim of the thesis, as I have explained at the 
beginning of section one, is to eventually end up with a functional theory of non-realist moral 
language. Thus far, quasi-realism looks like the best possible candidate for this. Blackburn 
claims to be able to provide the realist in the room with all of the answers that they want to 
hear and to provide the non/anti-realist with reassurance that they can preserve a healthy 
scepticism of moral ontology (Blackburn, 1984, 183). Blackburn also claims to be able to 
handle the Frege-Geach problem. Quasi-realism also has an interesting story to tell us about 
not only how a non-realist uses moral language in the way that they do, but more importantly 
why, as quasi-realism portrays itself as a form of projectivism (speakers project attitudes of 
approval and disapproval onto the world and objects in it via moral sentences). In other 
words, this story tells us that we use moral language to communicate attitudes of approval 
and disapproval (expressivism), which on the face of it at least sounds perfectly plausible. 
Blackburn even claims entitlement to being able to talk about notions of moral improvement 
and moral truth, again without committing to any moral ontology in the process.  He does this 
by creating a logic of attitudes which is meant to mimic the conventional logic of fact 
asserting propositions, but containing content not of assertions but of expressions. We then 
investigated the objections of Andy Egan and a valiant rebuttal and defence of Blackburn by 
Nicholas Smyth. In conclusion, we leave section one with a fairly positive outlook on quasi-
realism as being the primary candidate for a functional non-realist account of moral language. 
 
Now, in section two, the thesis begins to change direction as we begin to look into those 
objections to Blackburn that are not so easily thwarted. I shall begin with two chapters 
devoted to the objections of G.F. Schueler. Schueler argues that Blackburn’s solution to the 
Frege-Geach problem is ultimately flawed and that there is a larger problem also with the 
69 
 
kind of embedding that Blackburn does in that solution. Whilst Blackburn appears to 
successfully counter argue many of Schueler’s points in Essays in Quasi-Realism, he also 
exposes some potentially fatal flaws in quasi-realism that I have noticed, which I will outline 
in chapter three. The main issue in that regard, as I will explain therein, is that Blackburn’s 
solution to the Frege-Geach problem hinges on his ability to demonstrate that attitudes 
themselves can be inconsistent. It is not at all clear that he has done this. The example I use 
is of a monk who takes an oath of celibacy. The monk makes a personal moral commitment 
to refrain from sexual activity, but this does nothing in regards to his attitudes or his 
intentions towards the existence of sexual activity in general. This also helps us to understand 
the difference between attitudes and intentions towards actions. Attitudes can be hypocritical 
easily enough, but I argue that it is only actions which can be inconsistent in the way that 
Blackburn describes. This can also be applied to Blackburn’s favourite example of 
inconsistency which involves approving of getting one’s brother to lie. It may not be 
inconsistent to compel one’s brother to lie on one’s behalf if the reason for the original 
disapproving attitude towards lying comes from a personal commitment to refrain from lying 
rather than a universal commitment towards a world free from liars. It is only inconsistent to 
hold an approving attitude towards the brother lying on one’s behalf if one is committed to 
act only in accordance with that attitude and towards a world free from liars. A mere attitude, 
whether approving or disapproving, is insufficient to render this kind of strong inconsistency. 
All of this and more will be outlined in more detail in chapter three.  
 
In chapter four, I will examine the objections of Van Roojen, who also attempts to undermine 
Blackburn’s ability to demonstrate attitude inconsistency. Unlike Schueler, Van Roojen 
focuses his assault on Blackburn’s account of moral fallibility. This is a particularly 
vulnerable pillar in the quasi-realist project, because without a functioning account of how 
quasi-realists can be morally fallible, there cannot be a functioning account of moral 
improvement, and without that there cannot be a functioning account of moral truth. Without 
a functioning account of moral truth, Blackburn cannot gain entitlement to give everything 
the moral realists want to hear. Therefore, any fault line in Blackburn’s account of moral 
fallibility may prove calamitous by virtue of chain reaction throughout the rest of the project 
and its objectives. Luckily for Blackburn, much like Andy Egan, Van Roojen also inspires a 
defence by Nicholas Smyth. This defence does appear to pay off, but as I will discuss in that 
chapter, it is once again not clear that it is really quasi-realism that Smyth is defending so 




A similar theme arises in chapter five, where I will examine the battle between Blackburn and 
David Lewis. Much like Nicholas Smyth, David Lewis attempts to ‘rescue’ Blackburn. 
However, unlike Smyth’s response to Van Roojen and Andy Egan, wherein Smyth 
champions what he calls the ‘resolute expressivist’, David Lewis’s strategy involves shifting 
quasi-realism away from expressivism altogether and towards something called ‘moral 
fictionalism’, noting that many of the moves that Blackburn makes are remarkably similar to 
those that moral fictionalists make. Blackburn has a very interesting counter to this idea, 
however, which involves using Lewis’s own argumentative strategy against him. Lewis 
claims that to separate the quasi from the realist, the quasi-realist must outline things which 
the realist claims which the quasi-realist does not. In response, Blackburn claims that to 
separate the quasi-realist from the fictionalist, there are some things which the fictionalist 
claims which the quasi-realist does not. I believe that Blackburn does successfully 
demonstrate that quasi-realism is not the same thing as moral fictionalism. However, therein 
lies another problem for Blackburn.  
 
Returning to my example of the monk and the oath of celibacy, it is not at all clear that 
Blackburn can demonstrate attitude inconsistency in the strong way that he needs. This has 
two potentially calamitous results for the quasi-realist. First of all, it means that the solution 
to the Frege-Geach problem becomes much more suspect, as explained in chapter three in my 
examination of the objections of G.F. Schueler. Second, it makes Blackburn’s account of 
moral fallibility, which we will discuss in chapter four in my examination of Van Roojen, 
similarly suspect. This is particularly worrying for the quasi-realist, as it may cause a chain 
reaction splintering the entire project, and as I will explain in chapter five, I believe it is this 
tendency to depend upon multiple layers of accounts which are so linked together that makes 
quasi-realism particularly vulnerable. The other problem that I believe quasi-realism suffers 
from, which I will also explain in chapter five is its refusal to accept any kind of comparison 
with moral fictionalism, which appears to naturally avoid many of the problems that quasi-
realism faces and does not have any problem with ‘biting the bullet’ on certain difficult 
questions which quasi-realists incur so much cost to circumvent. In contrast to quasi-realism, 
moral fictionalism is not in the habit of pandering to moral realists or providing elaborate 
explanations about quasi moral truth(s); in that regard it is a non-realist account of moral 




This then leads me to a dramatic shift in the thesis where I begin to heed the advice of David 
Lewis and abandon quasi-realist semantics in favour of moral fictionalism, wherein I outline 
most of the nuances of moral fictionalism as described and championed by Richard Joyce 
throughout chapters six and seven. In these chapters I will explain what fictionalism is, the 
advantages it has over quasi-realism, as well as useful terminology and concepts such as the 
tacit operator, pretence assertion as well as the difference between hermeneutic and 
revolutionary fictionalism. Then, throughout the remainder of section two, I will examine 
some of the notable objections to fictionalism and the problem of fictional discourse in 
chapter eight, and the objections of Jonas Olson and his alternative account of 
‘conservationism’ in chapter nine.  
 
In chapter nine, however, there arise some objections to Joycean moral fictionalism that lead 
me to defend it in a way similar to what Smyth does in regards to objections to quasi-realism. 
It is at this point that I begin to describe an alternative version of Joycean moral fictionalism 
which I later in chapter ten call ‘expressive fictionalism’. This is owing to another 
observation that what fictionalism excels at in its simple and effective approach to moral 
semantics is also its biggest weakness. Why, the reader may ask, if we are turning to 
fictionalism, were we so preoccupied with quasi-realism to begin with? The answer to this is 
simple. What fictionalism lacks, which quasi-realism excels at, is in telling a convincing story 
about why we use moral language in a realist sounding manner if we are not talking as 
realists do. Expressivism has a simple enough answer to that question, but as I have spent half 
a thesis discussing, in even its most sophisticated versions (i.e. quasi-realism), it is ultimately 
very vulnerable to numerous problems including Frege-Geach and others on a semantic level, 
which fictionalist semantics appears to naturally avoid. On a pragmatic level, however, most 
or none of these issues seem to apply. This then leads me to what I hope is a unique solution 
to all of these problems. Why not simply combine fictionalist semantics with a form of 
pragmatic expressivism? As I will explain in chapter nine, I believe this successfully takes 
care of the problems outlined by Olson. The task then is to actually build this kind of theory, 
which will be what I will be attempting to do in my third and final section.  
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Chapter 2: G.F. Schueler 
 
In G.F. Schueler’s article “Modus Ponens and Moral Realism”, Schueler begins by presenting 
the debate between moral realism and anti-realism and explains that what he will focus on is 
the anti-realist positions of expressivism and projectivism (Schueler, 1988, 492). Thus, like 
Simon Blackburn, the debate is a linguistic one rather than a metaphysical or ontological one. 
In other words, we are less concerned here with the existence of objective ‘moral facts’ or 
‘moral properties’ than we are with the semantic and syntactic meaning of moral sentences. 
However, Schueler holds reservations about Blackburn’s account of ‘indirect contexts’, 
which include cases of embedding like those we saw in section one, claiming that 
Blackburn’s account is incomplete, defective and that nothing similar could possibly succeed 
(Schueler, 1988, 492). To provide some context to these issues, he quotes Blackburn directly, 
“Nobody denies that the surface phenomena of language-the fact that we use moral predicates 
and apply truth or falsity to the judgments we make when we use them---pose a problem for 
projectivism” (Blackburn quoted in Schueler, 1988, 492). In other words, it seems strange to 
talk about morality in terms of what is right and wrong, in a seemingly realist manner, when 
really it is an expression of our disapproval of certain behaviours i.e. the expression of an 
attitude. As Blackburn explains in Spreading the Word: Groundings in the Philosophy of 
Language, this issue inspires the quasi-realist project, which aims to explain why we use 
seemingly truth conditional moral sentences in the absence of truth conditional moral content 
(Blackburn, 1984, 170-171). As demonstrated by the Frege-Geach problem (see section one 
chapter six), one of the major difficulties for quasi-realism is the embedding of sentences in 
indirect or unasserted contexts. For both Geach and Schueler, the modus ponens case reveals 
a particular problem for embedding in general.  
 
Schueler’s apparent difficulty with Blackburn’s solution to the Frege-Geach problem is that it 
appears to treat modus ponens in a different way than what its logical form allows; in other 
words the problem lies in how we interpret modus ponens as a logical argument designed for 
a specific form of logic, or as a one that can be adapted into more unconventional uses.  
According to Schueler, if showing that an inference is modus ponens involves taking it ‘as 
the realist picture’ has it, then it cannot be explained in any other terms (Schueler, 1988, 495). 
Either the use of modus ponens is a valid one, or it is not, and that demands the use of certain 
truth conditions. If logical validity means that it is impossible for the conclusion to be false if 
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its premises are true, then those reluctant to apply truth and falsity to the premises of a 
syllogism will have to admit that the inference is invalid. Furthermore, Schueler seems to 
take issue with Blackburn’s use of terms like ‘commitments’, in that it is not immediately 
clear what Blackburn is talking about. According to Schueler, it throws doubt on the quasi 
aspect of quasi-realism in that either Blackburn is committing to a moral truth, in which case 
he is a realist, or he is ‘committing’ to something different, in which case he is an anti-realist 
(Schueler, 1988, 495). 
 
Blackburn has counter argued that none of these arguments are correct, but does concede that 
his work is far from complete and is certainly worthy of some degree of recalibration. In 
Essays in Quasi-Realism, Chapter 10: ‘Attitudes and Contents’, Blackburn addresses these 
concerns. For example, Blackburn claims that it is not as much of a given what it is for an 
argument to have the logical form of modus ponens as Schueler would have us believe 
(Blackburn, 1993, 182-183). Compare its form in propositional logic: “P, P→Q: Q” with a 
more applied form: “P→Q is the commitment of one who attributes a high probability to Q 
conditional upon P”. Which of the two better reflects the rule of modus ponens? If we focus 
on one at the expense of the other, then it immediately becomes controversial whether 
language includes any logical inferences when applied in real life. However, if we accept 
them both, then modus ponens becomes compatible with numerous explanations of the 
semantics of its components (Blackburn, 1993, 182-183). Blackburn also addresses 
Schueler’s concerns about commitments by explaining that the objective or subjective format 
of a commitment may vary. For example, the commitment that a Republican succeeded 
Carter is different from, say, the commitment to go for a jog once a week. I would add that 
the latter is wholly mind dependent on making the decision to go for a jog. In the context of 
meta-ethics, we are focused primarily on this latter form of commitment, and this is where 
the quasi aspect of quasi-realism can be found.  
 
As explained in STW, the key to Blackburn’s defence is to show that attitudes may be 
consistent or inconsistent with each other. For example, where one holds a negative attitude 
towards lying, as well as the positive attitude towards the conjunction of negative attitudes 
towards lying and getting one’s brother to lie, then one must also, according to Blackburn, 
hold the negative attitude towards getting one’s brother to lie (Blackburn, 1984, 189). If they 
do not, then their sensibility is ‘fractured’ in the sense that they cannot logically fulfil any 
practical aims from these conflicting attitudes. I would add that it is not logically impossible 
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to both want to win a competition and want to lose it; in fact, such conflicting attitudes are 
common. However, one cannot perform a deliberate act with the intention of both winning 
and losing; the agent must make a choice. This clarification is not recognised in STW, 
however, because Blackburn neglects to clarify what kind of practical aims are made 
unattainable by a conflict of attitudes. This encourages Schueler to challenge Blackburn on 
the notion that such a situation is an example of a logical mistake, rather than it being a moral 
failing on their part. If, however, there is only a moral error, not a logical one, then 
Blackburn’s analysis of modus ponens has failed: he cannot explain why we logically ought 
to accept the conclusion if we accept the premises. I will return to this important point later. 
 
Blackburn’s continued defence in ‘Attitudes and Contents’, against Schueler’s objections 
concern, as Blackburn puts it, Schueler “attacking the detail of my treatment” (Blackburn, 
1993, 184). The ‘treatment’ is Blackburn’s quasi-realist explanation of moral discourse. This 
involves differentiating between two methodological approaches within quasi-realism itself: 
what Blackburn calls fast and slow track (Blackburn, 1993, 183). Fast track quasi-realism 
involves earning the right for the truth predicate to be applied to moral sentences and then 
recognising that once this is established as legitimate then this frees the quasi-realist to 
legitimately talk about other seemingly realist things (e.g. moral truths), despite actually 
meaning attitudes towards certain things (e.g. behaviours or other attitudes that we either 
approve or disapprove of). This is similar to Blackburn’s methodology in STW. Slow track 
quasi-realism is far more meticulous. Rather than seeking to earn the right to a truth predicate 
in a single move, slow track quasi-realism involves demonstrating the acceptability of various 
kinds of apparent realist discourse in stages. This involves devoting energy to showing how 
sentences taking the form of expressions of attitudes, like ‘Stealing: Boo!’, may function in a 
way similar to antecedents of conditionals, and therefore as premises of valid, logical 
arguments. The purpose of this distinction seems to be to portray Schueler as attacking fast 
track quasi-realism rather than the more meticulous slow track version, as slow track quasi-
realism involves steps which Schueler does not touch upon in his arguments. This sees 
Blackburn begin the convoluted task of constructing a specific logic of attitudes, the aim of 
which is to mirror the logic of proposition-asserting sentences.  
 
The first step of this involves assimilating attitudes into the kind of logical relations between 
imperatives and norms. This involves imagining various scenarios within possible worlds 
(not entirely unlike modal logic semantics). Norms may be satisfied, and imperatives may be 
75 
 
obeyed. The question is whether two different norms may be satisfied in the same possible 
world. For example, if we use Blackburn’s ‘Hurray!’ and ‘Boo!’ operators once again, I may 
hold H!(p) and B!(p), in other words I hold both positive and negative attitudes towards p, 
and thereby express that ‘p’ is a goal, and ‘~p’ is also a goal. If B!(p), then an ideal possible 
world is one in which ‘~p’ is the case, where p does not exist or occur. If H!(p), then an ideal 
possible world is one in which ‘p’ is the case, where p does exist or occur. Thus, the H!(p) 
and B!(p) may be inconsistent, as there is no possible ideal world in which p both exists 
and/or occurs, and does not exist and/or occur. In other words, the attitudes ‘contravolit’ each 
other, as is the term coined by R.M. Hare. Where Schueler challenges the notion of attitudes 
being inconsistent in this way, Blackburn does not. He also makes a distinction between 
desires and wishes (Blackburn, 1993, 203). Wishes are not directly related to action, but 
rather they are mental states, in which a person may hold a positive attitude towards 
something but has no intention of making that thing a reality. Desires, on the other hand, are 
linked to intention, where the agent has the goal of making their desire a reality. To explain 
this, I would put forward the following example: imagine you visit a friend’s house, and they 
let you play one of their computer games, which you instantly fall in love with. It is an 
extremely rare game which is no longer sold in any stores, and you do not know of anyone 
who sells it on eBay. Because they are your friend, they let you borrow that game, with the 
understanding that you will return it in one week. After a week and a half of overzealous 
gaming, you realise that your friend has completely forgotten that you borrowed it, as they 
have not asked for it back yet. You wish to keep the game, but you also do not wish for your 
friend to remember that you have it, to get annoyed, fall out with you over it, and to not be 
your friend anymore. These two conflicting wishes may coexist in your mind with no 
inconsistency whatsoever. However, they will stress you out a great deal, because you also 
realise that ultimately a decision must be made. This game has a security key as part of its 
program which prevents you from copying it to your hard drive, and your friend is not the 
sharing type, and as a result you cannot both keep it and return it. There is no action you can 
take in which you can keep the game and see it returned to your friend. Therefore, you must 
choose whether your desire to keep the game is worth the risk of losing your friend.  
 
According to Blackburn, this kind of logic also applies to beliefs. You may be open to the 
possibility of inconsistent things, but you cannot hold active beliefs about them, otherwise 
this will result in an inconsistent world view (Blackburn, 1993, 215). You may be open to the 
possibility that Elvis is still alive, and you may be open to the possibility to he is not, but you 
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cannot believe that Elvis is both alive and dead at the same time. The purpose of both beliefs 
and desires is to guide one’s actions; I will return to this later on in this section. If you believe 
that Elvis is alive, and you want to get his autograph, then you may well choose to seek him 
out. However, you will discover that finding him will be extremely difficult, given that he has 
been dead for over three decades. What is worse is if you want to get Elvis’s autograph, 
despite knowing that he is already dead. In such a situation, you can only wish that you could 
get it; you cannot desire/intend to get it. 
 
If this logic holds, then Blackburn has demonstrated that attitudes may be consistent or 
inconsistent with one another, and if this is true, then it goes part of the way towards 
providing another layer of defence against the Frege-Geach problem. It means that Blackburn 
can counter the problem of modus ponens in unasserted contexts by demonstrating that 
conflicting desires may result in inconsistent aims. Whilst it may be logically consistent, 
albeit morally suspect, to hold a negative attitude towards lying and hold a positive attitude 
towards getting one’s brother to lie, it is more problematic to disapprove of lying and approve 
of sensibilities that conjoin disapproval of lying with disapproval of getting one’s brother to 
lie, as well as approving of getting one’s brother to lie (Blackburn, 1984, 189). Here we see a 
potential inconsistency within all the attitudes involved in the modus ponens case. A directly 
asserted inconsistency based on propositional modus ponens is not necessary to demonstrate 
how this is the case, nor would it work as the Frege-Geach problem so eloquently shows. 
Furthermore, Blackburn shows how holding both such desires is incompatible with any 
logical action one could take to satisfy both desires simultaneously. He does this by asking us 
to imagine a possible world in which there is a best possible action taken to fulfil both 
desires. If there is a desire that there be no lies, ‘B!(Lying)’, then the best possible world is 
one in which lying does not occur ‘~Lying’, but if we approve of getting our brother to lie 
‘H!(Brother lying)’, then the best possible world is one in which lying does occur. There is no 
possible world in which lying both occurs and does not occur. Therefore, the desire to get 
one’s brother to lie, whilst desiring that there be no lies, is practically inconsistent and results 





Chapter 3: Desires, Wishes and Intentions 
 
Blackburn’s defence hinges on a sense of ‘must’ in the context of desires being 
‘inconsistent’. If desires merely conflict, but are not logically inconsistent, then there is no 
logical force which Blackburn can use to infer that in a case of a) disapproving of lying and 
b) approving of sensibilities that conjoin disapproval of lying with disapproval getting one’s 
brother to lie, one ‘must’ accept c) disapproving of getting one’s brother to lie. The individual 
who gets their brother to lie, according to Schueler, may be guilty of a moral failing, but is 
not guilty of a logical one. Thus far, I have attempted to explain Blackburn’s defence in the 
sense that I understand it, that being that whilst ‘wishes’ may conflict with no inconsistency, 
‘desires’ necessarily ‘must’ conflict for there to be a fractured sensibility like Blackburn 
describes. I have also explained Blackburn’s concept of desires being related to action, in a 
similar way to intentions. However, Blackburn does not talk about intentions, but desires, and 
one of my objections is that when Blackburn talks about desires, it seems suspiciously like he 
is really talking about intentions. If we examine Blackburn’s argument within the context of 
intention to act, then as far as I can tell it holds up. It does not seem logically consistent to 
intend to win a competition whilst simultaneously intending to lose it. It also does not seem 
logically consistent to intend to seek out Elvis to get his autograph whilst believing that he is 
already dead. It appears that Blackburn is attempting to find a link between positive and/or 
negative mental states and motivation for action and using ‘desires’ as this link. However, I 
argue that it is debatable whether desires really are sufficiently different from wishes.  
 
Whilst I can have a deep emotional longing for Elvis’s autograph, which if he was alive 
would give me more than enough motivation to seek him out, that kind of motivation is not 
necessarily enough to generate any action on my part. In order for it to make sense for me to 
seek out Elvis, I also need to believe that Elvis is alive. Otherwise, I would be deliberately 
embarking on a hopeless quest. However, my belief that Elvis is dead does not change the 
fact that I have a positive attitude towards the notion of getting Elvis’s autograph. Similarly, I 
can have a positive attitude towards keeping my friend’s computer game and have a positive 
attitude towards keeping my friend. This is not problematic. It is only problematic when I 
attempt to act in accordance with either of those attitudes. If keeping my friend is dependent 
on my returning the game, then I cannot keep both the game and my friend. This raises the 
question of whether it is truly the attitudes that are incompatible or whether it is really the 
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actions that are acted in accordance with those attitudes that are incompatible. Blackburn 
clearly sees that such actions are incompatible and attempts to link them to attitudes in order 
to show how attitudes may themselves be incompatible. However, it is not clear that 
separating desires from wishes proves that desires are necessarily linked to action. The notion 
of incompatible beliefs, intentions and attitudes, however, may prove useful to Blackburn in 
this case. Referring back to my Elvis thought experiment, merely wanting Elvis’s autograph 
is not enough to produce action; belief is an essential component of motivation for action. As 
such, belief may be the important link that Blackburn is looking for. Unfortunately, this may 
not be enough to save the notion that desires can be inconsistent in the quasi-logical sense 
that he needs in order to successfully provide a quasi-realist account of embedding and 
related linguistic phenomena. 
 
The central question throughout this chapter is, “what kind of mental state do we need for 
there to be a logical inconsistency here?” It is not controversial that attitudes can in many 
ways be hypocritical, but are they inconsistent? If we evaluate this in the context of wishes, 
these being mental states surrounding particular actions with no intention of making those 
actions transpire, then no, there does not appear to be a logical inconsistency so much as a 
moral failing. According to Blackburn, it becomes inconsistent when they are desires with the 
intention of action. However, he never specifies this, but merely separates desires from 
wishes and tells us that there is a link between desires and actions. He does this by using his 
logic of attitudes. There is no possible world in which lying both occurs and does not occur; 
therefore, it is illogical to desire and intend to act towards an ideal world that cannot logically 
exist. However, I would like to examine this somewhat deeper. 
 
It is not explicitly addressed, in Blackburn or Schueler, what the reasons are for the 
individual having a negative attitude towards telling lies or specifically what form that takes. 
If the individual holds a negative attitude towards all lying, no matter what form it takes, then 
of course such a desire is incompatible with the intention of getting one’s little brother to tell 
lies; B!(all lying) and H!(no lying) is not compatible with H! (lying), that is, if there is 
intention to act upon both these attitudes. If you have a negative attitude towards the 
existence of lying and a positive attitude towards a possible world in which lying does not 
exist, then it is surely inconsistent to act in accordance with a world in which lying takes 
place. Once again, however, the motivation of the individual who gets their little brother to 
tell lies is not dependent on this. Such an individual may not have a negative attitude towards 
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the existence of lying, but rather to being a liar. For example, a monk or a nun may take an 
oath of celibacy for the rest of their natural lives. To this end, they have a strong negative 
attitude to the notion of having sex. For that matter, they may also have a strong positive 
attitude toward that notion, but for the sake of their oath, they make a ‘moral’ choice to act 
only in accordance with the first desire, it being incompatible with actions taken towards the 
second. However, this is not to say that monks or nuns necessarily have a negative attitude 
towards the existence of sex, nor are they in the habit of acting with the intention of creating 
a world in which sex does not occur. They are happy to allow others to have sex but do not 
intend to take part themselves. Similarly, an individual might have reasons for not wanting to 
tell lies, but is not against others lying or lying taking place. Such an individual would have 
no problem getting one’s little brother to tell the lies for them, and that would not be 
inconsistent with any desires on their part. I believe that this might prove problematic for 
Blackburn’s defence; it is unclear what the precise content of the attitude is. Is it disapproving 
of lying in general? Or is it disapproving of being a liar? There appears to be a significant 
logical difference between mental states along the lines of ‘would that there were no lying’, 
which appears to have a wish like quality, vs. ‘I will not lie’, which appears to be a much 
stronger commitment to desire forming the basis for intended action. This could be 
represented via a Venn diagram scenario in which the subject does not object to the circle in 
which lying occurs but strongly objects to being placed within that circle.  
 
My larger objection, however, concerns whether various different attitudes can be practically 
inconsistent with one another in the relatively strong way that Blackburn needs. I suggest that 
only attitudes closely related to producing action can. In an action related spectrum, with 
wishes on one end and intentions on the other, the questions become, ‘Where do desires go?’ 
‘Where does moral approval go?’ ‘What sort of approval is moral approval?’ It seems that 
Blackburn wants to paint desires as significantly towards the intentions end of this spectrum, 
with moral approval being strongly linked to action. To Blackburn the purpose of moral 
approval is to guide action; we use moral sensibilities to outline particular rules or axioms by 
which we ‘ought’ to behave (see section one chapter seven). However, I would clarify this 
point by differentiating between personal moral commitments and general moral attitudes and 
suggest that only personal moral commitments can be inconsistent in the way that Blackburn 
wants. For example, I may express my moral disapproval of lying in general, but that does 
not logically force me prevent myself from getting my brother to lie for me. Unless I have an 
intention to act in accordance with an idealised, non-lying world, then there is nothing 
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stopping me from getting my brother to lie regardless of any moral qualms I may have about 
it. Indeed, it is surely a common occurrence to hold moral attitudes towards behaviours where 
we have no intention to act upon them. I may not be proud of getting my brother to lie, as I 
know that I have committed the kind of moral failing that Schueler is talking about, but that 
does not necessarily mean that I have committed a logical inconsistency. It is only if I have 
made a personal commitment to act only in accordance with a world in which lying does not 
take place that I ‘must’ avoid getting my brother to lie. Merely disapproving of lying in 
general is not sufficient to incur this kind of logical force. This also goes both ways, as shown 
by my monk example. A monk who takes an oath of celibacy makes a personal commitment 
not to engage in sexual activity, and so it is logically inconsistent to act in such a way that 
would satisfy both their sexual desire and their oath of celibacy. The sexual desire in and of 
itself, however, may not be incompatible with their oath, as they have no intention of acting 
upon such desire. For there to be a logical inconsistency between (a- disapproval of lying and 
b- approving of conjoining disapproval of lying with disapproval of getting one’s brother to 
lie) and (c- approving of getting one’s brother to lie), as Blackburn wants, Blackburn needs to 
show that disapproval and approval carry with them the intention to act in accordance with 




Chapter 4: Van Roojen 
 
In Nicholas Smyth’s 2014 paper ‘Resolute Expressivism’, Smyth cites the argument of Mark 
Van Roojen in his 1996 paper “Expressivism and Irrationality”, in which he claims that 
Blackburn’s quasi-realist account of moral fallibility is unacceptably revisionary (so 
different from the original idea that it becomes lost). Like G.F. Schueler, who claims that 
Blackburn’s solution conflates logical and pragmatic inconsistency (Schueler, 1988, 492), 
Van Roojen draws on what he calls our “pretheoretical judgments about logical implication” 
(Van Roojen, 1996, 331). In this chapter, I will briefly explain the stages of Van Roojen’s 
argument and then discuss Smyth’s response in ‘Resolute Expressivism’. Just as is case with 
Andy Egan, Van Roojen strikes at the heart of Blackburn’s account of moral improvement 
according to which in order to arrive at an account of moral truth, we need an account of 
moral fallibility (which in turn depends upon the possibility that attitudes can be 
inconsistent). Moral improvement depends upon the subject’s ability to recognise 
inconsistencies within the ‘web of attitudes’ (see section one chapter seven) that form their 
moral sensibility.  
 
Van Roojen begins by distinguishing between genuine contradictions and mere pragmatic 
ones, likening the problem to a Moorean paradox, in which sentences like “It is raining but I 
don’t believe that it’s raining” are greatly puzzling. Van Roojen asks us to consider the 
following two sentences: 
 
(VR1) “Stealing is wrong, and stealing is not wrong” 
(VR2) “I don’t disapprove of stealing, and stealing is wrong” 
 
Blackburn does not make a sharp distinction between the two, and it is fairly straightforward 
why. In a quasi-realist sense, sentences like “stealing is wrong” and “I disapprove of stealing” 
are not too different; the only real difference is that as the quasi-realist sees it, the former 
involves a projection of a disapproving attitude rather than merely asserting that they have 
that attitude. Therefore, a quasi-realist will no doubt see little significant difference between 
(VR1) and (VR2); both are examples of attitudes which contradict each other. However, Van 
Roojen claims that the two sentences are intuitively different to the extent that any account 




To explain implications between expressions of attitude, Blackburn must invoke a 
notion of inconsistency strong enough to rule non-cognitive attitudes inconsistent, 
hence extending the notion of inconsistency beyond cases where the truth of one 
content rules out the truth of another. But the stronger notion invoked rules logically 
consistent claims inconsistent, precisely because it is stronger. (Van Roojen, 1996, 322) 
 
The simpler explanation of this is that Van Roojen is unconvinced by Blackburn’s attempt to 
create a logic of attitudes similar enough to the conventional logic of fact asserting 
propositions. Ultimately, these discussions always seem to boil down to the issue of what 
exactly constitutes ‘moral inconsistency’, or what kind of inconsistency is it that Blackburn 
requires for his account of moral fallibility to work.  Where (VR1) clearly appears as a 
semantically logical contradiction, the implication being that stealing cannot be both wrong 
and not wrong at the same time, (VR2) appears as wholly different, because it is entirely 
consistent for the subject to approve of stealing but be mistaken in their moral attitude. Even 
the quasi-realist must concede that this is problematic, because moral fallibility depends upon 
the subject’s ability to say, “I don’t think stealing is wrong, but I may be wrong about that”. 
This is similar to Egan’s challenge in that it attempts to pin Blackburn down on what exactly 
he means by “is wrong”, but it is different in that rather than appealing to the notion of 
stability of the subject’s beliefs, it simply asks the question of whether an inconsistency 
within a logic of attitudes indeed caries the same weight as a normal, logical contradiction. 
Van Roojen claims that it does not.  
 
Van Roojen frames the problem as a ‘dilemma’ (Van Roojen, 1996, 322). Either the ‘logic’ 
of attitudes is too weak to deliver logical inconsistency between conflicting attitudes, or it is 
strong enough to do this, but then it is too strong, making things that should not be logically 
inconsistent count as logically inconsistent. In fact, Van Roojen frames this dilemma in such 
a way that it is intended to affect non-cognitivism more broadly; he asks us to consider the 
following argument:  
 
1. If I don’t disapprove of Y, then X is wrong (Premise) 
2. If X is wrong, then Y is wrong (Premise) 
3. I don’t disapprove of Y (Premise) 
4. Therefore, X is wrong (From 1 and 3) 
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5. Therefore, Y is wrong (From 2 and 4) 
 
This argument is valid, and it can be invalidated by the negation of its fifth statement and 
conclusion, (“Y is not wrong”). Now Van Roojen asks us to look at the translation of this 
argument offered by the non-cognitivist and by Blackburn’s account that conditionals are 
disguised claims that one attitude involves another: 
 
1’. If I don’t disapprove of Y, then B! (X) 
2’. The disapproval of X involves a disapproval of Y 
3’. I don’t disapprove of Y 
4’. B! (X) 
5’. B! (Y) 
 
So to translate, Blackburn’s explanation, according to Van Roojen, seems to be that to have 
(2’), (4’) and ~(5’) is inconsistent in some sense. However, surely having (3’) and (5’) is just 
as inconsistent in that this also seems to display a contradiction of attitudes. This would in 
turn mean that (1’), (2’) and (3’) must also be inconsistent since it implies that (3’) and (5’). 
So on one hand, according to Van Roojen, Blackburn has given us an explanation of the 
validity of the argument only if he has given one in which the premises are inconsistent. 
However, the premises of the original argument both seem consistent and support a valid 
argument. So to reiterate, in order for the logic of attitudes to be strong enough to deliver 
logical inconsistency between conflicting attitudes, then this involves making things that 
should not be inconsistent count as inconsistent. Van Roojen claims that Blackburn has failed 
to deliver an account that escapes this problem, because as it is if the premises of the original 
argument are consistent, then the premises of Blackburn’s translation of that argument should 
be also, and according to Van Roojen they necessarily are not (Van Roojen, 1996, 320).  
 
Next, Van Roojen asks us to consider one more argument: 
 
P1. It would be wrong for me to believe ill of my friends. (Premise) 
P2. My parents, father and mother alike, are my friends. (Premise) 
P3. It would be believing ill of a friend to believe he would be duplicitous with another one 
of his friends. (Premise) 
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P4. If the coded valentine is not a joke, my father is being unfaithful to my mother, hence 
duplicitous. (Premise) 
P5. The coded valentine is not a joke. (Premise) 
C1. It is wrong for me to believe that my father is unfaithful to my mother. (From P1, P2, and 
P3) 
C2. My father is unfaithful to my mother. (From P4 and P5). 
 
Here the argument for the two conclusions is valid (whether or not it is sound is another 
matter entirely); however, this creates another problem. The logic of higher-order attitudes 
which Blackburn uses to explain the validity of evaluative arguments is supposed to render 
the two conclusions inconsistent; hence it must also regard the premises as inconsistent. 
Where C1 would translate to {B! (Believing that my father is unfaithful)}, C2 expresses 
exactly that belief. Ideally, the quasi-realist wants to convey the idea that having higher-order 
negative attitudes towards other attitudes that the subject has is inconsistent. Despite this, 
whilst the two arguments may be sound or unsound, depending on whether the subject 
genuinely believes in the premise that it is wrong to believe ill of one’s friends/family (which 
on reflection is not unusual for some), the important point is that the argument is 
valid/consistent and so are its premises:  
 
If a person who thinks it is wrong to believe something and yet believes it anyway 
commits an error, it is not an error of logic. Since the explanation used to explain 
logical inconsistency is equally applicable here, that explanation commits Blackburn to 
finding logical inconsistency [contradiction] where there is none. (Van Roojen, 1996, 
321) 
 
This raises important questions about what constitutes a logical contradiction in the first 
place. The standard Aristotelian account states that a contradiction is a basic form of error 
(Translation of Aristotle’s Metaphysics by Ross, 1928). Language functions to describe 
observable reality, and because reality cannot be two contrary ways at the same time and in 
the same respect, to say that it does creates this error. Modern adaptations augment this 
concept by appealing to possible world semantics. Two sentences contradict if and only if 
there is no possible world in which both sentences are true e.g. I may be married or 
unmarried but not both at the same time within that same possible world. According to Van 




Perhaps both sorts of inconsistency are logical in some good sense, and perhaps 
‘pragmatic’ is a bad term for the contrast class. The point is just that we can draw a 
contrast and then recognize instances of each sort in both the normative and the 
nonnormative domains (Van Roojen, 1996, 331-332).  
 
Even the quasi-realist must concede that it is not logically impossible for a moralist to have 
inconsistent attitudes; hypocrisy is common after all, just as it is possible to have 
contradictory beliefs; people are prone to inconsistency. To say something like, “I disapprove 
of eating meat, but I approve of eating chicken”, appears to be an absurd, hypocritical thing 
to say, and according to the quasi-realist, worthy of moral improvement. However, it is at the 
very least plausible that someone might have such a combination of attitudes. It is possible to 
disapprove of eating meat yet approve of eating chicken, however strange as that may be. It 
does not carry the same logical force as saying something like, “I am a married bachelor”. 
The latter is not so much hypocritical as plainly false, in all possible worlds. It is not possible 
to be a married bachelor23. A point of note is that the sentence, “I am a married bachelor”, 
says nothing about attitudes but rather is a non-expressive assertion about some matter of 
fact. Once again this brings us back to the old Frege-Geach discussion about whether quasi-
realist projections of attitudes can indeed contradict. Van Roojen, like Egan, like Geach, 
seems to maintain that they cannot.  
 
Smyth’s response to this is very similar to his reaction to Egan in that, unlike Blackburn, who 
attempts to wriggle out of the problem by talking about things like stability and attitudes, 
Smyth simply attempts to pull the rug out from under Van Roojen completely:  
 
In the case of (VR1) and (VR2), I think that there is a very important difference 
between considering them abstractly, as sentences spoken by no-one, and considering 
what our actual responses would be to persons who affirmed these propositions in the 
course of ordinary moralizing. This is a distinction that makes an enormous difference, 
not in the least because, pace Van Roojen, there cannot be any such thing as a 
pretheoretical distinction between logical consistency and mere pragmatic 
inconsistency. (Smyth, 2014, 15) 
                                                          





An interesting move here is that Smyth claims that making a distinction between logical and 
pragmatic inconsistency is not something that Blackburn needs to do in the first place for the 
quasi-realist account to maintain its basic structure. For example, Smyth asks us to imagine 
two interlocutors deciding what policies to adopt about stealing. One asks the other about the 
wrongness of stealing, and they say that it is both wrong and not wrong. This at first sounds 
exactly like a (VR1) situation, but Smyth then asks the question of what if they had said that 
stealing is wrong and that they have no negative attitude towards stealing (i.e. Van Roojen’s 
version of VR2). Surely this would be at least as confusing as the (VR1) taken at face value. 
According to Smyth, the resolute expressivist’s response is to point out that Van Roojen 
presupposes everyday speech is necessarily realist, because to the quasi-realist at least, this is 
not the case. More importantly, both (VR1) and (VR2) are equally useless for the purposes of 
real life planning and coordination, so whilst (VR2) is more realistically plausible than 
(VR1), because it is at least possible to approve of stealing and yet it be wrong, but not for it 
to be both wrong and not wrong, it is equally unhelpful in the context of conventional, real 
life moral discourse. Most importantly, if we are operating on the Aristotelian account of 
language being used to describe observable reality, then (VR2) has clearly made an error in 
doing so, as they have failed to convey in any meaningful way, or at least any way the 
listener will understand, the morality of stealing: 
 
I claim that it is not at all obvious that there are, in this context, categorically different 
norms governing the use of these two sentences. Each will leave you very confused 
about your interlocutor’s moral stance, each will provoke doubts about their sincerity, 
and both are equally useless for the purposes of shared planning, co-ordination or 
policymaking. In other words, each sentence will seem to violate the same 
conversational norms in basically the same way, and for a pragmatist, this entails that 
the two sentences cannot fail in categorically distinct ways. (Smyth, 2014, 16) 
 
I too would argue that Van Roojen’s account presupposes realist moral reference, where for 
the quasi-realist it does not exist, at least not in the same sense as the moral realist. As we 
will discover later in chapter five, the main difference between the moral realist and the 
quasi-realist seems to be that the moral realist makes assertions with the intension of referring 
to moral truths which are accounted for by metaphysics. The quasi-realist, by contrast, 
projects moral truths, which are accounted for by psychological states in the speaker and by 
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a logic of attitudes. Smyth appears to defend this account fairly well. However, what I 
believe is more open to question is whether or not this is an account which Blackburn shares. 
In other words, what precisely is it that makes a ‘quasi-realist’ rather than merely an 
‘expressivist’? Is quasi-realism merely a highly sophisticated form of expressivism, or does it 
claim to be something more? If so, what exactly is that in the sense of what exactly do these 
moral utterances refer to? Do they refer to anything? If we claim, as a resolute expressivist 
might, that they do not, because what we are saying is not fact asserting but rather expressing, 
[Boo! (ⱷ)], then where exactly does this leave Blackburn’s notion of moral truth? If, on the 
other hand, quasi-realist discourse is somehow referential, in the sense that it does somehow 
refer to something true about (ⱷ), can we really continue to call this expressive? Surely, if 
this is the case, then quasi-realist discourse begins to take on aspects which are more 
descriptive than expressive. So in conclusion, it seems as though either Blackburn must 
defend quasi-realism from the position of a resolute expressivst, as Smyth does, thereby 
casting real doubt upon what makes the quasi- realist, or, he must argue to preserve an 
account of moral language which somehow refers to quasi- moral truth(s), in which case Van 
Roojen’s arguments may become more of a problem for Blackburn. The problem lies in 
quasi-realism’s aim at being what appear to be two conflicting things, between being a) 
pragmatic and expressivist and not quasi-realist, and b) aiming to be quasi-realist but 
thereby becoming something more than (a), and what that is being somewhat nebulous. The 
other problem lies in quasi-realism’s inability to clearly demonstrate attitude inconsistency 





Chapter 5: Quasi Realism no Fictionalism 
 
Having now explored many of the avenues of Blackburn’s quasi-realist project, from its 
origins in STW, to its approach to the Frege-Geach problem, to Andy Egan’s objections, as 
well as those of G.F. Schuler and Van Roojen, and a valiant defence by Nicholas Smyth, the 
time must now come to decide, once and for all, if quasi-realism is a worthy enough 
candidate upon which to base our non-realist theory of moral language. I will therefore look 
at what I believe is a particularly important moment in quasi-realism’s story, that of David 
Lewis’s paper ‘Quasi-Realism is Fictionalism’ vs. Blackburn’s response, ‘Quasi-Realism no 
Fictionalism’. In this chapter I will examine how David Lewis actually attempts to save 
quasi-realism by proposing a fictionalist solution to what he calls the ‘error’ of moral 
realism. I will then examine how, in response, Blackburn successfully severs any potential 
ties with moral fictionalism, but in doing so, exposes what I believe to be fatal weaknesses in 
quasi-realism. In discussing fictionalism, this chapter will also serve as an important preview 
of what is to come.  
 
David Lewis begins with an endorsement of quasi-realism, saying that it is not unlikely that it 
succeeds perfectly on its own terms (Lewis, 2006, 314). This means that it has ‘offered a 
special semantics for sentential expressions of moral attitudes’, and has therefore earned the 
right to say everything that the moral realist says. The challenge is then laid out by Lewis for 
Blackburn to explain to us what, precisely, makes a quasi-realist. In other words, what is it 
about quasi-realism in particular that makes it distinct from simply being a rather abstract 
form of realism? One immediate issue which Lewis cites is that it is not enough to simply say 
that the truth conditional criteria of quasi-realism differ from conventional realist truth 
conditions. Moreover, ‘once the quasi-realist semantics is perfected, it becomes inapplicable’ 
(Lewis, 2006, 314). It is not entirely clear what Lewis means by this, but it seems to be a 
problem linked to what semantic content fits a particular person’s linguistic dispositions 
rather than their philosophical predilections:  
 
Presumably the realist semantics is right for the realist. It best fits his linguistic 
dispositions. But once quasi-realism has been perfected, the quasi-realist’s linguistic 
dispositions are exactly the same, so the realist semantics best fits them, so it’s right for 




So what seems to be the problem is that if quasi-realism succeeds in its mission to gain 
entitlement to everything the realist says, it thereby becomes indistinguishable from what it is 
supposed to be mirroring. Lewis does, however, have an ingenious solution to this. It is 
fruitless to search for something which the quasi-realist says which the realist does not, 
because the quasi-realist’s task involves mirroring what the realist says as closely as it can 
without compromising its own projectivism. However, if there is a distinction between 
realism and quasi-realism, then there should be things which the realist says, which the 
quasi-realist does not. This alleged distinction is what Lewis calls the ‘error of moral realism’ 
(Lewis, 2006, 315). Lewis continues to discuss what this ‘error’ might be, in terms of what 
Blackburn says when discussing moral realism, eventually settling on the following, 
clarifying for the sake of argument, that we are taking ‘moral realism’ to be a theory 
unwittingly committed to that error: 
 
The distinctive error of ‘moral realism’ says that there are properties, perhaps non-
natural properties, such that we can somehow detect them; and such that when we do 
detect them, that inevitably evokes in us pro- or con-attitudes toward the things that we 
have detected to have these properties...Projectivism is the view that this is indeed an 
error; our pro- and con-attitudes actually originate within us as a result of contingent 
aspects of our psychology and upbringing. (Lewis, 2006, 315) 
 
So it seems that Lewis’s interpretation of what Blackburn is saying is that what is different 
about quasi-realism is the alleged origin of approving and/or disapproving attitudes. Rather 
than being caused by moral properties in the world, they are caused by psychological 
phenomena constituted by observations and experience, which are then projected through 
moral utterance.  
 
Something else which Lewis asks is if the error of moral realism is theory based (an error in 
the methodological approach of moral realism) or conclusion based (an error with the 
conclusion that moral adjectives refer to natural properties), this being eventually what leads 
him to try to ‘save’ the situation by suggesting moral fictionalism as an interpretation of what 
Blackburn is saying (Lewis, 2006, 318). Lewis describes the difference between a theory 
based error and a conclusion based error, and its significance, by alluding to the archaic 
phlogiston theory. If we ‘incorrectly’ follow through on a reasonable theory, then we may 
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still reach an error laden conclusion despite there being nothing inherently error laden about 
the theory we are applying. If, however, the theory is itself laden with error, then no matter 
how diligently we apply it, we may still be left with conclusions which are laden with error. 
In other words, a theory based error is more serious than a conclusion based error. Lewis then 
applies this question to morality. If we take the error theorist to be correct in their assessment, 
then morality is victim to a theory based error in the sense that the theory of morality 
presupposes some account of things which is laden with error. Should we then abandon 
morality as we have the phlogiston theory? Alternatively, should we attempt to ‘correct’ 
morality and fix this supposedly error theoretic account? Lewis’s suggestion, however, is that 
a far easier solution would be to subscribe to a theory of fictionalist moral discourse, were 
we can ‘retain morality, but treat it as a fiction.’ (Lewis, 2006, 318). 
 
I assume from this that Lewis is claiming that Blackburn’s quasi-realism does indeed 
subscribe to this conclusion of a theory based error of realism and thus is in need of such a 
move. It becomes less obvious that this is the case in Blackburn’s response to Lewis, which I 
will discuss further down. For now, let us assume, for the sake of argument, that Lewis is 
correct in this assessment. Based on what Blackburn says of his projectivism, the quasi-realist 
appears to be doing exactly what the fictionalist does in regards to moral discourse. 
According to Lewis this involves providing a disowning preface, ‘let’s make believe that 
moral realism is true, though it isn’t’ (Lewis, 2006, 319). Thereafter, the fictionalist/quasi-
realist gains entitlement to say anything and everything that the realist says, including 
discussion of moral discourse, ‘but the fictionalist is not asserting what he says, rather he is 
quasi-asserting it because of his disowning preface’ (Lewis, 2006, 319). Lewis goes on to 
claim that Blackburn’s quasi-realism is indeed a brand of fictionalism not only for this reason 
but also because of what the aim of his project seems to be. Blackburn aims to gain 
entitlement to whatever the moral realist says, and this, ‘means either being, or make-
believably being a realist’ (Lewis, 2006, 319). So Lewis seems to lay down a dichotomy here. 
Either the quasi-realist is a kind of realist, in which case he is not so much a quasi-realist so 
much as a queasy-realist, as Blackburn himself puts it (Blackburn quoted in Lewis, 2006, 
319), or, it is not any kind of realism, in which case it is pretending to be so for the sake of 
preserving moral discourse. In this case, it seems indistinguishable from fictionalism, which, 




Blackburn, of course, does not agree. Somewhat ingeniously, he actually uses Lewis’s own 
argumentative strategy against him. Just as Lewis claims that there are things which moral 
realism claims which quasi-realism does not, so too does Blackburn claim that there are 
things fictionalism claims, which quasi-realism does not. Therefore, quasi-realism is distinct 
from moral fictionalism. To explain why he thinks this, Blackburn asks some important 
questions, most notably, what exactly does it mean to talk ‘as if’ something is the case? 
(Blackburn, 2006, 323). Blackburn initially uses colour fictionalism as an example of what it 
is that he is asking: “on the face of it, for fictionalism to gain a foothold, we apparently know 
what it is to talk as if there are colours, although there are none, in which case we need an 
explanation of what the content of this saying might be” (Blackburn, 2006, 324). In other 
words, we have an idea of colour even though, according to colour fictionalism, there are 
really no colours. Fictionalism requires us to understand the fiction of something (or the idea 
of something), being told as known fact. In other words, we need to understand what it would 
be for the thing to be a reality in order to understand it as a fiction.  
 
Where quasi-realism differs from fictionalism, according to Blackburn, is that where 
fictionalism claims to talk about things ‘as if’ they are real when they are merely fiction, 
quasi-realism claims to talk about things ‘as if’ they are real and that they are: 
 
What then is the mistake of describing such a philosophy [quasi-realism] as holding 
that ‘we talk as if there are necessities when really there are none’? It is the failure to 
notice that the quasi-realist need allow no sense to what follows the ‘as if’ except one in 
which it is true, and conversely he need allow no sense than (say) one holding Locke’s 
theory of colour need accept the view that we talk as if there are colours, when there are 
actually none. This is doubly incorrect, because nothing in the Lockean view forces us 
to allow any sense to ‘there are colours’ except one in which it is true; conversely 
neither need it permit a sense to ‘there are actually none’ in which that is true. 
(Blackburn, 2006, 323) 
 
I went on to say that if the words retain an uncorrupted, English, sense then the 
Lockean and similarly the quasi-realist, holds not just that we talk and think as if there 




Admittedly, it is difficult to describe exactly what Blackburn means by all of this without 
delving into Lockean metaphysics, but to summarize, Locke describes in his second book of 
the Essay, a kind of second order property that comes from standing in relation to an object, 
originally an idea proposed by the Greek Atomists (Locke’s Essay as described by William 
Uzgalis, 2017).  The important point, however, is that there is nothing in that view which 
commits the quasi-realist to either the view that ‘there is colour’ or that ‘there is no colour’ 
per se. To help Blackburn out here, there appears to be a kind of uniformity in language in 
which projected qualities act very similar to natural qualities that are referred to. I can talk 
about something ‘as if’ it exists when its actual existence is subject to intense philosophical 
debate, for example when I talk about imaginary numbers like the square root of minus one24.  
We can even formulate whole equations around these imaginary quantities. I can also talk 
about something ‘as if’ it exists because, for the sake of argument at least, it definitely does, 
such as this laptop on which I am typing this. Semantically, there is very little difference 
between the two, whereas metaphysically there seems to be a great deal of difference. The 
important point, however, is that to talk about something ‘as if’ it exists does not commit one 
to a conclusion one way or the other metaphysically. However, linguistically the truth 
conditional content of the quasi-realist semantics is another matter entirely, as Blackburn 
describes in STW when he talks about his accounts of moral improvement and moral truth 
(see section one chapter seven).   
 
Moving onto the important matter, however, that of moral fictionalism vs. moral quasi-
realism, Blackburn rightly challenges the fictionalist to answer what the content of a fictional 
moral claim is when the fictionalist is claiming that ‘there are no morals’. In other words, 
what is it for something to be true in fiction but not to be true in the world? To help 
Blackburn out here, let us think of an example. We know what it is to live in a world in which 
there are no unicorns. We also understand what it would be to live in a world in which there 
are unicorns. We therefore understand what it is to form a fiction around the idea of unicorns. 
It is much more difficult, however, to understand what it is to live in a world in which there 
are no moral facts, and for that we need to know what it would be to live in a world in which 
there are moral facts: 
 
                                                          
24 There is a great deal of debate about whether and/or in what sense imaginary numbers like the square root of 
minus one ‘exist’. 
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I say that it is bad to neglect children...what would it be for it to be fact and to be 
known and told as such, that it is bad to neglect the needs of children? It is not so in this 
world, evidently, so what is different about worlds in which it is? Do children suffer 
more? But why would that cast doubt on it being bad to neglect ours? (Blackburn, 
2006, 325) 
 
To say that it is fiction does not solve this problem, according to Blackburn. This is also the 
case if, rather than saying semantically ‘within the fiction x is true’, we instead only pretend 
to make moral assertions. Even in this case, ‘we still need to know what it is that we are 
pretending’ (Blackburn, 2006, 326). Blackburn continues to outline some of the other 
problems with moral fictionalism throughout the rest of his text, and for the sake of time I 
will not delve into them, for many of the same and similar objections I will deal with in later 
chapters when I discuss moral fictionalism more directly. The important conclusion we can 
draw, however, is that it seems that quasi-realism is not exactly the same creature as moral 
fictionalism. However, in saying that, I believe Blackburn has exposed some fatal flaws in 
the quasi-realist project.  
 
By his own admission, Blackburn’s aim is to give everything that the moral realist wants 
without actually being a moral realist. This raises an important question about exactly what 
the ‘quasi’ in quasi-realism actually means. On the one hand, David Lewis appears to want to 
help Blackburn out by providing a fictionalist solution that would allow him to preserve 
quasi-realism as an anti-realist account. What seems clear in Blackburn’s response, however, 
is that he has no intention of preserving quasi-realism as anti-realist any more than he wants 
to commit it to being realist. This at first seems to help us in particular, because as we 
discussed way back in section one, we are not in fact looking for a form of anti-realism so 
much as a form of non-realism, which quasi-realism seems to be if we choose to believe 
Blackburn’s story. Unfortunately, should we choose to do that then this inevitably drags us 
towards two, I think, insurmountable problems.  
 
The first problem stems from stacking quasi-realism against fictionalism and certain 
realisations that arise from making that comparison. As I will discuss much later in section 
three, fictionalism, like quasi-realism, is not necessarily bound to anti-realism either; it can 
also be depicted as non-realist. The difference, however, is that in doing so it retains the 
ability to ‘bite the bullet’ on some seemingly ‘difficult’ questions. It does this, as I will 
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explain throughout the rest of section two, by appealing to varying levels of something 
Richard Joyce calls ‘critical contexts’ (Joyce, 2011, 289). When we are in a philosophy 
classroom asking a very critical metaethical question about something relatively non-
controversial in applied ethics like, “is it really wrong to murder children?” this throws a 
proverbial gauntlet down to the fictionalist and quasi-realist alike. As Blackburn puts it for 
the quasi-realist, “we talk and think as if there are...[and] that there are.” (Blackburn, 2006, 
323). In other words, the quasi-realist commits to saying, in some quasi-logical sense, that it 
really is wrong to murder children, but that what constitutes that is not the metaphysical state 
of the real world but rather psychological states within people. This seems almost like saying 
something akin to, ‘it is real because people think & speak ‘as if’ it is it is real’. The 
problem is that there needs to be some account of how exactly that works which makes sense. 
This leads us to the second problem, which the first problem necessarily relates to. 
 
Recall back to what I was talking about in chapter three of this section about the difference 
between attitudes towards doing something and attitudes towards something taking place. For 
Blackburn to gain entitlement to say what the realist does about things in applied ethics 
discourse which are or are not the case, just like the realist, he relies on an account of moral 
truth, which necessarily depends on another account of moral improvement, which 
necessarily depends on an account of moral fallibility. This tendency towards multi layer 
dependency already creates a dangerous risk factor for the quasi-realist, because should 
Blackburn’s account of moral fallibility fail, for example, so too fails everything else by 
chain reaction. For his account of moral fallibility to work, Blackburn needs to demonstrate 
that attitudes can be inconsistent. In chapter three, I discussed how, in response to the 
objections of G.F. Schueler, Blackburn seems to successfully demonstrate a form of 
inconsistency that arises between a conjunction of a disapproving attitude towards lying and 
an approving attitude towards not lying, and an approving attitude towards lying. He does this 
by appealing to an argument in which he demonstrates that there is no possible world in 
which one can be committed to a world in which lying does and does not take place. As I 
discussed, however, what is lacking in that argument is a consideration of the varying forms 
of attitudes that exist surrounding, for example, lying. If I were to say that I disapprove of 
lying in general, or that I disapprove of the existence of lying, then Blackburn’s argument 
may work; there is no possible ideal world in which lying both does and does not occur that I 
can be committed to. If, however, I disapprove of me being a liar, but I have no qualms 
about other people lying, then there is absolutely no inconsistency, logical or otherwise. 
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Similarly, I may disapprove of lying in a particular situation but approve of lying in another. 
Furthermore, Blackburn’s argument only seems to function where there is a commitment to 
act in accordance with a desire (as opposed to a mere ‘wish’). There is no inconsistency 
between wanting to both lie and not to lie, but there is an inconsistency between actually 
lying and not lying or committing to worlds in which lying both does and does not take place. 
This does not, however, prove that attitudes can be inconsistent, only that actions and 
commitments can (which is not particularly illuminating). If attitudes are fundamentally 
attached to actions or commitments, then there may be grounds for saying that they can be 
inconsistent. However, Blackburn has yet to demonstrate that this is the case, and indeed 
there are many examples in which they are not. In chapter three I use the analogy of the monk 
who has taken an oath of celibacy. The monk’s disapproving attitude towards his own sexual 
behaviour is not inconsistent with the sexual behaviour of other people who have not taken an 
oath of celibacy. There is also no real inconsistency between a disapproving attitude towards 
the monk’s own sexual behaviour and an approving attitude towards it25. An inconsistency 
only arises where the monk intends to act in accordance with both attitudes (this is of course 
impossible), in which case I argue that it is the actions which are inconsistent, not the 
attitudes. If Blackburn cannot demonstrate significant inconsistencies between attitudes, then 
he cannot demonstrate moral fallibility in the sense that he describes it. If he cannot 
demonstrate moral fallibility, then he cannot demonstrate moral improvement, and if he 
cannot demonstrate moral improvement, then he cannot demonstrate moral truth, and he 
cannot gain entitlement to say, as the realist does, that it is wrong to murder children, only 
that he disapproves of it. This is a serious problem...for the quasi-realist. 
 
This is not, as I will reveal later on, a serious problem for the moral fictionalist. By contrast, 
the fictionalist is not looking to pander to realists, but merely to account for why realist 
sounding discourse is uttered. This is much simpler and easier to accomplish. Referring back 
to our first problem of answering that most difficult of questions about whether or not it is 
really wrong to murder children, a non-realist fictionalist can bite the bullet in the way that a 
quasi-realist cannot, by simply and unapologetically answering that, ‘there is no reason to 
think that it is really wrong to murder children when we examine that claim in the most 
critical context possible’. Whilst this sounds nihilistic, and potentially worrying, it is 
important to remember that the fictionalist may also answer the equal and opposite response 
                                                          




as well, ‘there is no reason to think that it is not really wrong to murder children when we 
examine that claim in the most critical context possible’. A non-realist fictionalist is no more 
bound to error theory than the quasi-realist is. It is only if the fictionalist is an anti-realist that 
the second claim becomes inapplicable. In neither version, however, is the fictionalist 
vulnerable to the same pitfalls of multi layer dependency or the challenge of proving quasi-
logical inconsistencies between attitudes. Within the realm of moral fictionalism, there is no 
inconsistency between disapproval of lying and approval of getting one’s brother to lie, nor 
does there need to be for fictionalism to function effectively, nor is fictionalism vulnerable in 
the same way as quasi-realism to the Frege-Geach problem, because it is not a form of 
semantic expressivism. Either assertions are made in the form of ‘within the fiction, x is true’, 
or assertions are pretended, in which case there is no need to form arguments in asserted 
contexts so much as pretence arguments based on pretence assertions (all this and more I will 
discuss this later on in this section).  
 
By rejecting fictionalism, Blackburn effectively condemns quasi-realism to all of the 
problems that fictionalism escapes from with relative ease. The main issues, as I see them, 
seem to be that Blackburn does not demonstrate that attitudes can be practically inconsistent 
in the relatively strong way that he needs to effectively demonstrate his account of moral 
fallibility, and so by chain reaction, this negatively affects moral improvement and moral 
truth also, and this in turns casts real doubt on whether Blackburn can indeed gain entitlement 
to all that he wants to say in appeasement to the moral realist. In addition, quasi-realism, 
when stacked against moral fictionalism, suffers from an inability to bite the bullet on 
difficult questions. Referring back to that dilemma posed by Lewis about whether or not 
Blackburn peddles quasi- versus queasy- realism, by saying that we speak as if it is wrong 
and that it is, Blackburn seems to push away from the ‘quasi’ and towards the ‘realism’, at 
the expense of his expressivism. Expressivism, at its heart, is the theory of moral language 
based on expressions of approval and disapproval, but Blackburn’s quasi-realism seems to be 
pushing for something more, something which, ironically enough, seems more and more 




Chapter 6: Fictionalism 
 
Over much of the course of the previous two sections, I have explained my reasons for 
pursuing a non-realist account of moral discourse after acknowledging grounds for doubting 
moral realism. I then turned my attention to Simon Blackburn and quasi-realism, which 
appeared to fulfil many of the criteria I was looking for, something which can give any realist 
in the room everything that they want to hear, which accounts for how and why non-realist 
language is used in a realist sounding manner, and without the expense of additional inquiry 
into any moral ontology. The answer is found not in the metaphysics of moral language but in 
the language itself and in the psychology of the language user. Unfortunately, I have also 
explained how there are unexpected and undesirable expenses attached to this approach of 
quasi-realism. As an expressivist account, it renders itself vulnerable to the Frege-Geach 
problem, something which Blackburn has attempted to deal with, the success of which is 
debatable (see section one chapters six and seven). However, I think that the larger problem 
for quasi-realism lies in its reliance on multi layer dependency between elements like moral 
truth, moral improvement and moral fallibility, and in how one problem may cause problems 
throughout the project by chain reaction. Specifically, quasi-realism struggles to satisfy the 
need to demonstrate how attitudes alone can be inconsistent in such a way that it can 
demonstrate logical, non-realist moral fallibility, and so by chain reaction, this casts doubt on 
quasi-realist claims which necessarily depend upon on this idea, namely moral improvement 
and moral truth, without which, the quasi-realist cannot achieve their aim of gaining 
entitlement to appease the moral realist in the room. A third problem lies in Blackburn’s 
inability to bite the bullet on difficult questions, which rather than being confronted head on 
and diffusing, as an anti-realist may be inclined to do, push the quasi-realist away from the 
‘quasi’ towards the ‘realism’ at the expense of their expressivism, a move dramatically 
different to something like the ‘resolute expressivism’ of Nicholas Smyth. This means that 
rather than maintaining their position as a non-realist peddling a theory of moral language 
based on expressions of approval and disapproval, quasi-realism tries to become something 
more, and what precisely that may be is frustratingly difficult to put a definitive finger on.  
 
This brings us to another theory of moral language: moral fictionalism. Before I continue 
throughout the remainder of the thesis, however, I would do well to explain myself a little 
here. After all, the reader may be wondering at this point: if quasi-realism is not all that it is 
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cracked up to be, then why have I subjected you to half a thesis talking about it? The answer 
to that question is very simple indeed. As I will explain throughout the rest of section two, 
moral fictionalism is not all that it is cracked up to be either. However, I believe that there 
are key insights in both accounts which are not mutually exclusive. In other words, both 
are required for what I will be doing later on in section three as you will discover. In essence, 
and as I will explain again at the end of this section, what I will be doing will involve taking 
some of the semantic content of moral fictionalism, reworking the expressivist components 
of quasi-realism to take on a more pragmatic role and splicing the two together with 
modifications of my own. The final result should be an account which is non-realist, as 
opposed to anti-realist, which accounts for how and why realist sounding moral language is 
used by non-realists, which is not dependent on error theory, which can and does bite the 
bullet on difficult moral questions without wriggling away from them, which survives the 
Frege-Geach problem and which does not depend on any moral ontology to explain any of 
this. I do not believe that either quasi-realism or moral fictionalism achieves all of this 
independently, but together, I believe that all of this and more is achievable. Without further 
ado then, let us delve into moral fictionalism.  
 
Let us first talk about fictionalism more broadly. In order to get a sense of why fictionalism is 
so interesting, let us first consider the strangeness of a particular phenomenon. When talking 
about things that are clearly fictional, we nevertheless seem to talk and feel about them as if 
they are real. For example, when talking to a Marvel comics fan, it would not seem out of the 
ordinary to say something like, “we don’t actually know Spiderman’s identity do we?” and 
for the Marvel fan to respond, “of course we do! Spiderman’s real name is Peter Parker!” No 
doubt that Marvel fan might actually be annoyed that someone has not only not read the 
comic but has completely failed to pick up on one of the key plot points. We see similar 
levels of annoyance about many subjects of fiction from continuity errors to arguments about 
who does and does not deserve to be tortured or killed in the next episode of Game of 
Thrones. What is interesting is that we seem to talk about fictional characters as if they are 
people that we know in real life to the extent that we feel elated when good things happen to 
them and heartbroken when bad things happen to them. What is strange is that we know that 
they are not real, so why do we talk about them as if they are, and why do we get so worked 
up about people who fundamentally do not really exist? Even more bizarre is that actual 
sentences like “Spiderman’s real name is Peter Parker”, appear to be true, to the extent that 
we are more often than not inclined to ‘correct’ people who say otherwise; this is despite us 
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knowing that the sentence surely cannot be true in the same way as normal assertions are, as 
there is no referent to whom the sentence refers. What on earth is going on here? 
 
At its most basic level, fictionalism is this practice of likening types of language (e.g. 
language about colours, mathematics or even ethics), to talking about things which do not 
exist outside the context of fiction (e.g. language about Spiderman or characters in Game of 
Thrones). This of course raises a very important question about the discourse of fictions. 
What exactly is going on semantically when a speaker utters a sentence about some fictitious 
entity, which for all intents and purposes sounds like an assertion about something real? 26 
There are at least two rival accounts that we should pay special attention to. One explanation 
is that the speaker of a sentence like, “Spiderman’s real name is Peter Parker”, is making an 
assertion and that that assertion, out of context, is ultimately false. Alternatively, some people 
think that when we speak about something fictional, we are tacitly using some kind of fiction 
operator, as if to say “according to the Spiderman fiction, ‘Spiderman’s real name is Peter 
Parker’”. The operator ensures that the sentence is true, because ‘according to the fiction’, it 
is, and without this operator it is not. This is not to be confused with lying, as there is no 
intentional deception on behalf of the speaker. To the contrary, the speaker relies on the 
listener knowing that what they are saying is not true in the absence of this fiction operator. 
Otherwise, we may get a conversation like this:  
 
Spiderman’s real name is Peter Parker / Who is Spiderman? / He’s a person who lives 
in New York who dresses like a Spider, shoots webs from his hands and fights 
criminals. / Wow! When can I meet this guy?! / He’s not real you realise. / Oh! Then 
why did you talk about him like he is then? 
 
It is indeed part of the strangeness of fiction that such conversations do not happen more 
often. Indeed, while this explanation seems sufficient to explain semantically what is going 
on, it does little to explain the strangeness of people’s reactions. Yet another explanation is 
that rather than making false or tacit assertions, sentences like “Spiderman’s real name is 
Peter Parker” do not actually assert anything at all but rather are examples of pretending to 
assert something. All explanations, especially the latter explanation, are highly context 
                                                          
26 This more than anything else does seem to be a central question particularly in Joyce’s main body of work 
The Myth of Morality. That being said, many of the other questions in that work I will address by references to 
other works of Richard Joyce, and as such I have not felt any pressing need to include undue references to The 
Myth of Morality on top of those.  
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dependent. If we say the sentence out of context, then we are likely to engage in a 
conversation like the one above. The main reason that we do not usually have these sorts of 
conversations is that we usually only utter such sentences in very specific contexts. For 
example,  
 
Who is your favourite super hero? / Spiderman, because he’s someone I can identify 
with, having to hide his identity to live a normal life etc. Spiderman’s real name is Peter 
Parker. Peter Parker has loved ones who can be harmed…  
 
The idea here is that the sentence is prefixed by a prior established context, as if to say, “Let’s 
pretend that for the duration of this conversation, there exists a guy called Peter Parker who is 
also Spiderman”.  
 
All of this and more is discussed by Richard Joyce in his paper ‘Moral Fictionalism’ as one 
of several accounts of fictionalism, and one that is of particular interest and relevance to any 
discussion on comparison with quasi-realism. What then is moral fictionalism? If we are to 
be consistent with our above definition of fictionalism, then moral fictionalism is the practice 
of likening moral discourse to discourse about fictional entities (e.g. Spiderman). Joyce 
begins by citing John Mackie’s Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, in which Mackie suggests 
that moral discourse “can continue with the status of a ‘useful fiction’.” (Joyce, 2011, 287).  
Joyce then asks how useful a system of morality can be when we cease to believe it is real, 
proceeding on the assumption that “Mackie’s arguments for moral error theory are cogent”, 
(Joyce, 2011, 287), which amounts to assuming firstly that moral sentences express belief 
states and second that moral assertions are untrue. Mackie’s response to error theory is to 
‘carry on with morality as a fiction’, and Joyce seeks to understand precisely what this 
answer means. According to Joyce, moral fictionalism is not so much a description of all 
moral discourse so much as a feasible description of the discourse of moral sceptics (i.e. 
those who do not believe in the existence of real moral properties). In other words, Joyce 
claims to be peddling a ‘revolutionary’ rather than a ‘hermeneutic’ form of moral fictionalism 
(as found in Burgess, 1983). This means that rather than trying to account for simply how 
mainstream speakers usually talk about morality, Joyce is instead describing how non-realist 




So why might someone be attracted to fictionalism in first place? In Joyce’s section on what 
he calls ‘critical contexts’, Joyce outlines “how it might be that a person might carry on using 
a discourse that she has come to see as flawed” (Joyce, 2011, 289). To this end, Joyce makes 
an analogy with colour fictionalism. Suppose that David, for whatever philosophical or 
scientific reasons, has come to the conclusion that despite the appearance of objects to have 
the surface properties of red, blue or yellow, such properties do not really exist. Rather, they 
are an invention of his consciousness, a means by which his brain has evolved to detect the 
physical surface properties of these objects, their chemical composition and/or their spatial 
location in relation to a given light source. Believing that these ‘colours’ do not really exist, 
does David go about the rest of his life correcting everyone who refers to the grass as green? 
Alternatively, does David, 99% of the time, when referring to grass pretend and refer to it as 
green? The latter is more likely according to Joyce (Joyce, 2011, 290). In fact, it is only in 
such places as the philosophy classroom, and only when properly pressed on the issue that 
David admits what he really thinks about the so called ‘colour’ of grass, or the so called 
‘colour’ of his mother’s eyes. Only then does David begrudgingly say, “My mother’s eyes are 
not really green; nothing is really green”. Joyce claims this to be an example of varying 
levels of critical contexts, contexts of critical analysis: 
 
...it would be too bizarre to hold that an individual, who has never given the issue any 
careful thought whatsoever, but thinks and acts in accordance with theory T, does not 
really believe T simply because if he were to think carefully about it, he would deny it. 
But if we add that at some point he has adopted a critical perspective and therein 
sincerely denied T, and remains disposed to deny T, were he again to adopt that 
perspective, then he disbelieves T, regardless of how he may think, act, and speak in 
less critical perspectives. (Joyce, 2011, 290) 
 
This brings us back to the issue of those competing accounts of fictionalism. First, let us look 
at the tacit operator version, which says that the sentence ‘Spiderman’s real name is Peter 
Parker’ really means, ‘according to the Spiderman fiction, Spiderman’s real name is Peter 
Parker’. The alternative is a ‘pretence assertion’ account, according to which when I utter the 
sentence about Spiderman’s real name I merely pretend to assert and the listeners join in the 
pretence, as if to say, ‘for the duration of the conversation, let us pretend that what I am 
saying is a true assertion’. Joyce argues against the first account. In David’s case, his most 
critical context is when he reflects on the matter of colour’s existence critically and 
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philosophically, but it is not what occupies his thoughts most of the time. For the majority of 
his time he still has this sceptical belief that colour does not really exist, but he is not 
attending to it. However, David remains disposed to deny T (T in this case being the theory 
that colours exists) when placed in his most undistracted, reflective and critical context. 
There is a difference then between describing the story as opposed to telling it. David always 
believes that the world is not coloured, even when he is pretending not to, which is most of 
the time (Joyce, 2011, 291). Similarly, when I say the sentence, “There once was a goblin 
that liked jam”, what I am not doing is saying, “According to Hans Christian Andersen’s 
story, there once was a goblin who liked jam.” According to Joyce, this is inadequate as a 
general claim (Joyce, 2011, 291). This is because if every sentence of the story contained an 
unpronounced fiction operator, then the above sentence ceases to make sense. According to 
Hans Christian Andersen’s story, there once was a goblin who liked jam; this is not pretence 
but fact. Joyce prefers to say that the speaker is not asserting anything at all but rather is 
pretending to assert this (Joyce, 2011, 291). Even when pressed on whether he is asserting 
that the grass is green, David will likely respond with an affirmative answer. However, Joyce 
argues that this affirmative answer is itself part of his semantic pretence (Joyce, 2011, 292). 
This is largely due to certain problems with the alternative explanation that David is making 
an assertion and that assertion is deliberately false. For example, consider the following: 
 
P1 Fresh grass is green. 
P2 My lawn is made of fresh grass. 
C Therefore, my lawn is green. 
 
If P1 is elliptical (according to the fiction of a coloured world, fresh grass is green), then the 
argument is not valid. Even if we suppose that all three claims are so prefixed, the problem 
then arises that we suppose that, “according to the fiction of a coloured world, my lawn is 
made of fresh grass”. Joyce argues that this is clearly false (Joyce, 2011, 292).  
 
It might seem obvious then that the concise explanation of Joyce’s argument against a tacit 
operator is that it is much simpler to assume a pretence assertion. For example, suppose that 
David says, “Fresh grass is a type of vegetation”, in order to get the conclusion that “my lawn 
is made up of a type of vegetation”. In order for this argument to be valid we need to interpret 
this new premise and this new conclusion as also bearing the prefix of ‘according to the 
fiction’. In fact, any assertion that David makes may utilise colour claims as a premise of an 
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apparently valid argument. Things of course get even more complicated if we suppose that 
colour is not the only fiction that David partakes in: 
 
Eighteenth-century philosophy may also lead him to endorse an error theory for sound 
and smell, for causation, for virtue and vice, and thus in order for all his apparently 
unremarkable, apparently valid argumentative moves to be genuinely valid, we will 
have to interpret every claim issuing from his mouth as brimming with unspoken 
prefixes…All such unpleasantness is avoided if we do away with tacit operators, and 
simply interpret David’s utterance ‘Fresh grass is green’ as a kind of make-believe 
assertion. (Joyce, 2011, 293) 
 
If we therefore suppose that fictional claims are pretence assertions rather than tacit 
operators, then the semantics become much simpler. The content of the proposition ‘There 
once was a goblin who liked jam’ does not change whether it is said as part of a story or 
when it is said as part of an attempt to genuinely assert something false. What changes is the 
force with which the content is uttered. However, this presents us with another dilemma; 
what are we to make of arguments that feature both fictional and real content? For example, 
consider the following: 
 
P1 It is cold tonight. 
P2 It is the height of summer. 
P3 A cold night in the height of summer is unusual weather. 
C Tonight is unusual weather. 
(Joyce, 2011, 294) 
 
Suppose I present this as an example of validity. Because it is merely an example, I am not at 
that moment asserting either the premises or the conclusion of this argument, and yet it 
remains valid. Suppose, however, that I utter P1 during my performance in a play given on a 
hot summer’s night. When pressed on the current climactic circumstances I genuinely assert 
that P2 and P3. Clearly, I have not committed myself to C, which I believe is false, because I 
also believe that P1 is false, despite pretending that I do not. However, there is nothing 
stopping me from combining P2 and P3 with the fictional P1 and endorsing C as part of the 
fictional act. What this does is force me to accept the following: “If it were cold tonight, that 
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would be unusual weather”, but as far as what I am genuinely asserting is concerned, it is 
precisely because I have not asserted P1 that I do not have to accept C.  
 
So let us recap what we have learned about fictionalism thus far. Fictionalism is a way of 
likening discourse about something, whether it is colour, mathematics or ethics, to discourse 
about fictional objects such as Spiderman. In other words, it is a way of explaining the 
semantics of things which do not really exist, or at the very least things we have reason to 
doubt the existence of. We have also learned about two opposing interpretations of 
fictionalism in particular, those being the tacit operator account and the pretence assertion 
account. In Joyce’s case, we have reason to believe that in the case of moral fictionalism at 
least, the pretence assertion account is better than the tacit operator account, as the former 
avoids many logical problems that the latter is particularly vulnerable to. I argue that this is 
indeed the case. I agree with Joyce on this point, and in my next chapter, I will discuss 
Joycean moral fictionalism in greater detail and provide some additional insight into why the 
pretence assertion account works particularly well for the moral fictionalist, as well as 




Chapter 7: Moral Fictionalism 
 
Now let us talk more specifically about moral fictionalism. In its most basic sense, moral 
fictionalism refers to a brand of fictionalism aimed at describing moral discourse (i.e. how 
people talk about ‘moral things’). According to our preferred brand of fictionalism (pretence 
assertion rather than the tacit operator), the sentence, ‘ⱷ is wrong’, holds exactly the semantic 
structure that it appears to. The speaker is pretending that they are making an assertion that ⱷ 
has a property of wrongness (according to some prior established context). It is important that 
within a given context, the sentence appears true, even though really it is not. Once again, let 
us compare this to literary fiction. When we talk about Spiderman’s real name being Peter 
Parker, we are essentially saying something that is not really true. There is no man called 
Peter Parker who shoots webs from his hands and swings around New York City fighting 
crime dressed as a spider. Nevertheless, I am not lying when I say the sentence; there is no 
deception involved.  
 
Why, you may ask, would anyone compare moral discourse to fiction discourse in the first 
place? In Joyce’s ‘Moral Fictionalism’, the key words that we ought to remember are 
‘motivation’ and ‘emotion’. Joyce is quick to admit that the emotions that arise from fiction 
do not necessarily affect human behaviour in the same way that emotions that arise from 
genuinely held beliefs do (Joyce, 2011, 302). That is not to say that they are necessarily less 
profound or less motivational, but they are certainly different. For example, a tragic scene in 
a film portraying the death of a leading character that you have spent the last two hours 
getting to know may well affect you in a far more powerful way than a news report about a 
person you’ve never met dying in exactly the same way in real life. On the other hand, as 
Joyce points out, the fear of fictional vampires is consistent with someone sitting and eating 
popcorn, whereas the fear of actual vampires is more consistent with them buying wooden 
stakes and garlic (Joyce, 2011, 302). What are we to make of this? What is interesting about 
the fictional examples is that despite not really being believed in, they are nonetheless 
provoking emotion and appear motivational on some level. For example, suppose I watch an 
episode of Star Trek: The Next Generation in which Patrick Stewart’s character is captured 
by aliens and tortured for information. Whilst the setting and the characters are entirely 
fictional (and scientifically implausible), because we have spent several seasons getting to 
know Patrick Stewart’s character Jean Luc Picard, the audience’s attitude towards what is 
happening to him is real. Somewhere within the episode, Picard utters the line, “torture has 
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never been an effective means of obtaining information; one wonders why it is still practiced 
in the 24th century” (Star Trek the Next Generation, series six episode eleven (“Chain of 
Command”)). Again, this has elements of fiction, as torture may or may not still exist in the 
24th century, we cannot know for sure, but there are also strong elements of truth within this 
quote. Torture is indeed notoriously unreliable (often the victim will say anything just to 
make the pain stop, whether they actually know anything useful or not), and yet it is still 
practiced in the 21st century, and this is exceedingly controversial. It is unlikely that a 
majority of the audience watching this Star Trek episode have had any firsthand experience 
with torture, nor do they likely know anyone who has had firsthand experience of it. 
Nevertheless, they are easily able to comprehend the horrifying effects of torture and to deem 
it undesirable simply by watching someone pretend that they are being tortured. The 
pretence alone may even be enough to inspire action against it. On a side note, it seems that 
the most powerful and motivational fictions tend to be those that make references to true 
occurrences. For example, sticking with our Star Trek theme, one of the most famous 
episodes of Deep Space Nine depicts Avery Brook’s character Benjamin Sisko, who is a 
successful commander of a space station in the 24th century, dreaming about living life as a 
black story writer in 1950s America. Again, whilst the character is fictional, the setting and 
the events that transpire are uncomfortably realistic (Star Trek: Deep Space Nine, series six 
episode 13 (“Far Beyond the Stars”)). 
 
So how does this apply to what we think we know about actual moral codes and moral 
systems? To that Joyce offers us the following:  
 
Suppose I am determined to exercise regularly, after a lifetime of lethargy, but find 
myself succumbing to temptation. An effective strategy will be for me to lay down a 
strong and authoritative rule: I must do fifty sit-ups every day, no less. (Joyce, 2011, 
303).  
 
Joyce continues to remind us that it is not strictly speaking a true thing to say that if he fails 
to perform these fifty sit-ups every day then he will indeed slip back into lethargy. Indeed, 
maybe forty or so every other day would be perfectly sufficient. However, to pay much 
attention to the flexibility of this ‘rule’ would be to dangerously bend and perhaps even break 
any progress that he might make. The attitude is more successful when viewed as inflexible. 
He may even convince himself that bad things will happen if he fails to perform fifty every 
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day, despite knowing in a more critical context that really bad things merely could happen. 
Within this critical context, however, does he really need to believe? Not at all, he need only 
convince himself to the extent that progress is made. This does indeed sound familiar.  
 
Motivation is often characterised as deeply personal. For example, Hume alludes to a 
drunkard who is repeatedly told about the statistics of alcohol related deaths, which has little 
effect on him; until he sees his own friend, who is also a drunkard, die from alcohol 
poisoning. It is not that the drunkard failed to believe the statistics prior to his friend’s death, 
but the “tangibility of the one death has, in Hume’s words, ‘a superior influence on the 
judgement, as well as on the passions’ (Hume, 1739/1978: 143-4.)” (Joyce, 2011, 304) 
According to Joyce, following the death of his friend, the drunkard’s perception of 
alcoholism may shift from one of ‘if I carry on, this terrible thing might happen to me’, to, ‘if 
I carry on, this terrible thing will happen to me’. The latter is far more dubious. There are 
many cases in which people carry on drinking or smoking heavily into old age and die from 
something completely unrelated. However, it is true that the odds are not in the drunkard’s 
favour should they continue drinking. In order to motivate themselves out of alcoholism, it is 
surely more effective to think in terms of how this terrible thing will happen, as opposed to 
the more realistic might.  
 
Now how do we apply this to moral discourse? Going back to a conversation in a previous 
chapter, we can look again at kicking cats. The fictionalist may claim that it is not really 
wrong to kick cats any more than it is really right to kick them. However, is it at all useful, 
practical or ultimately desirable to kick cats? To some of our more sadistic fellow human 
beings, perhaps it is, but to most ordinary people it is not in the slightest. Typically, one does 
not need to invent a rule to persuade oneself to refrain from kicking cats; such behaviour 
would not normally occur to the individual in the first place. However, there are far more 
generalised social rules that the individual may care to invent, e.g. “People must not cause 
unnecessary suffering to other living things”, which kicking cats would clearly fall under the 
category of, thereby provoking no small degree of outrage from beholding one who blatantly 
flouts this rule. The fictionalist may well believe that the culprit does not really have 
anything to lose by kicking the cat. If they can get away with kicking the cat, and kicking the 
cat brings them sadistic pleasure, why not kick the cat? However, an observer may not be 
comfortable living in a world in which cats are kicked and will do everything possible to 
dissuade people from that kind of behaviour, and the most effective way of motivating others 
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to refrain from kicking cats is to give people a sense of ‘wrongness’ (that some behaviours 
are intrinsically unacceptable). Another, perhaps more practical approach is to create some 
concept of cosmic justice, whereby if you do kick cats, the universe will find a way to make 
you suffer as a result. To the non-religious, this is not true in the slightest; the universe cares 
little for the plight of cats. However, we do know that if you can but convince enough people, 
then cats cease to be kicked. 27 
 
How can we relate this to actual moral discourse? According to a moral fictionalist, what 
does a person mean when they say that, “ⱷ is wrong!”? Based on what we have learned so far 
it seems that the answer is that saying, “ⱷ is wrong!”, in a pre-established context, is like 
saying that “Spiderman’s real name is Peter Parker” without a tacit operator. In other words, 
what we are doing is pretending to assert a true fact, when in reality we are not, in order to 
convey some other, more pragmatic information to the listener. This ensures that the semantic 
structure of the sentence remains consistent (i.e. “ⱷ is wrong!” is treated as truth apt; it is 
taken as true; it is really untrue28. The pre-established context of such an utterance also 
ensures that it is not taken as true in the same way as a non-fictional utterance (i.e. the listener 
pretends that it is literally true), but when either of us are pressed on the subject in our most 
critical context, we admit that it is really untrue. What pragmatic information is being 
conveyed to the listener surely depends on the context of the utterance. If, for example, I say 
to someone kicking a cat, “kicking cats is wrong!” then it would seem a Joycean fictionalist 
would argue that I am pretending to assert this and that I know that the listener knows that I 
do not really believe it, but that I still do not want them to kick the cat.  When I say, for 
example, that “cats ought not to be kicked”, this then seems to be making some kind of 
universal claim. In reality, it says a lot more about the kind of world that I want to live in 
rather than the reality of the world I actually live in. 
 
To conclude this chapter, I would agree with most of what Joyce is saying here. However, I 
believe that this is only the tip of the iceberg. Much of the first half of this thesis now 
becomes very important, because when Joyce talks about motivations and emotions, I believe 
that there are some striking parallels with expressivism. However, unlike expressivism, which 
deals with emotions and attitudes like approval and disapproval, and the communication of 
                                                          
27 These two approaches are very similar to the two models of translating emotions into moral language I 
describe much later in section three, and which form the backbone of my own expressive fictionalism later, 
these being the empathy model, and the pride, shame and responsibility model (see section 3 chapter 5).  
28 ‘Untrue’, however, should not be confused with ‘false’. ‘False’ is still truth apt.  
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those attitudes through projectivism, quasi-realism and the semantics of moral utterances, this 
kind of thinking by Joyce seems more targeted at the pragmatics of moral discourse. This is 
particularly interesting, and something which I will come back to at the end of this section, 
and something which will be a key theme throughout my third and final section of the thesis. 
What is also interesting, however, is that these motivations and discussions of the psychology 
of moral discourse stand related to but ultimately separate from the semantics of moral 
discourse involving pretence assertion and critical contexts. To my knowledge, Joyce does 
not peddle himself as a pragmatic expressivist, and frustratingly what I have said here alludes 
to most of what Joyce has to say on the subject of why moral fictionalists talk about morality 
in the form of pretence. It is for that reason that I believe that this kind of fictionalism could 
be developed a great deal further, as it has some very interesting potential, and I will be doing 
exactly that in section three. However, first let us see what could be wrong with this kind of 
fictionalism and see if this idea has any real merit by examining the case against fictionalism, 





Chapter 8: The Case against Fictionalism 
 
Let us now look at what might be wrong with fictionalism and speaking in fictional terms 
about something. Moral fictionalism claims that we can use and make sense of moral 
language even in the absence of any actual moral facts, in exactly the same way that we can 
use and make sense of language involving references to Spiderman in the absence of any 
actual Spiderman. This claim is both strong and fairly justifiable according to the previous 
two chapters, and it is a worthy candidate on which to base a non-realist account of moral 
language, at least on a semantic level. However, this does not come without a price. First of 
all, in rebelling against expressivism and quasi-realism, we abandon many of those pragmatic 
aspects of both that were so attractive to begin with. Quasi-realism, and expressivism more 
broadly, in comparison to moral fictionalism, has a comparatively detailed story to tell us 
about not only how we talk about ethics but more importantly why, the idea being that we use 
moral language to communicate attitudes of approval and disapproval, but as we have seen, 
trying to explain this through the semantics of moral discourse comes with certain objections 
and complications. Moral fictionalism on the other hand has just as interesting a story to tell 
us about how we can use moral language in a realist seeming, but ultimately non-realist 
manner, but does not have as detailed an account of the pragmatic reasons why we talk about 
ethics fictitiously. As discussed in chapter seven, we are given at least a strong attempt at this 
by Richard Joyce, but as I will address throughout section three, I am convinced that there is 
a great deal more to this than even Joyce supposes and that attitudes of approval and 
disapproval like those proposed by quasi-realists, and our capacity to communicate them, 
must play a central role as well. The second issue that must be resolved before we go any 
further is that just like quasi-realism; fictionalism is not free from controversy either. In the 
next two chapters, I will address some of the concerns addressing fictionalism, and the use of 
fiction more broadly, and then focus on one set of objections in particular in chapter nine by 
Jonas Olson.  
 
Attempting to undermine the fictionalist account on one side is at least straight forward, and 
there is a significant amount of material to use against hermeneutic fictionalism (using 
fictionalism to describe mainstream moral discourse). For example, among many objections 
to hermeneutic fictionalism made in 2001 by Jason Stanley, Stanley argues that while some 
autistic people struggle to comprehend concepts of fiction or were unable to distinguish 
between fiction and reality (a similar well known pop culture example would be the 
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Thermian species from the film Galaxy Quest, who lack a concept of ‘pretence’), they 
nevertheless did not struggle to comprehend what some hermeneutic brands of fictionalism 
portray as being fictional e.g. colour, mathematics, ethics etc. These cases offer some 
empirical evidence against hermeneutic fictionalism (Stanley, 2001, 36-71). Like Joyce, 
however, the form I am using is more revolutionary than hermeneutic in the sense that I am 
not asserting that the normal, standard form of moral discourse necessarily utilises fictionalist 
semantics. To the contrary, I believe that a vast majority of moral conversations are decidedly 
realist in the sense that moral assertions are made on the basis that they are at least intended 
to refer to actual moral ontology, whether such ontology is accurate or not, but I would argue 
that a majority of moral speakers either believe that it is or are morally agnostic on that point. 
However, not all moral speakers are realists, and this is what I seek to address. Semantically, 
what is going on in the case of the non-realist who does not want to make any commitments 
whatsoever to any moral ontology? How then does the fictionalist account for their language, 
which certainly appears referential, even when they ultimately do not believe there is 
anything really being referred to? So it is this kind of revolutionary form of fictionalism that 
we must attempt, and hopefully fail to undermine if we are to strengthen it.  
 
The most obvious way of doing this is to attempt to counter the idea that we can, quite 
reasonably, make truth apt assertions based on referring to things that do not exist, in which 
case this would also apply to our Spiderman example and literary fictionalism, and perhaps 
all fictional discourse. First, let us remind ourselves of what we are attempting to argue 
against. Under a literary fictionalist analysis, for example, the sentence, “Spiderman’s real 
name is Peter Parker”, should be taken as a true statement, because in context, it is 
understood as being such even though both Spiderman and Peter Parker constitute identities 
of a fictional character. One advantage in making this claim is that it is metaphysically 
economical. We do not necessarily need to account for Spiderman/Peter Parker’s ontological 
nature/existence if we accept that he does not need to exist in order to be referred to in a 
meaningful sentence, if we accept that ontological existence is not a necessary condition of 
referential language, or the truth aptitude of a given sentence. Rather, what is necessary is a 
mutually understood context (e.g. in this case the canon Marvel universe) in which, for the 
duration of a given conversation, the following references, in this case references to 
Spiderman, will be treated as truth apt. This is not unlike a Gricean concept of a cooperative 
principle (Grice, 1975, 41-58). Outside of this or any other context the sentence loses its 
meaning. For example, if I were to randomly say something like, “Jerry is a ‘Sparpleplat’ 
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[gibberish utterance]”, then we have no means of recognising whether or not this is a true 
sentence, as we have not assigned any context in which this can be treated as true or false; we 
have not assigned who this Jerry character is or what on earth a ‘Sparpleplat’ is supposed to 
be. It is, therefore, meaningless. In other words, truth apt fictionalist sentences are 
supposedly made true or false in virtue of their contextual dependency. However, all of this 
is not without some serious philosophical problems. 
 
The point in saying all of this is specifically to avoid serious philosophical problems 
regarding the ontology of Spiderman. However, fiction of this kind can, some argue, fail to 
deliver on this. Therefore, the supposed advantages in, for example, mathematical, modal or 
moral fictionalism being that these entities characteristic of the relevant discourse have the 
same ontological properties of fictional entities, can be problematic specifically because the 
ontology of fictional entities is not without controversy. Specifically, I refer to something 
called the problem of fictional discourse. Consider the following sentence: 
 
(1) Pegasus is a flying horse. 
 
As with many other sentences used in fictional discourse, this sentence seems to fulfil three 
specific conditions: 
 
1. It has a predicative grammatical structure, i.e. a structure that is rendered in logical 
notation (“Fb”---where “F” is the predicate expression “is a flying horse”, and “b” is 
the singular term “Pegasus”---in other words “Pegasus is a flying horse”) 
2. The singular term (“b”), is a name for a fictitious object 
3. The sentence is normally taken to be a true sentence in the context in which it is 
normally uttered. 
 
The problem of fictional discourse arises from two closely connected logical principles. The 
first is the principle of existential generalisation: 
 
Existential Generalisation 
Fb → ∃x(Fx), i.e.,  




The second is the often tacitly assumed predication principle: 
 
Predication Principle 
Fb → ∃x(x = b).  
(PP) may be read in two ways: 
(Ppa) If b is F, then there is something that is identical with b.  
(PPb) If b is F, then b exists. 
Both of these principles are prima facie plausible in that if it is true of an individual that the 
predicate “F” applies to it, then the predicate “F” applies to something. However, this does 
not seem to be the case when we apply “F” to fictional objects like Spiderman, and if we 
attempt to apply both of these principles to a fictional discourse like “Spiderman’s real name 
is Peter Parker”, they lead to further issues that seem to contradict empirical facts on the one 
hand and the ontological status of fictional objects on the other. According to the principle of 
existential generalisation, the following sentence: 
 




(2) There are flying horses 
 
...and yet, as far as we know empirically at least, this is false. Meanwhile, according to the 
principle of predication: 
 








...and yet Pegasus is a fictional object, and this seems to call into question whether or not we 
simply call an object ‘fictitious’ (i.e. to assign it a quality of “fictitiousness”) as a kind of 
synonym for saying that it does not exist. So to summarize, if (1) is true and (2) is false, then 
(3) cannot be true for fear of logical contradiction with (2); therefore, we cannot logically 
apply both the principle of existential generalisation and the principle of predication to 
fictional discourse (as seen in Reicher, 2014, &, Eklund, 2015). 
 
In other words, seemingly true fictional sentences seem to lead to logical contradictions if we 
insist on binding fictional discourse to these two principles. However, we may alternatively 
reject the premise that either the principle of existential generalisation or the principle of 
predication are universally applicable, proposing instead that some sentences, notably ones 
about fictional objects, do not necessarily operate under this exact kind of logical notation.  
For example, logicians such as proponents of Free Logics take exactly this position, such as 
Hintikka in 1959, Lambert 1983 and in 1991 and also Leonard in 1956. Similarly, while 
Simon Blackburn, who we have discussed extensively in previous sections, makes no claims 
towards fictionalism, his quasi-realist semantic form of expressivism and his logic of 
attitudes does resemble an attempt to steer moral language away from these two logical 
principles (Blackburn, 1984, 200). 
 
My approach, however, is to simply look at these principles again within the context of either 
the pretence assertion account of fictionalism vs. the tacit operator system discussed by 
Joyce. Under the tacit operator system, what is literally being said is that “[according to the 
fiction of Greek mythology], Pegasus is a flying horse”. This kind of sentence does not seem 
to conform to the principle of existential generalisation, as it does not seem to imply that 
there are flying horses. It is also clear that it does not conform to the principle of predication 
either, because, in this case, we are (tacitly) saying that Pegasus is fictional. Frustratingly, 
however, the tacit operator system whilst seemingly more equipped to handle these 
difficulties is problematic in the manner described earlier in chapter six. As a result, we 
preferred the pretence assertion account, which appears to assert that “Pegasus is a flying 
horse”, but in reality this is a pretence, thus it retains a more straight forward semantic 
content. However, it is important to make this distinction else it exposes this brand of 
fictionalism to the aforementioned problems that come with existential generalisation and 
predicative grammatical structure. The simplest solution then seems to be to deny the claim 
that the utterance is really asserted in the same way that a realist sentence would be. Instead, 
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as with keeping with the pretence assertion account, the speaker only pretends to assert the 
information. In other words, “Pegasus is a flying horse” is not the same kind of assertion, if 
indeed it is even a real assertion at all, as the one I would be making if, for example, I said 
that “water molecules consist of 2 hydrogen & 1 oxygen atom(s)”, unless of course you also 
happen to be a fictionalist about scientific discourse about molecules, which in this case I am 
not. One is a pretence assertion, an utterance resembling an assertion made within a 
cooperative dialog context in which such utterances are treated exactly like real assertions; 
the other is a real assertion in the sense that it conveys information about the real world. So if 
we treat “Pegasus is a flying horse”, as not really being asserted, it then becomes less clear 
that it is as vulnerable to problems with predication and existential generalisation, because it 
is less clear that, for example, there is a real implication that there are flying horses, or that 
there is a real implication that Pegasus actually exists. I argue that there is not and that the 
speaker who utters the sentence is in no way, deliberately or inadvertently, attempting to 
deceive the listener into really believing that flying horses exist. This does, however, seem 
like a very thin defence leaving the overall meaning of the sentence in question. If the 
semantic content of the sentence does not convey any real information to the listener, then 
what is the point in even uttering it? This is exactly why the pragmatic dimension of fictional 
discourse is so vitally important, as I argue that that is where the real meaning of the 
sentence is conveyed. This is, of course, also heavily dependent on the listener understanding 
the rules of the fictionalist dialog in question, because as we see in the film Galaxy Quest, 
where the Thermians interpreted a science fiction TV show as “historical documents”, not 
understanding that what was really being conveyed meaning wise lay behind an act of 
pretence led the listener(s) to take the fictionalist utterance as literal information about the 
real world, which in the film led to disastrous consequences.  
 
To conclude then, the threat of problems like predicative principles and existential 
generalisation can, I argue, be circumvented by standing as a ‘resolute’ fictionalist in a 
similar way to how Smyth defended objections to quasi-realism by standing as a ‘resolute’ 
expressivist. This seems to be the case both for the pretence assertion account and for the 
tacit operator account alike. In both cases, the solution seems to be to simply avoid any 
predication that implies that the object in question is real and not fictional. In the tacit 
operator account, we (tacitly) say that Pegasus is a fictional object. In the pretence assertion 
account, we do not assert in the first place that Pegasus is anything other than a fictional 
object; we merely pretend to do so. However, in taking this approach, it is more important 
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than ever to decipher what the ultimate purpose behind fictional utterances, and particularly 
important for our moral fictionalist utterances, is meant to be. In other words, it may be 
enough to avoid many semantic problems by simply saying that the moral discourse of non-
realists is fictionalist, that we do not make assertions, we simply engage in an act of pretence, 
but this is not enough to explain the communicative act of moral discourse and what is really 
being communicated. In my next chapter, where I talk about Olson’s case against 
fictionalism, I will unveil a brand of fictionalism that I have specifically designed to tackle 
this issue in particular.    
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Chapter 9: Olson & the case against Fictionalism 
 
If we were to attempt to truly undermine the fictionalist account that we are currently 
working with, then we would need to look specifically at a non-hermeneutic account. One 
notable example of such an assault on revolutionary fictionalism in particular is in Jonas 
Olson’s paper ‘Getting Real about Moral Fictionalism’, in which Olson talks specifically 
about Joycean fictionalism. In this chapter I will examine Olson’s arguments against 
revolutionary, or what he calls ‘revisionary’ fictionalism, mentioning first that Olson seems 
to assign a necessary connection with error theory to the revisionary fictionalist account. 
Whilst this is entirely appropriate in, for example, a Joycean account of moral fictionalism, it 
does not necessarily carry the same force if directed at a brand of moral fictionalism that is 
only revisionary in the sense that it is not hermeneutic. Earlier in the thesis we have looked at 
standard moral discourse, quasi-realism and the Frege-Geach problem. Now, for the purposes 
of countering Olson, and as a springboard into section three of the thesis, I will start to look at 
the discourse of a particular kind of non-realist; this is what I will ultimately refer to as 
‘Expressive Fictionalism’. This is also where my account begins to differ from Joyce’s, 
because I claim that by constructing an account by which a non-realist can consistently speak 
of morality in a fictionalist manner, I do not say that they ought to speak in this way for the 
sake of ontological correctness. With this, I believe, unique approach to fictionalism, I avoid 
having to commit to error theory in order that my account should function. There are, 
however, other concerns which Olson does raise that I answer as well.  
 
One objection that Olson raises concerns about is whether moral fictionalism can adequately 
deal with the phenomenon of moral disagreement. In his second section, Olson explains the 
route between moral error theory to revisionary fictionalism, in his third section he explains 
why moral disagreement must be accounted for, in both revisionary and hermeneutic 
fictionalism, in his fourth section he leaves hermeneutic fictionalism behind and specifically 
confronts Joycean fictionalism, and finally in his fifth section Olson introduces an alternative 
which he calls ‘conservationism’, which he explains as the “preservation of ordinary (faulty) 
moral discourse” (Olson, 2011, 183). I will now go through each of Olson’s sections 
individually. I will argue that much of Olson’s criticism of Joyce is successful but that my 




In his second section, Olson claims that the attraction of revisionary fictionalism is that it can 
very easily be adopted by anyone convinced of error theory but who does not wish to accept 
an abolitionist approach (i.e. that we ‘ought’ not to use moral language in the absence of any 
accurate moral ontology) (Olson, 2011, 183). I certainly agree with this in the sense that if, 
for example, I were to commit fully to an error theoretic account of moral discourse, that 
revisionary fictionalism is preferable to abolitionism, which I argue is significantly more 
expensive, because it incurs greater change, meaning that we ‘ought’ to change how we 
actually speak and the words we actually say rather than simply to change how we think 
about what we are already saying. Certainly I argue that abolitionism is an extremely costly 
position to accept. However, I am convinced that this is not the only path to a revisionary 
fictionalism of some kind. Suppose, for example, that an individual wishes to take an 
agnostic position on moral ontology, where then does this leave them if they then want to 
account for moral semantics? Normal moral language to listen to certainly appears to 
‘resemble’ the account favoured by the realist, but to commit to moral realism is also to 
commit to moral ontology, which the agnostic is disinclined to do, as the former is dependent 
on the latter. In other words, this is also a rather expensive option. Alternatively, they may 
embrace an anti-realist semantic account leading for instance to something resembling 
expressivism (which has merits, but is vulnerable to difficult problems e.g. the Frege-Geach 
problem, and is thus expensive in other ways)29. Alternatively, they could embrace 
fictionalism, which then raises the issue of whether they embrace hermeneutic or revisionary 
fictionalism. Hermeneutic fictionalism, however, is also vulnerable to expensive problems, 
particularly when we look at moral discourse empirically (as discussed in my previous 
chapter). So by process of elimination, the moral agnostic may also easily arrive at a kind of 
revisionary, or at least non-hermeneutic fictionalism just as the individual who is convinced 
of error theory might do. 
 
In his third section, Olson claims that moral fictionalism should be able to accommodate an 
explanation of moral disagreement. This is because, as Olson claims, it is important to 
explain how moral discourse is useful in having the function of “coordinating and regulating 
interpersonal relationships” (Olson, 2011, 184). I will address this lower down. In doing so, 
he makes a well known distinction between what he calls ‘content’ moral fictionalism (what 
we have in previous chapters described as the ‘tacit operator’ account), and ‘force’ moral 
                                                          
29 See Section one chapter six and my analysis of Frege-Geach. 
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fictionalism (what we have preferred to call the ‘pretence assertion’ account). Olson tackles 
content moral fictionalism first. However, whilst his analysis of content moral fictionalism is 
very interesting, it is not strictly speaking relevant to my account given that we are not 
constructing a theory of moral semantics which uses a tacit operator. Therefore, I shall 
proceed directly to his analysis of force moral fictionalism. Under the force moral fictionalist 
account, two speakers engaged in a moral argument cannot have a genuine moral 
disagreement, because neither of them is making any genuine moral assertions. Rather, they 
have a pretence disagreement subject to the context of that dialog. This is problematic for 
Olson, because it has “no dialectical advantage over a view that allows only cases of apparent 
moral disagreement (or ‘disagreement in attitude’) and apparent logical fallacies.” (Olson, 
2011, 191) Here Olson is directly comparing force moral fictionalism to quasi-realism, which 
makes a similar move. In short, this move runs a serious risk of placing fictionalism into the 
same firing line of the Frege-Geach problem that quasi-realism incurs so much cost to 
circumvent, because it calls into question whether or not we can logically make moral 
inferences in the absence of genuine moral truth aptness. This is additionally problematic, 
because if we cannot make real moral inferences, then we cannot accommodate an account in 
which conflicting moral beliefs are inconsistent and that genuine moral disagreements can 
occur. As a result, the moral agnostic, in searching for an economic theory of moral language, 
may find that revisionary fictionalism is a more expensive option than they previously 
thought. Blackburn attempts to circumvent this issue through construction of a quasi-realist 
logic of attitudes, but fictionalism seems not to have a similar story in response to this issue. 
However, I argue that this is because it does not necessarily require one, and thus it is still an 
economic position to take. 
 
To make one thing clear, it is Olson that raises this connection of the Frege-Geach problem: 
 
...another advantage of moral fictionalism is its immunity to Frege-Geach problems, i.e. 
problems having to do with inferences involving moral terms. These problems are 
notorious for quasi-realists, but NRW (Daniel Nolan, Greg Restall and Caroline West) 
claim that they don’t even arise for moral fictionalists. But given that we have opted for 
a version of moral fictionalism according to which utterances of moral sentences are 




In other words, force moral fictionalism faces a similar threat that expressivists face, but for 
slightly different reasons. For expressivism the difficulty is in making an inference where at 
least one of the premises is, “Boo! (ⱷ)” (an expression rather than an asserted proposition), 
whilst another similar utterance is embedded in a conditional. Force moral fictionalism may 
face a similar difficulty in making inferences where at least one of the premises is a pretence 
assertion, while another similar utterance is also embedded in a conditional: 
 
- Truth Apt Content 
1) if it is the case that {stealing is wrong}, then it is the case that [arresting a thief is 
right] 
2) it is the case that {stealing is wrong} 
C)  therefore, it is the case that [arresting a thief is right] 
           Valid Argument 
 
- Force Moral Fictionalist Content 
1) if it is the case that {stealing is wrong}, then it is the case that [arresting a thief is 
right] 
2) {stealing is wrong}---*Not actually asserted* 
C)  therefore, it is the case that [arresting a thief is right] 
      Invalid Argument*--- (2) is not an asserted proposition, it is merely treated as one. 
 
So the problem seems to come from the conditional ‘if it is the case that (x)’, where (x) is not 
asserted in premise (2) and thus is not the same as the antecedent of the conditional in (1). 
However, where force moral fictionalism differs from expressivism is that the semantic 
structure is still there, albeit conveyed in a fictitious way. My point is that this does seem to 
be a problem if we want to accommodate genuine inconsistency of moral inferences, but this 
is not something which force moral fictionalism claims to be able to do. It is enough, I argue, 
to place the entirety of the inference in a fictional context: 
 
Force Moral Fictionalist Content 
Let us pretend that... 
1) if it is the case that {stealing is wrong}, then it is the case that [arresting a thief is 
right] 
2) it is the case that {stealing is wrong} 
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      C)   therefore, it is the case that [arresting a thief is right] 
      Valid Argument*--- Within the context of ‘let us pretend that...’ 
 
In other words, what we get is pretence consistency but consistency nonetheless. The only 
problem I see with this is that this looks a lot more like a tacit operator than pretence 
assertion. However, I argue that this “let us pretend that...” condition does not need to be 
overtly stated provided that the listener understands that it is there. For example, if I pretend 
to assert something about Spiderman, then the listener’s knowledge of that context should 
provide the “let us pretend that...” context/condition required and for any supposed 
inferences made within that context to be treated as sound and valid. So my argument here is 
that force moral fictionalists cannot account for genuine moral consistency or inconsistency 
in the case of actual moral propositions simply because they cannot infer on what they do not 
assert, but this is not something which force moral fictionalism ever set out to do. It is not a 
means by which speakers describe or infer on what is actually going on, rather what would 
be going on were morality real (at least as far as the non-realist/fictionalist is concerned), and 
so it is enough to suppose valid moral inferences, but it is not required that we actually make 
them.  
 
However, surely this still leaves us with the problem of lacking a convincing account of 
moral disagreement. Again, however, I maintain that this is not problematic in so far as it is 
required on a propositional level. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that we cannot 
accommodate moral disagreement under fictionalist semantics, the problem then is, as Olson 
puts it, that we lose an explanation of the useful function that moral discourse has at 
coordinating and regulating interpersonal relationships (Olson, 2011, 184). I suggest that this 
is only true if we focus on moral semantics to the exclusion of moral pragmatics, which I 
suggest is more than capable of doing this. It may be enough to suggest that we can explain 
the use of pretence moral disagreement in terms of communicating conflicts of interest or 
attitude, just as expressivists do. So in terms of the old cat thought experiment, we can 
explain the function of a pretence disagreement about cat kicking, where I say, “kicking the 
cat is wrong”, and another objects by saying that one communicates a motivating attitude 
towards cat kicking and another communicates an attitude towards the opposite. Even if the 
two utterances are not semantically inconsistent, as no genuine assertions are made about 
whether or not it is really wrong to kick the cat, there nevertheless remains a conflict of 
interest, because both attitudes are incompatible when acted upon; one intends the cat to be 
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kicked, and the other intends the cat not to be kicked, but the cat cannot be both kicked and 
not kicked in the same universe. If we want to maintain a fictionalist account of moral 
disagreement, then we should argue that moral disagreements are similar to disagreements 
about fictions. For example, I may claim that Hamlet is mad, and another may disagree and 
say that Hamlet is only pretending to be mad. However, to have such a disagreement relies on 
both of us pretending that Hamlet is a real person and that the events of Shakespeare’s play 
really took place, hence we have a disagreement within a pretence, but a disagreement 
nonetheless. For a moral fictionalist, ethics work in a very similar way, the only real 
difference is that the consequences of disagreements within the pretence of right and wrong 
are far more profound.  
 
We may choose to counter all of this by saying that not all moral utterances communicate any 
attitudes or intentions. For example, I may say that, “kicking cats is wrong, but I don’t care if 
it happens”. My response to this is very simple, and that is to say that this is actually an 
inconsistent sentence (on a pragmatic level), if sincerely uttered by a fictionalist of the kind I 
am describing i.e. one who uses fictionalism as a semantic basis for pragmatic expression. In 
other words, if the motivation towards moral language is ultimately to express emotions 
towards certain behaviours in an authoritative manner, thereby instilling a sense of ‘must’ in 
the listener, then it makes little to no sense to use fictionalist semantics to describe the 
opposite of what the speaker is actually feeling, unless they are deliberately being insincere. 
In other words it seems intrinsic to moral language and its usage to be inherently motivating, 
whether the content is believed by the speaker or not, especially in an environment awash 
with moral realists, who do believe the content. Were I to assert, directly, that I am merely 
‘uncomfortable’ with the kicking of cats, but that I do not care if it happens, then I would be 
directly contradicting myself, because the whole point of me phrasing it like that is to 
communicate the fact that I do care and that I want it to stop.  
 
In his fourth section, Olson targets Joyce more directly. This involves making the case that 
Joyce fails to ‘sufficiently’ motivate his target audience towards revisionary fictionalism, and 
that many of the analogies he uses are highly vulnerable to counter example(s). His most 
salient example of this is on Joyce’s claim that true beliefs are inherently valuable and that 
false beliefs are inherently disvaluable, the idea being that fictionalism is attractive in virtue 
of its ability to preserve normal sounding moral discourse without consciously embracing 
false ontological beliefs (Olson, 2011, 193). Olson objects to this premise. For example, he 
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agrees that someone who is about to eat a poisonous apple would do well to believe that the 
apple is poisonous, and so true environmental beliefs can be inherently valuable. This can 
also be true of accurate mathematical beliefs; if someone is being pursued by two wolves, and 
one breaks off, the prey would do well to believe that there is one still pursuing (Olson, 2011, 
193)30. However, as Olson points out, there are very significant counter examples. Olson 
talks about very controversial philosophical positions, such as the value of the ‘illusion’ of 
libertarian free will or the disvalue of beliefs on matters like personal identity, bias, 
responsibility and desert. However, I think there are less controversial examples that could 
lend weight to Olson’s argument. In terms of beneficial false (or at the very least empirically 
unjustified) belief, one need only look at any pharmaceutical clinical trial and the effect(s) of 
placebo to confirm that there are cases of this, e.g. giving a subject a sugar pill and telling 
them that it will help them to quit smoking. Similarly, practices like meditation, yoga or 
hypnosis are widely regarded as producing similar results if embraced. Similarly, whether 
any particular world religion is true or not, it is hard to deny that in many, for example in 
Judeo-Christianity and Islam, Hinduism or Zen-Buddhism, the belief in the efficacy of prayer 
and meditation appears to have psychologically beneficial effects on believers. In terms of 
detrimental true beliefs, the discovery of any negative yet completely unalterable and/or 
irrelevant fact could, I argue, in some situations, be better left unknown31. 
 
Regardless, Olson’s point is that Joyce should not infer that fictionalism has any advantage 
based on the intrinsic value of true belief, and I am inclined to agree here. What Olson 
suggests in response is what he calls conservationism, which he explains in his fifth section. 
Conservationism, as Olson describes it, is the theory that we should preserve normal moral 
discourse but that we should simply embrace false beliefs and false assertions. So in the cat 
case, this means that “kicking cats is wrong” is an assertion, but it is false, and it is 
                                                          
30 I would also argue this is largely true of accurate scientific beliefs; if it is true that the altitude of a jump is insufficient for 
a parachute to sufficiently reduce the velocity of the fall, and the impact force upon landing, or that nuclear fission for useful 
energy production is mechanically achievable under certain very specific physical conditions, then someone to whom this 
kind of information applies would do well to believe it. Similarly, in terms of false beliefs, if embraced, a belief that 
spending an inordinate quantity of money on a race horse with very extreme odds against it is ‘likely’ to go well is 
statistically unlikely to pay off; a belief that one is immune to bullets also has the potential to cause intense, and brief, 
disillusionment. 
31 It is entirely possible, scientifically speaking, that a nearby star may supernova, or has already done so in the last few 
decades or centuries, and for a catastrophic amount of solar radiation to travel through our solar system, travelling at the 
speed of light and thereby giving us absolutely no warning of an impending extinction level event (which we can do literally 
nothing to prevent) comparable to a similar event that may have happened 440 million years ago [during the Ordovician 
period] in which 70% of marine and all terrestrial life on earth was wiped out. However, whilst it is true that this is a genuine 
scientific possibility, it is questionable how useful believing this is, given that there is nothing possible that can be done 
about it. To the contrary, this information is likely to further the believer’s anxiety about the possibility of bad things 
happening if focussed on, so it is arguably better not to focus on it, or even to completely ignore it. 
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deliberately false i.e. the speaker does not believe that kicking cats is wrong. The advantage 
of this, Olson claims, is that conservationism does not need any self surveillance to be 
maintained when using moral sentences (Olson, 2011, 198). Olson seems to base this idea on 
a key passage from Hume’s The Sceptic:  
 
If we can depend upon any principle, which we learn from philosophy, this, I think, 
may be considered as certain and undoubted, that there is nothing, in itself, valuable, or 
despicable, desirable or hateful, beautiful or deformed; but that these attributes arise 
from the particular constitution and fabric of human sentiment and affection. [...] We 
may push the same observation further, and may conclude, that, even when the mind 
operates alone, and feeling the sentiment of blame or approbation, pronounces one 
object deformed and odious, another beautiful and amiable, I say, that, even in this 
case, those qualities are not really in the objects, but belong entirely to the sentiment of 
that mind that blames or praises. (Hume, 1993, 97) 
 
Hume advocates habit as a ‘powerful means of reforming the mind and implanting in it good 
dispositions and inclinations’ (Hume, 1993, 97). Olson advocates conserving the language of 
moral realism, and the semantics of assertion and inference, but with the belief that these 
assertions are ultimately false. This does seem to preserve semantic simplicity and, via error 
theory, has a clear position on moral ontology as well. However, I have my worries about this 
solution. 
 
The first is one of the same worries I myself have about fictionalism on its own; if the 
speaker deliberately speaks in a way that does not accurately reflect what the listener 
believes, then there is a case to be made that the speaker is deliberately being deceptive when 
talking to a moral realist and that this is an unattractive conclusion. Both fictionalism, 
particularly of the hermeneutic variety, and conservationism depend on some kind of 
cooperative principle that for the duration of the following conversation, we will treat x as 
true, but this is not obviously the case where a fictionalist, or a conservationist, is talking to a 
realist, who specifically believes that moral language is true and that it refers to real moral 
values and properties. Whilst I can address this problem pragmatically under an expressive 
analysis in regards to the fictionalist, as I will do later on in chapter ten and later again in 
section three, I am not convinced this is possible if the moral discourse used relies on 




My second worry follows from an alternative perspective on fictionalism, and I believe this is 
an idea that expressivism shares. This is the idea that we should be able to accommodate the 
intuition that saying something like, “it is wrong to kick cats, but I don’t care if it happens”, 
reveals some sort of logical inconsistency. Expressivism explains this by stating that the “...it 
is wrong to kick cats...” clause of the sentence is equivalent to “...Boo! Kicking cats...” from 
which we should be able to infer observationally that the speaker does care if it happens, 
which directly contradicts the second clause of the sentence. I argue that we can use a similar 
move in regards to fictionalism, albeit slightly differently. Rather than the first clause being 
an expression, we can instead see it as a pretence assertion and one from which we can also 
reasonably use as a communication that the speaker does care what happens to cats, which 
much like the expressivist case directly contradicts the second clause. The difference is, 
however, that this is not a semantic inconsistency, but rather a pragmatic one: 
 
- Fictionalist/Pragmatic Expressivist Content 
1) Let us pretend that...it is the case that {kicking cats is wrong}32 
2) (1) = {I care if cats are kicked}33 
3) it is the case that  ~{I care if cats are kicked} 
      C)  therefore, it is the case that [{I care if cats are kicked} ^  ~{I care if cats are kicked}] 
       
Inconsistent Argument* --- At least in terms of its communicative function i.e. it is 
inconsistent to communicate that I both do and do not care if cats are kicked.  
 
Conservationism, however, cannot make this move:  
 
- Conservationist Content 
1) it is the case that {kicking cats is wrong}---false 
2) it is the case that  ~{I care if cats are kicked}---true 
      C)  therefore, it is the case that [{kicking cats is wrong} ^  ~{I care if cats are kicked}]---  
false 
       
                                                          
32 “Let us pretend that...it is the case that {x}”, is a pretence assertion, which, if left without additional, 
explanatory premises, we cannot make inferences from. 
33 Whilst this is not a stated assertion, it is, however, a truth condition which we can pragmatically infer from as 
I will outline in section three chapters four and five. 
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Valid (Unsound) Argument* --- (1) is false, rendering (C) also false, so this is still a 
consistent, albeit unsound, argument. 
 
So under a conservationist analysis, the sentence, “kicking cats is wrong, but I don’t care if 
care if it happens”, comes from a perfectly valid and consistent argument; it is simply 
interpreted as false. The fictionalist, with a little pragmatic expressivism, on the other hand 
can tackle this sentence with significantly more force by saying that the sentence is not only 
false, but inconsistent on logical grounds (albeit in terms of its pragmatic, communicative 
function rather than under a very strict, exclusively semantic analysis of its spoken content).  
 
My third and final worry is that conservationism seems to heavily rely on error theory, which 
is an ontological commitment in and of itself, and one which I am inclined to avoid. If the 
speaker actively believes that when they say a particular moral sentence that the sentence is 
false, then this surely seems to suggest that they are communicating a commitment of some 
kind towards moral ontology on some level as well. I believe that the kind of fictionalism 
(with subtle hints of expressivism) that I am peddling, which Joyce is not, has a significant 
advantage here over Olson’s conservationism, because whilst conservationism seems to rely 
on error theory, this newer brand of fictionalism does not. This is because the claim it makes 
is not one about how morals really are, nor is it a claim about how moral agents ‘ought’ to be 
speaking if they are to be correct; I believe that both kinds of claim are unnecessarily limiting 
and committal. My claim is one about how a non-realist can consistently speak, whether error 
theory is true or not. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that error theory is false. Suppose 
next that morals do, ontologically, exist on some level34. In such a case, the conservationist 
might intend to speak falsely about ethics not knowing that what they are saying is actually 
referentially true. By contrast, this possibility should not faze the non-realist that is agnostic 
when it comes to moral ontology. That it is ontologically wrong to kick cats does not alter the 
truth value of what they are saying, because no propositions are really being made, nor does it 
alter the information they are attempting to convey, because whether kicking cats is 
ontologically wrong or not, the point in saying so is to communicate attitudes with an air of 
authority motivating action, which stands regardless of what the moral ontology is or is not. 
                                                          
34 That morals have some kind of objective, existential qualities is certainly not without a convincing case; 
however, my concern has always been in regards to the suggestion that we can access them epistemologically 
(see section one chapter two). My position argues that the question of whether or not morality objectively 
‘exists’ and in what sense is less serious a question than the one about how on earth we could access or have 
knowledge of it if even if it does.  
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In other words, moral ontology need not be seen as necessarily error laden, rather it is simply 
irrelevant as far as the agnostic non-realist is concerned. So the advantage is one of a 
versatility and flexibility which conservationism lacks. Nevertheless, Olson’s arguments are 
extremely useful in that they help to highlight the key differences between the Joycean 
fictionalist account and my own. 
 
This, I believe, unique approach to the case against fictionalism, in which I take the stance of 
an agnostic in regards to moral ontology, and infuse moral fictionalism with pragmatic 
elements of expressivism, is what I ‘Expressive Fictionalism’. In my final chapter of this 
section, I will talk more about expressive fictionalism and discuss a little of what is to come 




Chapter 10: Expressive Fictionalism 
 
So what exactly is my own account, and how exactly does it differ from the Joycean one? 
Unlike the argumentative strategy used by Lewis and Blackburn in chapter five to separate 
the realist from the quasi-realist and the quasi-realist from the fictionalist, by pointing out 
what the other says which I do not, I will instead do the opposite and point out what I say, 
which I believe Joyce does not. In other words, I will make a similar move in regards to 
moral fictionalism that Nicholas Smyth makes in regards to quasi-realism, where I attempt to 
help it out by modifying it slightly. I do not believe that the semantic components of moral 
fictionalism are as problematic as Jonas Olson supposes. However, Olson does make an 
excellent point that when we follow through on moral fictionalism, we begin to lack a 
convincing account about the true function of non-realist moral discourse. In other words, if 
non-realists speak about morality in a fictionalist manner, then fictionalism accounts for how 
that works, but it struggles to account for why fictionalists do this. Why not simply adhere to 
error theory, talk about intentions and attitudes but leave ‘morality’ out of it? Why the 
pretence? Why make your moral discourse sound realist when in reality it is not? In chapter 
seven I describe Joyce’s account of moral fictionalism, which concerns motivations and 
intentions. According to Joyce, if I convince myself (at least when I am not in a ‘critical 
context’), that I ‘must’ do something, then I am more likely to actually do it, and this is 
somehow beneficial. I think that Joyce is right in saying this, but I am convinced that there is 
a great deal more to say about this, and I believe that there is room for some pragmatic 
expressivism here. In other words, I believe that we can utilize fictionalist semantics and 
pragmatic expressivism, and effectively splice them together. This is the approach I call, 
‘Expressive Fictionalism’.  
 
Something I will discuss at great length in section three is the relationship between moral 
language and the psychology of emotions and attitudes. We often use words like ‘good’ and 
‘bad’ both to describe moral properties and to describe positive and negative feelings. We 
also have a tendency to immerse moral language in a language of feeling, “I feel like this is 
the right thing to do” or, “This feels wrong”. We are also inclined to describe ‘moral’ acts in 
emotive terms, for example, ‘What a joy it is to see you behave so responsibly’, or, ‘I am 
disgusted by your behaviour today’. We also appear to struggle to separate emotions from 
moral discourse. For example, in my undergraduate days when I studied English literature, 
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we spent a week studying Lolita by Vladimir Nabokov, the subject matter of which is 
famously controversial, and so unsurprisingly nearly all of our discussions were emotionally 
charged. Much as we do with works of fiction, we have a tendency to become very much 
invested in the subject matter particularly where issues associated with morality are 
concerned. It is at least partially owing to these observations, among many others I will 
explore in section three, that I am convinced that expressivism is actually onto something 
when it describes moral language in terms of approving and disapproving attitudes35. What I 
think is interesting, however, is how compatible this seems to be, at least on a pragmatic 
level, with the kind of fictionalist semantics and their usage described by Joyce, albeit with 
some nuanced differences. In previous chapters we have both talked about the relationship 
between pretence in the form of fiction and motivation towards encouraging or discouraging 
action. If I convince myself that I ‘must’ do (x) amount of sit ups a day, then it is more likely 
that I will actually do it. To compel others, we would do well to also instil a sense of ‘must’ 
in them. What I think Joyce misses, however, is the relationship between inclinations towards 
affirmative or discouraging action or intention, and emotional, attitudinal dispositions 
towards these things and the communication of those attitudes that I believe are taking place 
in and around the pretence. In order to motivate a sense of ‘must’ in myself or others, I ‘must’ 
surely appeal to some force which is inherently motivating. One potent means of doing this is 
in appealing to human emotion. For example, if I want to ‘instil’ a sense of ‘must not’ in a 
child, then I am more likely to describe it in more decisive terms like, ‘kicking cats is 
wrong’, or at least, ‘kicking cats is unacceptable behaviour’, than a more passive ‘please 
don’t kick the cat; it upsets me’.  
 
I argue that what is being communicated between all of these sentences is almost identical, 
but that the former, more decisive utterances, in maintaining a pretence about ‘must’ and 
‘must not’, is subtly different, because rather than being phrased as a passive request, like the 
latter sentence, it is portrayed as coming from a position of authority; this is particularly 
important, for example, in child development. In other words we appeal to the child on an 
emotional level not only in terms of their capacity for empathy (which in the case of children 
is often still developing, as any parent or teacher will attest to), but also their fear of looking 
                                                          
35 ‘Attitude’ as a word is not without variations in meaning, however, and so for the purposes of this, let us take 
‘attitude’ to mean a person’s emotional disposition towards something; to have an approving attitude towards 
kindness means that I feel positive and affirm kindness as a ‘good’ thing, and to have a disapproving attitude 
towards cruelty means that I feel negative and repulsed by cruelty as a ‘bad’ thing. Let us then suppose that I am 
disposed or inclined to pursue and/or encourage ‘good’ things and to avoid and/or discourage ‘bad’ things.  
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‘bad’ in the eyes of others and being punished or chastised for it. As I will investigate further 
in section three, fear (of reprimand) even carries through into adulthood, not only in our 
justice system but on a social level as well, where much of how we speak and act is 
determined by concerns we have about how we appear to others. Concerns we have about 
how we appear to ourselves also play a crucial role, for example I argue that much of what 
constitutes a stable and positive sense of self-esteem often involves convincing ourselves that 
we are a ‘good person’. To a non-realist, this convincing involves some level of pretence, but 
it is nevertheless important, because as I will discuss later on in section three, the absence of 
this pretence is problematic not only socially, but also psychologically.  
 
Before continuing to build upon this idea in section three, let us first recap where we are right 
now. In our search for a functioning non-realist account of moral language, we first looked at 
the case against moral realism to give us some foundation to start with. We then discussed 
some of the useful terminology including expressivism, non-cognitivism and projectivism, 
and then looked at some of the other less common forms of non-realism, that we will not be 
focussing on and why that is the case. Next, we focussed our attention on quasi-realism, a 
seemingly promising form of non-cognitivist projectivism, which seemed like a worthy 
candidate on which to base a functioning non-realist account of moral language. This then 
became the primary focus of section one, in which we discussed the origins of quasi-realism 
in Spread the Word: Groundings in the Philosophy of Language by Blackburn, the Frege-
Geach problem and Blackburn’s proposed solution to it, and then we looked at Andy Egan’s 
objections and Nicholas Smyth’s defence coming from the position of the ‘resolute 
expressivist’. We then ended section one feeling reasonably positive about quasi-realism and 
its prospects.  
 
This then brought us to the beginning of section two, where we began to evaluate those 
objections to quasi-realism which were not so easily thwarted, in particular those of G.F. 
Schueler, in which I cited a new problem for quasi-realism that I have noticed, that being its 
apparent inability to accommodate the subtle differences between general vs. personal moral 
commitments and the difficulties that poses in demonstrating attitude inconsistency. We then 
looked at Van Roojen’s objections and a second defence by Smyth, in which we began to 
suspect that Smyth’s expressivism was not the same thing as quasi-realism. This then became 
very much apparent in chapter five when we looked at David Lewes’s paper, and Blackburn’s 
reply/response ‘Quasi-Realism no Fictionalism’, where we concluded that Blackburn had no 
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intention of preserving quasi-realism as resolutely expressivist in the same way that Smyth 
does, and we noticed further that this inability to accept any aid from the fictionalist also 
helped to condemn quasi-realism to the same problems that I noticed in my chapters on 
Schueler. Finally, we concluded that Blackburn seems to move away from the quasi- towards 
the realism, at the expense of his expressivism. As such, it became apparent that fictionalism 
was the far purer and far less costly form of non-realism of the two.  
 
We then focussed our attention on fictionalism, and in particular the account peddled by 
Richard Joyce, in which we discussed the difference between the tacit operator and the 
pretence assertion, as well as the difference between hermeneutic and revolutionary 
fictionalism, concluding that, like Joyce, we favoured a revolutionary account based on 
pretence assertion. We then looked at how this applied to moral discourse semantically and 
began to look at some of the pragmatic elements as well. We then looked at some of the 
objections to fictionalism and the problem of fictional discourse. This then brought us to the 
previous chapter detailing the objections of Jonas Olson to Joycean fictionalism. In that 
chapter, we concluded that fictionalist semantics are not necessarily as vulnerable as Olson 
supposes, but that there are major concerns which the Joycean fictionalist struggles to deal 
with, most notably the ability to account for the function of non-realist moral discourse.  
 
Joyce does provide an account of emotions and motivation in regards to moral fictionalism in 
which he likens moral language to a language of personal commitments, (e.g. ‘I must do x 
number of sit ups a day in order to maintain my fitness’ or ‘I mustn’t smoke or else I will die 
of lung cancer’). Such pretences motivate reinforcing or preventative action, and interestingly 
these kinds of sentiment are reminiscent of expressivism. However, I argue that this line of 
thinking, whilst provocative, is thus far underdeveloped and that Joyce could say a great deal 
more on this, namely about how these pretences are applied in varying levels of critical 
contexts, whether or not these are constituted by attitudes, how these attitudes may be 
communicated to others, whether the Frege-Geach problem is a concern here or not and 
whether or not there is an issue of deception involved in these kinds of pretence assertions. 
All of this and more I delve into in section three to provide some insight into what a more 
developed Joycean account of motivation may look like, and what happens when we combine 




My solution to this issue, therefore, which I have discussed in this chapter, is to use what we 
have learned in the first half of the thesis from the expressivists and quasi-realists, and to 
work this around the semantics proposed by fictionalists. My hope is that this will finally be 
what we have been looking for: a non-realist account which successfully accounts for the 
semantics of non-realist moral discourse and gives us a convincing account of the pragmatic 
discourse involved as well. My hope is also that this will be compatible with both error 
theory and moral realism alike, as it stems from neither, but rather from a position of 
agnosticism regarding moral ontology. Much like quasi-realism, I claim that what we treat as 
morally true or false stems from a psychological source rather than a metaphysical one. 
Unlike quasi-realism, whilst communication of attitudes plays a central role, these attitudes 
are not communicated semantically but rather through an alternative means of pragmatic 
discourse, an account of which I will build upon throughout section three. However, there is 
still a semantic content uttered, which exists in a form reflecting a Joycean fictionalist 
account in which we speak about ‘morality’ as a form of pretence in which we instil a sense 
of ‘must’ in both the listener(s) and in ourselves. It falls then to section three to explain 




Section 3: Expressive Fictionalism 
 
Chapter 1: (Introduction) 
 
In this chapter I will be doing a little sign posting about what to expect in the third, final and 
most important section of my thesis. Having now explored non-realist moral language and 
having, I believe, established that a Joycean fictionalist account is a worthy candidate for the 
semantics of non-realists, the task is then, as I have mentioned, to marry that with a pragmatic 
component thereby creating a more complete analysis of the moral communication of non-
realists. In this section, I will explore that component and in so doing go through various 
stages in that process.  
 
The first stage, which I will discuss in chapter two, will be to briefly talk about the 
differences between semantic and pragmatic discourse in order to give us some insight into 
what exactly we are looking for when we talk about providing a pragmatic component to our 
theories about the moral communication of non-realists. For instance, what effects do 
phenomena such as irony, intonation, emphasis or conversational implicature have on the 
meaning of an utterance? How is meaning conveyed beyond or around the semantic content 
of what words literally translate to within a given sentence? What role does context play in 
determining the meaning behind what people are saying, or moreover where, when and how 
they are saying it? In exploring these well known questions, but (less commonly) applying 
them specifically to moral communication, I hope to demonstrate the importance of going 
beyond semantic theories, and to place previously discussed semantics firmly within a 
broader context of a more complete analysis of moral communication.  
 
In order to make any of what comes later more than mere speculation, however, it is 
important that I provide some justification for thinking that emotions and attitudes play a 
central role in moral cognition and moral communication. To that end, I have devoted chapter 
three entirely to providing some kind of empirical, scientific basis for this link between 
emotional sensitivity and moral thought. In that chapter, I look at correlations between 
attitudes and behaviour with neurobiological phenomena in the ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex, observations of behavioural anomalies in humpback whales and case studies and 
testimonies of severe depression and anti-depressant medications, specifically of selective 
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serotonin reuptake inhibitors. By the end of that chapter, I conclude that whilst it would be 
difficult to demonstrate a necessary or logically deductible causal link between emotion 
sensitivity and moral cognition, there does seem to be more than enough empirical evidence 
to demonstrate at the very least a correlation and in all probability some kind of causal link to 
that effect.  
 
Once that link has been established, I will then set about applying this emotional sensitivity to 
moral language, developing a kind of pragmatic expressivism to fictionalist semantics. In that 
chapter, I will introduce two separate models by which we may translate emotions into moral 
language, these are the pride, shame and responsibility model and the empathy model. I will 
then construct a ten stage inferential process by which emotion sensitivity in the form of 
empathy may be psychologically translated into the moral language of a fictionalist.  In the 
following chapter, I expand further on this empathy model, and begin to break down this ten 
stage process, looking at each stage individually to determine how well it stands up to 
scrutiny. In the process, I also attempt to combine and integrate the empathy model with the 
previous pride, shame and responsibility model.  
 
Chapter six then revisits the previously explored Joycean concept of critical contexts, which I 
will endeavour to expand upon myself by applying my new expressive fictionalism to it. In 
this chapter, I introduce concepts which further elaborate on how expressive fictionalism 
works in critical contexts, such as that of emotional override and the problem of deception. 
Chapters seven through to nine then focus on applying expressive fictionalism to an argument 
for a concept of moral progress. Unlike Blackburn, I do not argue for a notion of moral truth 
within expressive fictionalism. However, I do argue that there are nevertheless still grounds 
for differentiation between moral actions and attitudes on grounds of quality and consistency 
within the morality fiction and that we can apply that to historical analyses to determine 
moral progress or regress. However, in keeping with the fictionalist content of the moral 
language involved, constituted not by assertion but by pretence assertion, this too is part of 
the pretence when analysed within a maximised critical context. This becomes evident 
particularly in chapter eight when I examine a very similar approach by the pragmatic 
expressivist Catherine Wilson and her comparison between the historical narratives of slavery 
and the phlogiston theory of combustion. Finally in chapter nine, I don the pretence mask to 
demonstrate how we may apply an expressive fictionalist style of language when talking 
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about moral progress throughout human history. In chapter ten, I will then put all that we 
have discussed here together and draw my final conclusions.   
 
By the end of my thesis, I aim to finally have what we have been searching for; that is a 
complete theory of non-realist moral language, which explains how and why we use 
seemingly realist moral language in the absence of reference to real moral content, which is 
compatible with an agnostic perspective on the existence of moral properties within 
metaphysics, that does not rely or supervene on any additional epistemology, that does not 
constitute a reduction to error theory, that does not compromise its own non-realism, that 




Chapter 2: Semantic and Pragmatic Discourse 
 
Communication goes far beyond the code of what words literally mean within a sentence. 
Nearly all animal species for instance rely heavily on non-verbal communication (e.g. body 
language). This is not to say that in human communication semantic meanings of words are 
not important; they certainly are. It is, however, only one component in a vast system of how 
one communicates. In this chapter I will begin to discuss the concept of ‘pragmatics’. To 
avoid any unnecessary confusion, I will be treating ‘pragmatics’ as an aspect of 
communication about which we might theorize about how context contributes to the meaning 
of an utterance. In particular, I will be focussing on phenomena like conversational 
implicature (Grice, 1989, 26), emphasis and intonation as examples (though it should be 
noted that many other fields are associated with the term ‘pragmatics’ e.g. speech act theory, 
conversation analysis etc).  To put things even more simply, I will be looking into systems of 
how people communicate beyond or outside of the literal meanings of the words they use.  
 
For example, to use a very dramatic case of pragmatic communication, sarcasm, we can 
clearly see how meaning is often context dependent. For instance, suppose you already 
know that I dislike mayonnaise. If upon receiving a sandwich drenched in mayonnaise, I 
suddenly roll my eyes and say, “oh yeah, I really really like the look of this sandwich”, then 
my meaning should be apparent---I do not like the look of this sandwich. Sarcasm is so 
dramatic an example, because the ultimate meaning behind the utterance is the complete 
opposite of the literal, semantic meaning of the words and sentence that I used. So whilst 
sarcasm will not prominently feature in any of the following theories of moral pragmatics, it 
is nonetheless a useful example we can use to demonstrate how dramatically the meaning of 
an utterance can differ from its semantic meaning within a given context. It is, in effect, a 
useful springboard into the world of context dependency.  
 
Pragmatics is not merely about altering the meaning behind an utterance from its semantic 
components; it can also be about augmenting semantic meaning(s) with additional 
meaning(s). For example, to use a famous Gricean concept, conversational implicature 
describes how context implies additional information beyond a sentence’s semantic content: 
“Mary had a baby and got married”. This sentence suggests that Mary had her baby before 
the wedding. However, the sentence does not say this, and it would still hold true as a 
sentence with the exact same semantic content were the opposite case true (i.e. if Mary had 
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the baby after the wedding). Similarly, if I were to say the words, “I ate some pie”, this 
suggests that I did not eat all of the pie. However, the sentence’s semantic content would still 
produce a true sentence if I had eaten all of the pie. In audible communication, emphasis can 
also be an important means of conveying meaning. If I were to say, with emphasis, that, “I 
ate some pie”, then this very clearly suggests that I did not eat all of the pie (Grice, 1989, 22). 
Again, however, if we look merely at the semantic content of the sentence, this is not 
necessarily the case, as the sentence would still be literally true if I had eaten all of the pie, 
though the listener would no doubt question why I emphasised the word ‘some’ and may 
even accuse me of dishonesty despite the fact that, semantically speaking, I am not actually 
lying.  
 
So what does any of this have to do with moral sentences? Moral sentences constitute 
communicative acts just like any other sentence. The difference is that unlike many 
sentences, it is not entirely agreed upon what function or form of communication moral 
sentences involve. If we are to have any hope of resolving this issue, then we must surely 
look upon the entirety of the communicative act when speaking about ethical issues. For 
example, if we take a kind of realist stance on the issue and say that moral sentences assert 
moral facts, then the semantic content of the sentence then becomes very clear and straight 
forward (at least in a linguistic sense albeit not in a metaphysical sense). What is more open 
to discussion, however, is the pragmatic motivation and contextual meaning behind the 
assertion. Suppose we say that the primary motivation behind any assertion is to enlighten the 
listener. In other words it is to make the listener aware of a particular fact and/or set of facts. 
However, there may be any number of reasons why the speaker may do this. Perhaps the 
speaker feels the listener might benefit from additional moral knowledge, or perhaps the 
speaker feels they need to adhere to some kind of ‘responsibility’ and ensure as many people 
are as aware as possible of certain moral facts. Regardless of the specific motivation behind 
their utterance, there is surely at least some kind of contextual meaning behind it.  
 
Things become even more interesting if we adopt a non-realist or a non-cognitivist stance. If 
we assume, for the sake of argument, that moral sentences do not assert moral facts, they 
nevertheless appear as though they do. This raises very interesting questions about what the 
speaker who speaks in a realist way (but who is not a realist) wants to accomplish by 
speaking like this. One solution is expressivism, which we have explored in previous chapters 
and which claims that the semantic content of these sentences convey expressions of 
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emotional approval/disapproval. This is interesting, because it introduces us to the idea that 
there is some kind of connection between emotion and ideas and language about ethics; this 
is something I will come back to. This emotional connection is not so emphasized in moral 
fictionalism, however, which is the other non-realist solution I have investigated in previous 
sections.  
 
What motivates the revisionary fictionalist speaker who knows that they are a fictionalist? 
This is, perhaps, the most important question that should drive the remainder of the thesis. 
According to the pretence assertion account of moral fictionalism, when we utter moral 
sentences we are pretending to assert moral facts. This is already highly context dependent, 
the rules of the conversation need to be understood by both speaker and listener, as if to say, 
“Let us pretend for the duration of the conversation that moral facts exist and that I am 
referring to them”. The important question is simply, why do this? In section two, we 
concluded that according to fictionalism, the semantic content of the sentence remains as it 
appears. Therefore, any alternative meaning behind the utterance or from the communicative 
act in general must come from the context or way in which it is uttered; this brings us 
squarely back to the pragmatics of moral discourse.  
 
So what we have here is thus the unenviable task of linking semantic fictionalism with some 
kind of compatible pragmatic account of moral discourse as a communicative act, as opposed 
to merely focussing on what moral sentences literally translate as. I have mentioned earlier 
that when it comes to non-realist accounts of motivations behind moral discourse, as opposed 
to simply how they work, that expressivism is particularly interesting for several reasons. The 
first reason is that expressivism has a convincing story to tell us about moral attitudes as 
opposed to moral beliefs, and why exactly it is so convincing in my opinion I will delve into 
in the chapter which follows this one. This very much helps us explain the contextual nature 
of moral discourse. According to expressivism, moral discourse takes place where there are 
events (or theoretical events) which provoke attitudes or feelings of approval and 
disapproval, and the aim of moral language is to communicate these attitudes. The second 
reason is that this does not necessarily contradict semantic fictionalism so long as we style 
ourselves as pragmatic expressivists rather than semantic expressivists. For example, as we 
saw half way through section two, if we were to try to marry fictionalism with another 
semantic theory within expressivism, such as quasi-realism, then problems would occur. As 
Simon Blackburn (correctly) points out, quasi-realism is not same animal as fictionalism.  If, 
139 
 
however, we focus on those elements of expressivism associated with communicative acts 
and contexts in which moral discourse occurs, then we may have something which does tie in 
with and augment the semantic components provided by Joycean fictionalism quite nicely.  
 
Before we do this, however, there is one more important matter to attend to and that is the 
matter of what basis we have for supposing that moral discourse necessarily has anything 
whatsoever to do with attitudes or emotions. Unfortunately, it is not enough for me to simply 
say that the expressivist account of why we use moral language in the way that we do 
‘sounds’ convincing. In other words, we suppose that there is some kind of connection 
between emotions and attitudes and morals and sensibilities. We suppose that morality, and 
moral language has something to do with processing and communicating feelings of approval 
and disapproval. It ‘sounds’ convincing, but it would most definitely help if we had some 
evidence to suggest that this is indeed the case. This brings us to my next chapter in which I 
will attempt to provide this.  
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Chapter 3: Emotions and Ethics---A Scientific Perspective 
 
I would like to begin this chapter by talking about the apparent relationship between moral 
attitudes (i.e. attitudes of right and wrong), and feelings of strong emotion. I imagine that for 
most readers, moral decisions usually seem to be coupled with a strong emotional opinion on 
whatever the issue in question is. For example, I for one tend to feel some strong emotion 
(e.g. sympathy or in some cases worry for the wellbeing of others) prior to wanting to do 
something altruistic, such as giving up a seat on a train, lending out a coat or in extreme cases 
putting my own safety at risk to ensure the wellbeing of another, and that action tends to be 
followed by different emotions (e.g. relief, satisfaction or pride). I would imagine that others 
hold similar sentiments as well. It seems then that there is some kind of connection or 
correlation between emotions and what we would normally recognise as ‘moral’ decision 
making. However, this raises some important questions. Just how evident is this correlation, 
and what kind of connection are we even looking for? I argue that it would be difficult at best 
to find a connection between emotion and moral decision making that is necessary or self-
evident. To do so would surely require us to demonstrate that it is somehow logically 
contradictory to posit that a moral decision can be both sincerely and dispassionately made 
(without any emotion being present or being conveyed). In other words, if there is even one 
example where this occurs, then the conclusion is by definition false. I argue that there is, 
however, more than enough empirical evidence to suggest at the very least a correlation 
between emotion and moral judgement. The question then becomes, as it always does with 
any empirical research, whether or not this correlation is causal or not. Do our feelings cause 
our moral judgements? Do our moral judgements cause our feelings? Nevertheless, 
throughout this chapter I will examine some of this evidence (in truth there is far too much to 
examine in its entirety), and in so doing it should gradually become apparent that the 
conclusions that we reach clearly provoke questions for any potential discussion about what a 
moral fictionalist is truly hoping to achieve by communicating in the way that he/she does.  
 
First, let us look at what the evidence for this correlation is. Liane Young and Michael 
Koenigs suggest that neuroscience provides evidence that emotional processes underlie 
individuals’ moral decision-making. According to their abstract, “Neuroscience offers a 
unique perspective on this question by addressing whether brain regions associated with 
emotional processing are involved in moral cognition.” (Young & Koenigs, 2007, 69) The 
study involved conducting a narrative review of neuroscientific studies which focus on the 
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role of emotion in morality. Specifically, the study describes evidence implicating the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPC), a region of the brain known to be associated with 
emotional processing (Young & Koenigs, 2007, 69). MRI scans demonstrated VMPC 
activation during tasks probing moral cognition. In addition, studies of clinical populations, 
specifically patients with damage to their VMPC, revealed an association between 
impairments in emotional processing and impairments in moral judgement and behaviour. 
The study concludes that these studies indicate “that not only are emotions engaged during 
moral cognition, but that emotions, particularly those mediated by VMPC, are in fact critical 
for human morality.” (Young & Koenigs, 2007, 69).  
 
Assuming that the evidence provided by Young and Koenigs is correct, then there is a clear 
and evident correlation between emotion states and moral cognition and moral decision 
making. However, we would do well not to get too carried away here. What the initial part of 
this study shows us is that there is an evident correlation rather than a necessary causal 
relation. The second part of the study is, however, more promising in that regard, as it seems 
to reveal that if the ventromedial prefrontal cortex is damaged, then the patient’s moral 
cognition seems to suffer as well. However, whilst this does suggest a causal relation of sorts, 
this is not to say that emotion is necessarily the exclusive source of moral judgement. For 
example, one possible explanation is that emotion is an important component of moral 
decision making, because morality applies to how we treat others in a social context and this 
is also an evolutionary function of emotion. This at least sounds plausible. In an evolutionary 
context, much of our survival has been down to how well we interacted with each other in a 
group. In this context, it stands to reason then that the application of moral judgements is 
something we ought to care deeply about. One issue with this explanation, however, is that it 
does not tell us anything specific about the application of moral language, which from a 
philosophical point of view is what we really want to focus on; this is something I will 
address further down. Nevertheless, I argue that Young and Koenigs work is a great stepping 
stone into the world of relationships between emotion and what we might recognise as 
‘morality’.  
 
This recognition is also very important, because the matter of what constitutes morality is a 
very controversial issue. For the sake of argument, let us take altruism as an example. We can 
look for and often find correlations between seemingly altruistic behaviour and strong 
emotions. In fact, we can see this not only in people but in certain animals as well, 
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predominantly those that live in social groups. For example, in 2012 a BBC/National 
Geographic film crew for the series Planet Earth took incredible footage of a previously 
unseen phenomenon. Whilst filming an orca attack on a grey whale mother and her calf 
around Monterey Bay, two humpback whales were seen ‘intervening’ on the hunt. Humpback 
whales are known for making a high pitched trumpeting sound when agitated. The crew 
observed the humpbacks trumpeting, diving and violently slapping their pectoral fins against 
the water. According to observer Victoria Bromley “It didn’t seem at all like they were 
confused… they were definitely there with a purpose,” (as seen in Davis, 2012). 
Nevertheless, the attack resulted in the killer whales successfully killing the grey whale calf, 
after which all of the larger whales, including the mother grey whale fled the scene. After the 
attack, however, the humpback whales were seen moving back into the area where the calf 
was last seen, trumpeting and rolling in the water and aggressively swiping their tails at any 
orcas that approached. According to observers, “the whales [we watched] should have been 
off feeding: instead, they deliberately stayed in our area, loudly announcing their presence.” 
(Davis, 2012) “This was not a curious approach by these humpback whales: they seemed 
truly distressed.” (Davis, 2012) The observations have since been backed up by more 
academic studies into the behaviour of humpback whales, for example by zoologists like 
Robert L. Pitman, Volker B. Deecke, Christine M. Gabriele and others (Pitman et al, 2016, 
7). The research in this study strongly suggests a conclusion that these instances of 
humpbacks interfering in orca attacks are examples of interspecies altruism. Other possible 
explanations include kin selection theory and reciprocity, both of which are lacking in direct 
evidence in observations of the behaviour of humpback whales. It is clear that humpback 
whales can be highly emotional before, during and after performing apparent altruism, but the 
still unanswered question is this: was this apparent altruism caused by the whales’ emotions? 
 
The only way we could truly answer the question of whether or not there is a causal relation 
between emotion and moral decision making and to what extent it plays a role in moral 
language is if we were to look at a case or cases where a subject is entirely devoid of 
emotion, and then see whether or not they are even capable of making what they or anyone 
would comprehend as a moral decision. This is difficult to imagine let alone find an example 
of. However, perhaps something very close to this can be found in some particularly severe 
cases of clinical depression. In the most extreme cases of depression, it is not uncommon for 
a patient to experience a very high degree of emotional detachment. Similarly, some patients 
with mild to moderate levels of depression who have been treated with SSRIs (selective 
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serotonin reuptake inhibitors) have experienced similar periods of emotional detachment 
albeit to a lesser extent (in fact this is something I have first-hand experience of). The 
phenomenon is not particularly well understood, but the symptoms generally appear to 
consist of the patient experiencing an impaired ability to experience strong emotions both 
positive and negative.  
 
Jonathan Price, Victoria Cole and Guy M. Goodwin talk about precisely this phenomenon. 
Their paper details a qualitative study gathering data through individual reviews, a group 
interview and validation interviews, which concluded that emotional side effects from SSRIs 
are “a robust phenomenon, prominent in some people’s thoughts about their medication, 
having a demonstrable impact on their functioning and playing a role in their decision-
making about antidepressant adherence.” (Price et al, 2009, 211) During the interviews, eight 
key framework themes were identified. The general effects on all emotions, reduction of 
positive emotions, reduction of negative emotions, emotional detachment, ‘just not caring’, 
changes in personality, effects on everyday life (helpful or unhelpful), and the final theme 
being ‘it’s because of my pills’.  
 
On the general effects on all emotions, the study had this to say:  
 
Most participants described a general reduction in the intensity of all the emotions 
that they experienced, so that all their emotions felt flattened or evened out, and their 
emotional responses to all events were toned down in some way. Very common 
descriptions of this phenomenon included feelings of emotions being ‘dulled’, 
‘numbed’, ‘ flattened’ or completely ‘blocked’, as well as descriptions of feeling 
‘blank’ and ‘ flat’. A few participants described a more extreme phenomenon, in 
which they did not experience any emotions at all. (Price et al, 2009, 213). 
 
Almost all of the patients described a reduction of positive emotions to some extent (i.e. 
happiness, enjoyment, excitement, passion, affection, enthusiasm etc). “Many participants 
described reduced enjoyment of, for example, social situations, hobbies or interests, beauty 
and nature, and music and other emotional media.” (Price et al, 2009, 213) All of the patients 
also described a reduction in the intensity of frequency of negative emotions also, which they 




Although a reduction in these negative emotions was usually at some stage a benefit 
or relief, for many participants it had become an unwanted side-effect, impairing their 
quality of life. Participants described the need to be able to feel negative emotions 
when appropriate, such as grief or concern. Some were unable to respond with 
negative emotions, such as being unable to cry when this would have been appropriate 
or respond appropriately to bad news. (Price et al, 2009, 213). 
 
Most patients described emotional detachment manifesting in a general detachment from 
other people and from social interaction. Specifically, they felt reduced sympathy and 
empathy (Price et al, 2009, 213). This also seems familiar to my own experience of SSRIs, 
which I suppose affords me the opportunity to ask some relevant questions here. Did I feel 
like my capacity to make what I would now recognise as moral decisions was affected whilst 
in this emotionally detached state? More importantly, was it noticeably more difficult to 
convey ethical ideas through moral language? One would think that these would be simple 
enough questions to answer, but unfortunately they are not, even to one who has experienced 
this, but if I were to come up with either a yes or no answer then I would probably say ‘yes’. 
The main difficulty in answering this question lies in the realisation that during these periods 
of emotional detachment, matters of moral decision making did not seem overly relevant at 
the time for the simple reason that I was rarely if ever interacting with other people in social 
activities, and so there was little to no pressure to adhere to any moral principles of any kind. 
All thoughts seemed to be those that referred to what were the most rational courses of action 
when generally acting around the house on my own e.g. ‘I ‘should’ pre-heat the oven before 
putting the bread in’. On the rare occasion that I did interact with other people, I was 
noticeably more polite than usual. However, this politeness did not come from a desire to be 
so based on the idea that it was ‘the right thing to do’, but rather that it was a ‘sensible’ thing 
to do in order to make the conversation go more quickly. In fact, things being ‘the right thing 
to do’ were not generally a relevant concern at the time, rather what was the ‘smart’ thing to 
do. Whilst there was a lot to be said for this rational approach to daily life, I ultimately do not 
regret choosing to stop taking SSRIs and instead treat my depression using a different kind of 
antidepressant, an NaSSA drug called Mirtazapine, which focuses primarily on raising 
serotonin levels via treating my insomnia; I found this far more effective in my particular 
case, though it is important to remember that the best treatments vary on a case to case basis 




I believe this personal testimony of mine bears some resemblance to the framework themes 
described in the 2009 study. The fourth framework theme described involves patients 
describing a state of ‘not caring’ (not feeling overly strong emotions about any one thing in 
particular). Interestingly, this is described as having both positive and negative results in 
hindsight (Price et al, 2009, 214). A positive consequence of this is that it reduced the 
pressure on some patients to perform activities to the impossibly high standards that they set 
themselves, thus relieving a great deal of stress that would otherwise be experienced. Many 
patients described their previous depressive state as being rooted in a kind of unrealistic and 
unhelpful or even pathological perfectionism, inevitably leading to self-criticism and bitter 
disappointment upon discovery of one’s own natural and inevitable imperfection. However, 
they also felt less motivated to perform well in tasks that they previously excelled at. They 
also felt less motivated to look after themselves physically as well as they used to. “Some 
participants felt that their sensible, safety-conscious, side had diminished and they just did 
not care as much about the consequences to themselves of their behaviour.” (Price et al, 2009, 
214). In some extreme cases, this went a stage further and started to affect the patients in 
dramatically negative ways. “A few participants went further, mentioning thoughts of self-
harm or suicide that they related, at least in part, to feelings of emotional detachment and 
emotional numbness. One participant had started to self-harm in an effort to feel emotion 
[even if that emotion was negative].” (Price et al, 2009, 214). This last case is particularly 
interesting, as it implies that there is at least some means of motivation for behaviour other 
than emotion, given that the motivation is directly targeted at feeling an, or any, emotion in 
the first place (I will return to this idea a little in my next chapter).  
 
Without spending too much time going through all of the remaining framework themes, let 
me instead sum up by concluding that the 2009 study shows us a fairly close example of what 
an individual functioning with little to no emotional attachment looks like. Now for the 
important questions: do these cases also display an inability to function in what we would 
normally recognise as moral behaviour? Also, do these cases display an inability to utilize 
and/or recognise moral language? Referring again to my own testimony regarding moral 
language, I do not recall so much as even making use of it when emotionally detached. This 
was because my perception of everyday life did not seem to manifest in the context of what 
was ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ but rather in terms of what was ‘sensible’ or ‘logical’ and what was 
clearly ‘illogical’. Ironically, this did allow me to function as a moral agent of sorts. It simply 
did not occur to me to carry out overtly cruel acts, as they were generally irrational and/or 
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pointless and thus not worth doing. However, if I care to think back in hindsight, I realise that 
non-reciprocal altruism also eluded me at the time. I was, however, able to recognise the 
moral language of others as moral language, I simply did not utilise it myself. The best way I 
can think to describe it is that I had little to no moral sentiments, and so I had no reason to 
convey emotional concepts through moral language. I imagine the experience would be a lot 
different to someone who had never known strong emotion unlike me who at least had the 
memory of strong emotion to conceptualise and recognise the meanings behind emotional 
terminology. However, just imagining a subject who has never experienced an emotion 
speaking in terms of what is right and wrong in a way that would have the same meaning to 
you or me is difficult. Regarding the 2009 study, this subject of the effects of SSRIs on 
specifically moral language is sadly not really touched upon. However, what is a recurring 
theme in the study is the idea that these patients had a dramatically reduced sense of empathy 
(Price et al, 2009, 213). That is, a reduced sense of the feelings of others.  
 
So how can we attach this connection with emotion into the moral language of the expressive 
fictionalist for example? First, let us look at what an emotion is. This is, unfortunately, 
frustratingly difficult. Describing emotions in a non-circular way is difficult in and of itself. 
For example, describing it as a subjective ‘feeling’ may be unhelpful here. Instead, let us 
assume for the sake of argument then that an emotion is best described as a kind of alarm bell 
or warning signal that there is some issue relevant to the subject’s survival and/or wellbeing 
that they would want to take notice of if such things are important to them, as some in 
evolutionary theories describe it. For instance, suppose we see emotions as Paul Ekman 
describes, for example the emotion fear as related to the subject’s awareness and 
interpretation of potential dangers in their environment. Similarly, we see disgust as related 
to the subject’s self defence against contagious diseases, anger as related to the subject’s 
motivations to solve problems and/or remove threats quickly and decisively, sadness as 
related to preventing the subject from continuing behaviour that is ultimately unhelpful 
and/or a hindrance to more productive goals, and finally, joy as related to reinforcing 
behaviour that is helpful and/or beneficial to the subject’s health and/or wellbeing (Ekman, 
1992, 169)36. Most basic emotions seem to stem from these archetypes, for example terror a 
more extreme form of fear, amusement a more specific form of joy, embarrassment a very 
                                                          
36 If this sounds familiar, that could be because Ekman was a leading psychological consultant on the 2015 
Disney Pixar film Inside Out; there are also other ‘primary’ emotions Ekman describes that do not feature in the 
film, such as surprise.  
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specific form of sadness (possibly with connotations of surprise as well) etc. Let us also 
assume for the sake of argument that not only do we have an immediate and very direct sense 
of our own emotions, but we also have an observable sense of other people’s emotions as 
well: empathy. This is equally useful, because our own individual survival and/or wellbeing 
when coexisting in a social group (e.g. a tribe, a nation or even a world), is intrinsically tied 
to and in no small way dependent on the survival and/or wellbeing of others. If we combine 
this with the idea that empathy is somehow connected to what we would recognise as moral 
concepts (e.g. altruism, i.e. that which relates to our treatment of others), then we can begin to 
see how a fictionalist may assimilate some of this into their own language (this in particular 
will help us out a great deal in the later stages of chapter five). First, let us remind ourselves 
of how a fictionalist describes moral concepts in terms of language. Assuming we are going 
with Joyce’s pretence assertion theory over a tacit operator (Joyce, 2011, 291), then the 
sentence “kicking cats is wrong”, is a pretence assertion, semantically meaning what it says, 
but in fictional context. Therefore, it not really asserting anything whatsoever, and as stated 
previously, this raises the question of why the fictionalist would bother to do this. To answer 
that question let us look at what might be going through the fictionalist’s mind when he/she 




Chapter 4: From Science to Language 
 
My arguments in the preceding chapter(s) should, I hope, suffice to establish that there is a 
link between emotions and moral attitudes, for instance those of approval and disapproval. If 
we accept that that is the case, the question that now arises is how this is communicated 
through moral discourse. One possible way, which I have explored extensively in my 
previous two sections, is to express attitudes of approval and disapproval semantically. 
However, as we have seen, this explanation is vulnerable to the Frege-Geach problem where 
we lack a convincing explanation of how moral language can serve an expressive function in 
unasserted contexts, and it takes very elaborate and ambitious projects, such as quasi-realism, 
to even try to circumvent that difficulty. However, I argue that the Frege-Geach problem is 
only a difficulty for expressivism so long as we interpret semantic content as expressive 
rather than assertoric. In other words, we can still be expressivists in terms of our 
interpretation of the communicative act of moral discourse whilst using alternative 
approaches to fill in the content semantically i.e. moral fictionalism. However, if we are to 
marry the two concepts together, then we surely need some means of answering how and why 
non-realists may use fictionalised moral terminology to assert, or pretend to assert, 
fictionalised moral phenomena to express emotions and attitudes, such as approval and 
disapproval. In the following chapters, I will explore how various emotions function in 
relation to moral cognition, and then moral language. I will do this by introducing two 
separate models in which emotions may be translated into moral language. First, I will 
discuss what I call ‘the pride, shame, and responsibility model’, and later on ‘the empathy 
model’. These two models may even stand as alternatives to each other, yet I would argue 
that more often than not the two are very closely related, for they are neither mutually 
exclusive nor even averse to working in parallel with each other, and more often than not 
they do just that. 
 
First let us discuss the pride, shame and responsibility model. One possible inspiration we 
may take is from Jesse J. Prinz’s 2007 work The Emotional Construction of Morals. Prinz, 
for example, also argues, as Gilbert Harman does and as I do, that morality originates not 




We don’t have a clothing module; we just get cold and are clever enough to solve that 
problem by making things to cover our bodies. We don’t have a religion module; we 
just have tendencies to attribute mentality to non-living things and a penchant for 
stories that violate expectations (Boyer and Ramble, 2001). My conjecture is that 
morality falls into this category. It is a byproduct of capacities that are not themselves 
evolved for the acquisition of moral rules. (Prinz, 2007, 270) 
 
This is, ironically enough, not unlike Blackburn and the quasi-realist discourse on 
projectivsm, whereby non-moral cognitive processes are projected onto the world not the 
other way around, and where morality is treated as a construct rather than a property. Prinz 
argues that emotions help to form the cognitive processes necessary for moral attitudes to 
arise. He discusses his theories on how these cognitive processes manifest and the variety of 
complex systems this involves:  
 
First and foremost, we need to have certain emotions: other-directed emotions such as 
anger, contempt, and disgust, as well as self-directed emotions such as shame and guilt, 
which, I argued earlier, may be related to embarrassment and sadness. Second, one 
needs the ability to formulate rules. During moral development, we must transfer the 
negative emotions that we are conditioned to experience when we misbehave to the 
misbehaviour. In so doing, we generate a mental representation that disposes us to have 
negative feelings about a type of behaviour regardless of who is performing it. (Prinz, 
2007, 270) 
 
So here Prinz is dividing emotions into at least two categories, those directed at others and 
those directed at oneself. He also raises a very important point about rule formation. Systems 
of morality often involve far more than mere approval or disapproval; moral rules are an 
integral component of how morality functions in everyday life. The concept of ‘justice’, for 
example, is embedded with layers of additional abstract concepts, such as discipline, 
punishment, accountability and responsibility. More importantly (for us), these layers of 
conceptualisation are, more often than not, infused with more emotions like pride, shame and 
guilt.  
 
For the sake of argument, let us define pride as a feeling of positive self-esteem, either in the 
form of a general admiration for the self or of a particular set of actions, attitudes or 
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characteristics perpetrated by oneself. This is not to be confused with another, very similar 
phenomenon i.e. arrogance, which we may describe as concerning the perceived image of the 
self in relation to others (in this case considering oneself as somehow ‘better’ than others). 
To clarify, where we talk about pride (in the context of the pride, shame and responsibility 
model), we are referring to the emotion/feeling of positive self-esteem, rather than how it 
relates to how others are perceived in comparison. Now let us interpret shame to be a feeling 
of negative self criticism, and so in many ways we may see it as an opposite to pride. Much 
like pride, shame may be targeted at any number of things, from physical appearance to 
particular actions, attitudes or other feelings one may have in relation to something. 
 
Earlier on Prinz also describes something called ‘meta-emotions’, this will be something 
which will come to be rather important later on. According to Prinz, “we don’t just value 
actions; we also value the valuing of those actions” (Prinz, 2007, 120). In other words, like 
Blackburn, Prinz portrays emotions and attitudes as multi layered, whereby emotions and 
attitudes may be directed at other emotions and attitudes. According to Prinz, “If your values 
disagree with mine, I will have a negative response to both your behaviour and your values. 
The former may lead me to try to alter your behaviour directly, but my distaste for your 
values will require that I try to alter how you feel” (Prinz, 2007, 120). So in essence a meta-
emotion is simply an emotional reaction to an emotional reaction. How this plays out, 
however, is very interesting, because what appears to happen is that emotional reactions take 
place not only in response to certain behaviours, but in response to others’ emotions (or lack 
thereof) in response to those behaviours. Later on, he describes something else, this being 
meta-punishment (Prinz, 2007, 271). This involves not only punishing those who flout moral 
rules, but also those who allow this to happen. Thus, meta-emotions like disdain or outrage 
are targeted not at the original immoral act itself (exclusively), but at wilful apathy in 
response to that act also (Prinz, 2007, 271). These two concepts will help us out a great deal 
as we begin to unravel how this leads into the pride, shame and responsibility model.  
 
As mentioned earlier, pride and shame are, as Prinz would describe them, self-directed 
emotions. Now let us look at how these kinds of sentiments manifest in other-directed 
emotions like anger or disgust. Prinz, for example, proposes a form of social punishment 




If you want to train people to be good at withdrawing love, you could train them just to 
behave as if they were withdrawing love, or you could train them actually to withdraw 
love. In short, you could train people to be disappointed (or angry or disgust etc.) when 
other people misbehave. The latter strategy seems more direct, and hence more 
efficacious. If I am right, then the best way to implement meta-punishment is to show 
disappointment (or anger or disgust etc.) at those who do not react to misdeeds with 
negative emotions. When we do that, we effectively condition people to feel badly 
about not feeling badly about bad behaviour. Thus, meta-emotion is a form of meta-
punishment because it assigns an emotional cost to anyone who fails to have punitive 
emotions toward those who transgress. (Prinz, 2007, 271) 
 
So already, we can see how one possible model for translating emotions into moral language 
arises, one based on the social positioning of one in relation to a perceived transgression, and 
how one’s reaction is perceived by others in a social environment. Therefore, the emotional 
need for the individual to exist harmoniously within one’s social environment carries with it 
certain behavioural imperatives; these include active efforts to avoid violation of behaviours 
others deem less than acceptable. Failure to conform to these collective standards carries with 
it other emotions, such as the fear of ridicule, abandonment and/or punishment. In essence, 
the emotional, social, and perhaps even the physical health of the individual depends 
significantly on their ability to manage through a complex web of emotional states working 
simultaneously in conjunction with each other, ranging from pride of one’s ability to conform 
to the social requirements, reinforcing ‘good’ behaviour, to shame or guilt at one’s failure to 
do so, to then applying the expectation of such emotions in others, then applying anger or 
disgust towards any apathy displayed by others towards their own need to conform, we may 
then refer to this as their responsibility to do so.  
 
In my next chapter, I will examine this model in greater detail and then proceed further by 
discussing how these emotions may be communicated through fictional utterances, not only 
expressing pride and shame, but also through other phenomena such as empathy and 
compassion. With this aim in mind, I would do well to set a few ‘sub aims’ and key points 
here: 
 
1) The ultimate aim is to depict a non-realist account of moral language---i.e. one which 
does not rely on any realist metaphysics or epistemology but rather is an account 
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stemming purely from the philosophy of moral language (specifically within the 
realms of semantics and pragmatics).  
2) The account depicts a fictionalist account of moral semantics---i.e. one which depicts 
a self-aware fictionalist and is a revisionary account rather than a hermeneutic account 
(in other words we are describing the language of speakers who have distinctly non-
realist/fictionalist philosophical perspectives on moral language, rather than 
describing the everyday moral language of everyday persons, whom we will presume 
are either moral realists or are morally agnostic on the issue).  
3) Like expressivism and/or quasi-realism, the account depicts a means and/or system of 
communication whereby information about the speaker’s emotion(s) is conveyed 
through moral discourse. However, unlike regular expressivism, this communication 
of information is conveyed pragmatically rather than being conveyed within the 
semantics of the sentence(s) uttered.  
 
To sum up, the aim is relatively simple: to depict a brand of moral fictionalism that also has a 
story to tell, as expressivism or quasi-realism does, about how information about speakers 
emotions are conveyed through moral discourse and which is loyally non-realist.   
 
To recap, let us first go over what we have achieved thus far. The first goal was to establish at 
the very least a plausible case for a non-realist account in the first place. To that end I 
discussed moral realism (as well as something as dauntingly vast as this can be within a 
single chapter) as well as some of the most notable counter arguments to it, specifically those 
of Gilbert Harman and J.L. Mackie. The key point here was and is not to declare in any way 
that moral realism is false (justifying such a declaration convincingly would no doubt require 
an entire thesis in and of itself) but rather to simply point out that there is a case to be made 
for a convincing non-realist account. The next stage was to examine what the non-realist is 
literally saying (and meaning) when utilizing moral language, in other words what is going 
on semantically? This led me initially to expressivism, at which point we were confronted 
with the Frege-Geach problem (how can meaning be derived from expressivist utterances in 
unasserted context(s)?). In seeking a solution to this problem, quasi-realism appeared to be an 
attractive option promising to deliver everything that a moral realist could wish for whilst still 
retaining a non-realist status, without committing to any metaphysical arguments, and thus 
being significantly more economical in its approach. However, whilst this metaphysical 
economy was indeed attractive, it soon became apparent that quasi-realism was more than 
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expensive enough in other regards. It also became apparent that there seemed to be a lack of 
any clear distinction between what was being said by Simon Blackburn and what was being 
said by moral fictionalists, which led us to the debate between Blackburn and David Lewis, 
who cited this issue. Whilst Blackburn appeared to successfully sever all ties to fictionalism, 
he appeared to do so at the expense of the crucial, non-realist aspect of quasi-realism.  
 
Moral fictionalism thus became the new prime suspect for a convincing non-realist semantic 
account of moral language. Fictionalism had both a relatively straight forward story to tell, 
and one which seemed immune to the ravages of the Frege-Geach problem. In comparison, 
quasi-realism only had this by no small degree of controversy. Fictionalism, however, lacked 
the same promises made by quasi-realism, which was a story about the emotional attitudes 
behind moral language and the communication of those emotions. Nevertheless, it seemed 
that I had a convincing candidate for my first two goals, and thus the hunt was now on to 
fulfil the third and final goal by looking into the pragmatics of moral discourse. To do this it 
was important that I establish a clear and evident connection between emotions and moral 
language, and so I decided to take a scientific approach in doing so, concluding that whilst I 
am not convinced of a ‘necessary’ i.e. logically deductible connection, there seemed enough 
observable evidence to make a convincing empirical case in this regard. So, finally, this 
brings us to the last piece of the puzzle, which is to marry this connection to the semantic 
fictionalist account in a way that makes some philosophical sense.  
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Chapter 5: Translating Emotions into Moral Language 
 
In chapter four I discussed the self-directed emotions (as Prinz would call them) of pride and 
shame, as well as some other-directed emotions like anger or disgust. However, I would like 
to briefly refine Prinz’s usage of these emotions before we proceed. This is because I would 
argue that anger and disgust are not exclusively other-directed nor are pride and shame 
exclusively self-directed. Embarrassment for example may be seen as a highly nuanced and 
entirely self-directed combination of a whole host of negative feelings, including disgust or 
anger, with connotations of sadness or even fear as well. In fact, embarrassment is, I would 
argue, one of the most difficult emotions to actually describe. It is also, I would argue, an 
essential ingredient for shame, shame being a very specific form of embarrassment 
manifesting in a realisation of one’s failure to live up to a particular standard, directly 
impacting self-esteem and potentially social status. It is for these reasons that I have referred 
to this model as one of pride and shame primarily, these being more complex emotions made 
up of other more basic emotions like anger or disgust or joy, which ultimately fall into and 
help to constitute one or the other. That said, however, it is still useful to discuss other 
emotions and their role in doing so. Like Prinz I would also separate these emotions into self-
directed and other-directed, but in a slightly different way. I would argue that both pride and 
shame can just as easily be other-directed as self-directed, we can be proud of someone we 
have taught, and we can be ashamed of someone who has let us down.  
 
Now let us see how these two mental states (of pride and shame) may work in conjunction 
with a constructed morality system. As mentioned in previous chapters, it is very important, 
even for the non-realist, to actively participate in the morality narrative. This may be 
characterised by a collective understanding of actively pursuing things which make us feel 
proud and avoiding things which make us feel ashamed. Unfortunately, I would argue that 
when it comes to morality, anxiety about other people’s opinions have a lot to do with this, 
thus there is certainly a level of insecurity attributed to it. This is not always the case, and I 
would certainly argue that it is entirely possible to derive moral pride from an action without 
being overly concerned about how that action may be perceived by others. There may even 
be occasions where we may perform an act of kindness or generosity only to cover it up, 
because we do not want to be seen to be helping that person for whatever external reason. In 
such cases, the pride we feel is derived from us and us alone, in the sense that we realize that 
we have done an admirable thing, but do not feel the need to showcase this to others; it is 
155 
 
enough for us to recognise that we are behaving like the people we want to be, and are, 
therefore, participating in the morality fiction. However, I would, sadly, argue that this is not 
the majority of cases, even among realists, and that a considerable amount of our acts of 
kindness and generosity derives largely from fear and insecurity about how we appear to 
other people. In other words, it is not enough to actively participate in the morality narrative; 
we must be seen to be participating. I would also argue that this has a great deal to do with 
anxiety about social status, not to mention the consequences of breaking certain laws.  
 
Prinz argues that whilst meta-emotions may not be necessary for such moral senses to exist, 
and an example he gives is how individuals with autism still moralize despite empathy 
impairment(s), meta-emotions nonetheless “...play a fundamental role in the emergence of 
morality through cultural evolution” (Prinz, 2007, 270). 
 
Using game-theoretic models, Henrich and Boyd (2001) have argued that widespread 
cooperative behaviour would not be sustained and transmitted over generations if it 
were not for punishment; a society of co-operators would be over taken by defectors. 
The same point can be articulated in terms of moral norms; a society would not 
continue to conform to moral norms generation after generation if wrongdoers were not 
punished (Stripada and Stich, 2006). (Prinz, 2007, 270) 
 
This is useful, because it reminds us that merely speaking out against an act is one action 
towards preventing its continuation; another is creating a genuine emotional cost to the 
perpetrator.  Now let us picture this in a fictionalist context. The morality narrative, as 
described by the individual’s culture and/or upbringing, outlines certain actions, attitudes and 
characteristics, some of which the individual is actively encouraged to pursue, whilst others 
they are actively discouraged from or even actively prevented from doing. Over time, the 
individual associates so called ‘correct’ actions, attitudes and characteristics with positive 
feeling whilst evaluating oneself, manifesting in positive self-esteem upon the realization that 
their self image matches what they have been brought up to perceive as ‘good’ (as described 
by the narrative). We may call this state ‘Pride’. This positive association then encourages the 
individual to reinforce this by continuing to behave in that way. As a result, pride becomes 
both a self-directed and other-directed emotion driving both a self determination to uphold a 
certain standard of behaviour as well as to encourage that standard in others. At the same 
time, the individual also associates the ‘incorrect’ actions, attitudes and characteristics (as 
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described by the narrative), with experiences of negative feeling, and in the form of self 
criticism upon the realization that at least part of their self image matches those, which then 
discourages them from continuing to behave in that way. Again, this goes both inwards and 
outwards, driving the individual away from actions they know will induce a sense of shame, 
and actively discouraging others from those actions as well. Once either pride or shame has 
been established, this will then inevitably affect how the individual presents the action, 
attitude or characteristics to others. For example, if someone is proud of a particular action, 
they may enthusiastically tell others all about it, knowing that this is likely to inspire positive 
feedback from others i.e. praise. If someone is ashamed of a particular attitude, they may 
actively try to cover it up from others, knowing that if others were to find out about it, then 
this would incur negative criticism i.e. blame.  
 
Now let us look at some potential examples of speech acts utilising these kinds of cognitive 
processes.  
 
 “I couldn’t have lived with myself if I had let that happen” (Self-directed pride 
reflecting positively on one’s awareness of what the moral narrative was, and what 
was necessary to conform to it).  
 “I know you’ll do the right thing” (Other-directed pride reflecting an individual 
appealing to what they see as others’ ability to recognise the moral narrative and what 
is necessary to conform to it).  
 “How could you?” (Other-directed shame reflecting disbelief and bitter 
disappointment in another’s failure to conform to the moral narrative, resulting in a 
kind of love withdrawal (as Prinz would describe it)).  
 “I’m so sorry; please forgive me” (Self-directed shame reflecting one’s own failure to 
conform to the morality narrative, and an appeal for a chance to repair the damage to 
their social status by redeeming themselves and earning the other’s trust/love once 
more).  
 
It is important to remember here that as mechanical and potentially even manipulative as this 
appears, the majority of the reasoning would appear to take the form of unconscious 
inferences (something we will return to later on). From the speaker’s point of view, the 
reasoning at work behind the emotions driving these kinds of speech acts may not be 
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immediately apparent only the fact that they feel proud or ashamed. It is also important not to 
underestimate the efficacy of the fear of punishment, particularly when it manifests in social 
abandonment. The need to ‘fit in’ in one’s social environment is not a trivial matter; to the 
contrary it has been essential for our very survival for millions of years. To be seen to 
conform and contribute (on a moral level) is, therefore, absolutely essential for the non-realist 
just as it is for the realist.  
 
Pride and shame clearly play a fundamental role in the formation of moral rules also, acting 
as emotional motivators compelling either the individual, or a collective of individuals, to 
construct axioms and maxims to adhere to based on what leads to pride and what leads to 
shame, and encourage others to do the same. At this point, we can apply some good old 
fashioned projectivism, as this can then be expanded on by projecting these same axioms 
(‘Do not steal’, ‘Be polite’, ‘Care about others’ feelings’ etc), onto the world and everyone in 
it. Referring back to Joyce and the pragmatic motivations behind fictionalism, we may recall 
how convincing oneself that something bad will happen if we don’t do x amount of sit-ups a 
day, or if we smoke too many cigarettes, is more efficacious than more realistically realising 
that it merely might (Joyce, 2011, 303). In a similar vein, the expressive fictionalist can do 
something similar by projecting a kind of cosmic imperative to conform to the morality 
narrative and encourage others to do so, acting and speaking ‘as if’ the universe will find 
some means of punishing them should they fail to do this. This may be exaggerated for 
motivational purposes, or it may be based in a genuine concern regarding certain actions and 
the consequences of acting them out. These consequences may take the form of legal 
punishment, social abandonment or both. This even helps us to account for moral 
disagreements, as different individuals and different cultures arrive at different axioms and 
maxims via different circumstances, different attitudes and different unconscious inferences. 
As Prinz and Nichols put it:  
 
When emotions are conditioned in the context of behaviour, sentiments are formed and 
affect-backed rules result (compare Nichols, 2004a). The business about punishment 
and meta-punishment shows that these relatively simple resources are quite powerful. 
In principle, any form of behaviour could be subjected to a form of emotional 
conditioning that would result in the formation of a moral rule (Sripada and Stich, 




We may call this overarching drive to uphold a moral maxim, be it individual based or 
collectively based: ‘moral responsibility’. We may call punishment meant to either deter or 
correct transgressions ‘justice’. This is not to be confused with ‘legal’ justice, however. It is 
important here that we treat morality and law as two different entities to avoid unnecessary 
confusion. One (morality) we are treating in the context of a constructed, psychological 
narrative, for the purposes of expressive communication. The other (law) is constructed by 
political and managerial institutions for the purpose of enforcing standards of behaviour 
necessary for society to function and ensure the safety and welling of its citizens. There is 
considerable overlap of course. In most cultures, both current and historical, serious offenses 
such as, theft, rape and unsanctioned violence have been treated as both immoral and illegal, 
and there are some things which nearly everyone agrees are both socially unacceptable and 
actively destructive to a society. However, that which is illegal is not necessarily seen as 
immoral, and that which is seen as immoral is not necessarily illegal. For instance, it is not 
illegal to be lazy or impolite, but neither is it seen as ‘good’.  
 
With this in mind, let us now look at some more potential utterances made by the expressive 
fictionalist: 
 
 “Something ought to be done about this!” (Other-directed shame (i.e. disappointment 
in the establishment) appealing to the social collective to apply some measure against 
others who have failed to fulfil their responsibilities).  
 “I think that I’ve earned a rest.” (Self-directed pride reflecting an appreciation of 
one’s ability to fulfil one’s responsibilities).  
 “I should’ve tried harder to stop it!” (Self-directed shame reflecting disappointment in 
one’s ability to fulfil one’s responsibilities).  
 “Congratulations, you deserve this.” (Other-directed pride reflecting admiration for 
another’s ability to fulfil one’s responsibilities.) 
 
As we can see here, the expressive fictionalist, by participating in the morality narrative, once 
again uses speech acts to respond to circumstances in either a preventative or reinforcing 
manner, just as we will see in the next chapter in the empathy model. In this case, the 
expressive fictionalist utilises moral responsibility as a motivator, providing emotional 
benefits for some behaviours and costs to others.  
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So let us recap on what we have here. First, we have pride and shame, both self-directed and 
other-directed; this provides our base layer. Next, we have these emotions applied through 
social conditioning. This may take on many forms, for example, through positive feedback 
for behaviours conforming to the morality narrative, or criticism for behaviours which 
abandon it. Next, we (the expressive fictionalist) reinforce this conditioning through systems 
of reward and punishment, applying genuine physical or emotional costs and benefits to our 
actions. Next, we combine these elements together, adding them into our own morality 
narrative. Finally, we communicate this narrative, within the fiction itself, thereby 
participating in it. In so doing, we communicate far more than mere approval and 
disapproval, but a whole range of emotional information. In other words, we convey a great 
deal more about who we are, and how we feel about certain kinds of behaviour, than it says 
anything objective about the behaviour itself. One may shout, and scream and tell another 
that they have a responsibility to those around them, or express their pride in someone for 
doing the right thing. This does not really tell us much about the ultimate nature of 
responsibility or the nature of real moral properties metaphysically, but it does tell us a great 
deal about that person (who is speaking) and the kind of person that they are. If A tells B that 
B has a responsibility to treat others with respect, then this tells us a lot about A, for example 
that they value politeness and social grace, and that they disapprove of people who hurt 
others’ feelings or slander others’ reputations. If A expresses pride in B for owning up to 
stealing a £10 note, this tells us A values honesty and integrity, disapproves of theft and 
respects those courageous enough to own up to their own transgressions and attempt to make 
amends. One simple moral utterance, whilst conveying little about the ultimate nature of 
morality, conveys volumes by way of emotional communication, regardless of what the 
ultimate nature of morality is or is not.  
 
This is, of course, all rather dependent on whether or not A is sincere in what he/she is 
saying, because the real question is why or even how a non-realist experiences genuine pride 
or shame about something that they do not actively believe in i.e. morality. In other words, 
given that we are ultimately treating morality as fictional rather than real (ontologically), then 
where does this captivating drive to conform to this morality narrative come from? Is all this 
just an elaborate form of psychological manipulation, for the expressive fictionalist to get 
what they want out of other people? This does not seem at all a desirable conclusion to me. 
Fortunately, fictionalists like Joyce would seem to think not, and I am inclined to agree. 
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Critical context plays a vital role in why we both think this; this will be the subject of great 
discussion in chapter six. 
 
Before this, however, there is a great deal more to talk about in regards to translating 
emotions into moral language. So far I have outlined one model for doing so based on pride, 
shame and responsibility. However, this is by no means the end of our story, because the 
pride, shame and responsibility model may also lead into other models as well, in which 
emotions like anger or disgust, pride or shame are expressed by way of other psychological 
phenomena. In the following two sub chapters, I will outline a detailed process by which this 





Chapter 5.1 Empathy & Compassion 
 
Over the course of the last two chapters, I have explained one possible means by which 
emotions may be translated into moral language. In the pride, shame, and responsibility 
model, emotions like pride and shame play a social conditioning role in the individual to 
avoid certain behaviours whilst reinforcing others by applying positive feedback to those who 
conform to the morality narrative, and applying negative criticism to those who do not. In 
many cases, this may be taken much further by applying emotional costs to those who 
severely flout the rules of the morality narrative, including social rejection and love 
withdrawal. The real question for us, however, is how this actually manifests in moral 
language. Earlier we looked at particular sentences, such as ‘I know you will do the right 
thing’ or ‘How could you do this to us?’. These express emotion states like pride or shame, 
anger or disgust by projecting those emotions through moral utterance. I would argue, 
however, that we can take this a stage further, and that we can even outline a process by 
which these emotions are communicated. One means by which we can do this is by exploring 
psychological phenomena such as empathy or compassion. Empathy, for example, can be 
treated as a means to having appropriate moral emotions: one may empathise with the victim 
of perceived suffering, wincing in response. As a result, one may be compelled to feel pity or 
compassion for them, anger towards the assailant, indignation at their breaching the morality 
narrative. As such, the mere witnessing of an act perceived as admirable or obscene, as 
conditioned via the pride, shame and responsibility system, evokes powerful emotions which 
are then expressed through moral utterance. Over the course of this chapter, I discuss 
empathy and compassion, and their role in moral discourse. I will then outline, in detail, a ten 
stage inferential process, beginning with observation, and ending in preventative or 
reinforcing speech acts.  
 
First, let us examine the study of empathy historically, thereby (hopefully) shedding light on 
what it is that we are talking about here. The history of the study of empathy is not 
particularly easy to track, as words with similar meanings have been often hinted at and 
touched upon ever since the days of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle37. It is far more recently, 
however, that dedicated philosophical research into the specific word and the specific concept 
                                                          
37 The original source of the modern word ‘empathy’ (prior to its etymology from the German word 
‘Einfühlung’) is the ancient Greek word εμπάθεια (empatheia, meaning "physical affection or passion"). The 
German word we see later was adapted from this (Gallese, 2003, 171).  
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has taken place. The word ‘empathy’ most recently originates from a translation of the 
German word “Einfühlung” meaning (‘feeling into’), as translated by psychologist Edward 
Titchener in 1909 (as seen in Stueber, 2013). This was following a specific concept brought 
to light by Theodore Lipps around the same period in his works on the philosophy of 
aesthetics in which Lipps frequently talked about our ability to read into and feel into various 
forms of artistic expression (Curtis & Elliot, 2014, 353). Lipps, however, took the concept 
much further by pitching empathy as an epistemic phenomenon (Curtis & Elliot, 2014, 376). 
This in turn led to no small measure of debate throughout the early 20th century, largely from 
Lipps himself; about how exactly our perceptual analysis of other minds takes place, as well 
as reconciling troubling questions such as Mill’s inference from analogy and the problem of 
other minds (Stueber, 2013), the former of which is particularly important. The inference 
from analogy describes the steps taken that enable us to attribute mental states to others by 
observation and from direct experience of their behaviour (Stueber, 2013). This generally 
presupposes a Cartesian perspective on the mind, in which we have direct access to our 
consciousness and which is infallible, and in which knowledge of other minds is indirect and 
fallible (Stueber, 2013). 
 
The latter of the two examples, the problem of other minds, as Wittgenstein pointed out later 
on (Wittgenstein 1953, 350), also depends heavily on a Cartesian account of the mind (i.e. 
knowledge of one’s own mind is self-evident, but knowledge of other minds is suspect). The 
problem of other minds asks us how we can have knowledge that other people have minds. 
Empathy understood as the primary epistemic means for receiving information about other 
people’s minds was revived in the 1980s as well by simulation theorists like Davis and Stone 
(Davis, 1997, 144-168). Neuroscientists have also held discussions on subjects like mirror 
neurons, providing empirical evidence for Lipps’ theories on what he calls ‘inner imitation’ 
(i.e. the mind’s ability to imitate or ‘mirror’ others’ emotions) (e.g. Gallese and Rizzolatti, 
2004, 396-403).  
 
In terms of the study of empathy in specific relation to moral philosophy and moral 
psychology, the works of psychologists Batson and Hoffman are of particular fame. 
Specifically, Batson devised a series of experiments to test what he calls the 
empathy/sympathy thesis (Batson, 1995, 1042–1055). This involved trying to determine if 
empathy/sympathy was altruistically motivating rather than motivating for egoistic reasons. 
According to the egoistic interpretation, empathy is associated with negative feelings of guilt, 
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shame or fear of social sanction, something we discussed in the pride, shame and 
responsibility model. It can also be associated with recognition of the positive consequences 
of helping behaviour such as social reward and/or feelings of pride. This interpretation is also 
characterised as “the social exchange theory” (Batson, 1995, 1042–1055). Batson specifically 
argues against this interpretation in favour of a more genuinely altruistic one and that 
empathy forms the basis of this. In the experiments, students were asked to listen to tapes 
from a radio program featuring a woman who has broken both legs in a car accident talking 
about how she was beginning to struggle in her classes at university. The students were given 
letters asking them to compare lecture notes and meet with her. In one group, the 
experimenters attempted to heighten the level of empathy by specifically discussing how the 
woman was feeling; whilst in the other they specifically portrayed this as irrelevant. The 
experimenters also adjusted the cost of helping depending on the group in question. The high 
cost group were also told that she would be in their class after school, and the low cost group 
were told she would finish at home. The experiment showed that the high cost group were 
just as inclined to help as the low cost group (Batson, 1995, 1042–1054).  
 
The general consensus within psychology is that Batson’s research, whilst impressive, is not 
necessarily persuasive, however, as the egoistic interpretation that he gives is extremely 
limiting and his conclusions do not necessarily confront, much less disprove alternative 
egoistic interpretations, nor does his research alone validate the thesis that empathy is a 
convincing basis for morality (Stueber, 2013). Hoffman on the other hand takes a far more 
biological perspective on empathy as a physical predisposition towards altruistic behaviour. 
His conception of empathy is based on various ‘modes of arousal’, which allow individuals to 
respond empathically to distress cues from other people. Hoffman also talks about mimicry as 
a form of social conditioning (Hoffman, 1981, 137).  
 
If there is a connection between empathy and the expression of moral utterances, however, 
that is utterances aimed at communicating attitudes, then it stands to reason that in making 
such an utterance the speaker communicates, deliberately or not, that they empathise with the 
object of the sentence. Note here that I am taking the ‘object’ to mean that which is the object 
of a sentence, as opposed to the subject of a sentence, grammatically speaking. This is 
because what is under discussion is a moral sentence which appears descriptive, and so the 
target of the projected moral quality is the thing within the sentence that appears as having 
something done to it. I suspect that in some instances a speaker may also target a subject of a 
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sentence as well. For example, “...you should not kick the cat...” here ‘you’ is the subject, and 
the cause for disapproval, as the speaker knows what kicking involves. Again, this is 
information that is not specifically stated in the semantics of the sentence. It may, however, 
be nonetheless communicated if the speaker is projecting the quality of wrongness and if this 
concept is intrinsically tied to the application of a speaker’s empathy. For example, if we take 
the following process:  
 
1) An expressive fictionalist speaker observes a cat being kicked.  
2) The speaker is also aware that being kicked constitutes a negative emotional 
experience. 
3) The speaker is therefore aware that the cat must currently be enduring this negative 
experience by virtue of being kicked. (From 1 and 2) 
4) Observing negative experiences create(s) negative emotions in the observer. 
(Assumption). 
5) In observing the act, the speaker experiences a negative emotion (e.g. pity, 
indignation, outrage etc, as seen in the pride, shame & responsibility model). (From 3 
& 4) 
6) Emotions motivate either preventative or reinforcing action (other things being 
equal). (Assumption) 
7) Speaking out in a condemnatory fashion is a preventative action; this may manifest in 
expressing anger/disgust towards the assailant, and/or expressing intent towards social 
rejection and/or love withdrawal. 
8) The speaker speaks out in a condemnatory fashion. (From 5, 6 & 7) 
9) The speaker speaks using moral terminology. (From 8) 
10) In using moral terminology, the speaker therefore communicates that they empathise 
with the subject or object of the sentence, & expresses other directed shame towards 
the assailant, leading ultimately to the emotional costs seen above. (From 8 & 9) 
 
I have deliberately italicised 4 and 6, because of this process these are the two steps in most 
need of further explanation. The main difficulty with (4) of course is that it is conditional on 
it being a case of someone who has the empathic trait of experiencing negative emotions 
when observing the negative experiences of others. However, where exactly does this 
‘empathy’ come from? We may theorize that this empathy is a survival mechanism 
determined to ensure the survival and/or wellbeing of those around us thus aiding our own by 
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promoting the health and wellbeing of the social environment which we ourselves depend 
on. However, there may be some individuals who simply lack this trait altogether, for 
example individuals who are sociopathic. Another angle might be to suggest that if a speaker 
who lacks any empathy with the subject or object of their sentence speaks about them in a 
moral way, then there may be grounds to suspect that they are by definition being insincere. 
Moreover, we should remember that we are attempting to explain how moral language 
incorporates emotions, and as such we should focus on individuals who feel the relevant 
emotions we are discussing, and not the people who do not. This is an idea I will look at in a 
later chapter. (6), however, is the biggest assumption here. Whilst we have explored a great 
deal about how feelings are psychologically connected to preventative and/or reinforcing 
action associated with moral thought, we have yet to truly press home, how or in what way 
they are linked, and in what way, if any, they are causal. All we know, thus far, is that 
impaired functioning of one seems to result in impaired functioning of the other. If I were to 
offer any explanation at all, it would be that moral attitudes are a way of conceptualising how 
we ‘feel’ about the well-being of others, and are therefore an important means of 
communicating empathy.  
 
Unfortunately, I suspect that these are not things to which we can have one hundred percent 
certain answers to. However, I think that there is enough observable evidence to say with a 
reasonable degree of conviction that there must be a connection of some kind between 
emotions and moral decision making of certain kinds, (namely those involving the way we 
relate to and behave around others). From observable changes in the decisions made by those 
with damage to their ventromedial prefrontal cortex, to apparent correlations between distress 
and seemingly altruistic behaviour in multiple animal species, to a lack of such behaviour 
from patients with severe depression and/or in certain cases of SSRI treatment, there is a 
great deal of evidence that suggests that what affects a subject’s emotions also affects their 
ability to make moral decisions. How this links in with moral language is I would say 
contextual after a fashion in that we refer to these concepts of empathy as ‘moral’ ones (i.e. 
relating to how we feel about others) in conversation.  
 
This is not to say that there is not a wealth of recent literature on the connection between 
empathy and morality; there certainly is. There are some contributions that are also sceptical 
about the importance of empathy. For example, Paul Bloom argues that empathy is too 
‘narrow in its focus, rendering it innumerate and subject to bias’ (Bloom, 2017, 24). 
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According to Bloom, empathy ‘can motivate cruelty and aggression and lead to burnout and 
exhaustion’ (Bloom, 2017, 24). Bloom challenges empathy on the grounds that it is 
insufficient to produce results when compared to other characteristics such as compassion 
(Bloom, 2017, 24). Indeed, there may be some weight to the argument. Just because we may 
empathise with somebody or something does not necessarily mean that how we react will be 
in everyone’s best interest. For example, I may empathise with someone who is suffering and 
be motivated to speak out against it, and yet in doing so perform more harm in the process if 
it is something that cannot be prevented, or is necessary for some subtle reason. By contrast, 
we need not necessarily understand or empathise with someone to react with compassion. For 
example, one can be polite and courteous to others, even towards people we regard as 
detestable. However, I think that we should avoid getting carried away here. What I argue for 
is how a non-realist speaker may use empathy to communicate emotions. What I do not argue 
is that this is always a good idea, or that it is always beneficial. I argue that one of the 
defining features of moral language is that it is imperfect and often speaking out or in some 
other way taking a stance on some ‘moral’ issue can often cause significant problems for the 
person speaking. So whilst examples like Bloom’s go a long way to outlining the limitations 
of empathy, they do not invalidate it as a tool of recognising situations which motivate 
preventative or reinforcing speech acts.   
 
Before we proceed with the next step, let us briefly discuss one more important issue and that 
is the difference between empathy and compassion. Unlike empathy, compassion does not 
necessarily require an understanding of what the one recognised as suffering is experiencing 
per se, only an understanding that that being is suffering. For example, there are many 
experiences endured by people which we have never experienced and in all probability will 
never experience. There are also some experiences which are only experienced by a particular 
group of people be that determined by sex, race, gender, body type and so on, and in many of 
these cases, complete and total empathy by those who have never had, and will never have 
these experiences is, to a certain extent, impossible. This does not mean, however, that we are 
totally incapable of responding to the needs of those whose experiences are completely alien 
to our own, only that recognising them can be more difficult. Empathy is such as a useful 
phenomenon in this regard simply because it allows us to identify with others on a deeply 
personal level. It is much more difficult to understand the suffering of someone (or 




However, just like with empathy, compassion works on the principle of understanding that 
suffering is something that we ought to prevent, and so whilst compassion alone may be less 
efficient than empathy in that it is more difficult to identify what is and what is not 
‘suffering’ in a person or being that we cannot so easily identify with, if we can still  
recognise it as suffering, then the result is much the same as the empathy case, in that it 
triggers emotions in us which motivate preventative or reinforcing action. For example, from 
a cisgendered male perspective, I think that attempting to completely empathise with a 
woman experiencing child birth would be futile at best (and probably a little insulting), 
because by definition it is not something I will ever go through nor am I physically equipped 
to even conceptualise what the experience is like, nor would I care to38. However, just 
because this is the case does not mean that I would be totally divorced from the situation 
were my wife or girlfriend to go into labour, nor would I fail to be overcome with a wide 
variety of very strong emotions were this to happen. My point is, complete understanding of 
what the other is experiencing is not strictly necessary, but rather recognition of what the 
other needs from you in that moment.  
 
How then does this affect the empathy model? Essentially it does not, except to slightly 
modify (4) from an assumption about the speaker mirroring, to a certain extent, what the cat 
must be going through, to simply being concerned that that is happening, and wanting it to 
stop.  
 
This may seem like a more genuinely altruistic account, but it should be noted that it has two 
distinct disadvantages compared to the original empathy model:  
 
1. The assumption made by (4) is far narrower, as it requires a person to experience negative 
emotions despite not identifying in any way with the other (in the example case ‘cats’).  
 
2. Because it is much harder to recognise suffering in an animal that we do not identify with 
like we do a person, it is less likely this will actually occur.  
 
In other words, empathy is more reliable than simple compassion, because empathy shows 
us, albeit in a limited way, what the other is experiencing rather than merely alerting us to the 
                                                          




information that they are suffering. It therefore compels us, in a much more potent way, 
towards that preventative or reinforcing action in response to it. In very extreme cases, and 
one in which there is already a very high degree of emotional investment, such as the wife or 
girlfriend going into labour, it is easy to see how a powerful emotional reaction galvanising 
one into action would be almost automatic. However, with the cat case it is less clear (I think) 
that this would actually be the case given the lack of prior emotional investment. By contrast, 
a non-realist who makes an active attempt to empathise with cats that are being kicked would, 
I argue, be far more compelled to speak against it.  
 
Lastly, it should be noted that this ten stage process can, and often does proceed in both 
directions. In other words, it can lead to praise just as easily as it can lead to blame. For 
instance, an expressive fictionalist may observe another rescuing a cat from being kicked, 
follow the process and communicate (to the rescuer) empathy with the cat, admiration for the 
rescuer’s compassion, their bravery, respect for their moral integrity and so on. They may 
simultaneously express other directed shame towards the attackers as seen in the original 
example. All this and more may be communicated by a single sentence: “It’s horrifying that 
they would do such a thing; thank goodness you got here when you did!”  
 
As we can see, there are thus multiple ways by which we can translate emotions into moral 
language, ways which are not mutually exclusive. The general idea is, however, that 
emotions triggered by observation compel speech acts which then express (by projecting onto 
the world) moral attitudes. In my next chapter, I will examine this empathy model on a much 





Chapter 5.2 Combining the Models 
 
Now that we have seen both models in action, we should see how the two may work in 
conjunction with each other. To do this, I will break down the empathy model and examine 
each stage of the ten step process in detail. In doing so, I will (hopefully) be able to piece 
together a story about emotions and their role in moral thinking and moral discourse.  
 
First, let us look at the empathy model once again. In my last chapter I put forward the 
following ten stage process as an example of how marrying an emotional perspective to the 
semantic fictionalist account might be achieved: 
 
1) An expressive fictionalist speaker observes a cat being kicked.  
2) The speaker is also aware that being kicked constitutes a negative emotional 
experience. 
3) The speaker is therefore aware that the cat must currently be enduring this negative 
experience by virtue of being kicked. (From 1 and 2) 
4) Observing negative experiences create(s) negative emotions in the observer. 
(Assumption). 
5) In observing the act, the speaker experiences a negative emotion (e.g. pity, 
indignation, outrage etc, as seen in the pride, shame & responsibility model). (From 3 
& 4) 
6) Emotions motivate either preventative or reinforcing action (other things being 
equal). (Assumption) 
7) Speaking out in a condemnatory fashion is a preventative action; this may manifest in 
expressing anger/disgust towards the assailant, and/or expressing intent towards social 
rejection and/or love withdrawal.  
8) The speaker speaks out in a condemnatory fashion. (From 5, 6 & 7) 
9) The speaker speaks using moral terminology. (From 8) 
10) In using moral terminology, the speaker therefore communicates that they empathise 
with the subject or object of the sentence & expresses other directed shame towards 
the assailant, leading ultimately to the emotional costs seen above.  (From 8 & 9) 
 
Prinz mentions empathy in The Emotional Construction of Morals, referring to it as ‘mind 
reading’; “the ability to attribute mental states to others” (Prinz, 2007, 270). This allows us, 
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he argues, to acquire information about social norms, as well as promoting pro-social 
behaviour. It also allows us to acquire “norms about norms”, turning observers into educators 
who “...can recognise our emotions and urge us to feel sorry for our bad behaviour...” (Prinz, 
2007, 270) As we will discover later on in this chapter, this helps to connect the empathy 
model to the pride, shame and responsibility model. Social and psychological conditioning 
increases the likelihood that one will act in accordance with these norms, because, as we will 
see later, a failure to do so results in negative experiences such as emotions like guilt, or the 
disapproval of others manifesting in anger or disgust, leading to other consequences such as 
social abandonment or physical punishment. According to Prinz, the disposition to 
experience guilt provides us with stability, “...because we would feel guilty if we didn’t feel 
guilty” (Prinz, 2007, 270). Therefore, the establishment of rules help to establish meta-
emotions, which act in a similar way to an insurance policy deterring misbehaviour.  
 
Before we proceed on this, however, let us first investigate our initial cognitive process in 
great detail. As mentioned before, I have also italicised the two most vulnerable assumptions 
necessary for my ten stage process to function. Before I address these particular concerns, 
however, I would do well to elaborate on, to an extent at least, the thought processes behind 
each component of this process.  
 
The initial step is that an observer, who just so happens to be a fictionalist and knowingly so, 
observes, for example, a cat (or any other sentient organism) being kicked (or otherwise 
receiving violent or offensive treatment of some kind). This observation is important, because 
whilst I am attempting to piece together a non-realist case for moral discourse, I am not for a 
moment going to suppose that the subject matter of this moral discourse is not itself real. My 
point here is that whilst the language used to describe the moral characteristics of cat kicking 
voiced by a fictionalist may be non-realist, the fact remains that the observation of the 
kicking of the cat that inspire(s) such language is a real phenomenon, and so what we have is 
a non-realist language that nevertheless addresses real issues.  
 
The second step is marginally more controversial, that the observer recognises that the kind 
of violent behaviour that they are observing constitutes negative physical and/or 
psychological experience(s) in whoever is receiving it. The main difficulty in justifying this 
step is that it must by its very phrasing take a somewhat one dimensional approach to the 
issue of pain and suffering. For example, can we continue to hold this as a plausible step 
171 
 
given that we also observe that an individual may actually consent to receiving pain and/or 
suffering? One option here might be to adjust the phrasing slightly to target specific instances 
of non-consensual ill treatment. However, I am not entirely sure this is necessary. Even if a 
painful experience was desired, it remains a painful experience, and so I believe this step still 
holds for its intended purpose. The ultimate aim of outlining the process is not necessarily to 
account for how a fictionalist should react when observing a cat being kicked but rather how 
one simply can do. It is important also to remember that moral reactions to observations are 
not always perfect or even appropriate to the reality of the situation. Often we will observe 
what we think to be an immoral act and react to it in a condemnatory fashion without 
realising the full context of what it is we are observing and thus whether or not our 
condemnatory reaction is appropriate to the situation or not. 
 
If we accept these two steps, then we should accept that if the observer has the ability to 
deduce from a general principle that being kicked constitutes a negative experience, and that 
they are observing a cat being kicked, that the cat must, by this same principle, be having a 
negative experience. Here we encounter a problem, because here we are portraying the 
expressive fictionalist as making an inference, and this might run counter to some theories on 
empathy in which it is portrayed as distinctly non-inferential. This may also be a problem 
with empathy in the sense that if there is any ambiguity in our working definition, then we 
end up holding hostages to fortune without even realising it. I argue that it is therefore 
important to outline what we are essentially taking ‘empathy’ to mean here. By ‘empathy’ I 
mean, as Prinz does, the ability to detect what other people are feeling, and in some way 
experience and/or mirror those same emotional states in one’s own mind as a result. There is 
nothing in this definition that necessarily prohibits an inferential means of moving from a 
simple observation to an emotional reaction to that observation; the observer may not be 
consciously aware of this inference, but that does not mean that it does not take place. It is 
also important to outline what we mean by ‘inference’ also. By ‘inference’ I mean the ability 
to reach a conclusion on the basis of evidence and reasoning. There is nothing in this 
definition that demands that such inferences are always made consciously. In other words, I 
argue that even if empathy does not always appear inferential, as on a conscious level 
emotional reactions just seem to occur in response to certain observations, on a subconscious 
perceptual level, it stands to reason that the human brain engages in some kind of inference 
when processing sensory information in order that additional information may be accessed. 
This kind of unconscious inference is also not without significant evidence in perceptual 
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psychology39. Optical illusions are one example of unconscious inferences in which 
observational ‘premises’ lead to conclusions which ultimately prove to be false. In a similar 
vein to fictionalism, Helmholtz also refers to theatrical performance as an example of 
unconscious inferences leading to emotional reactions to situations that are not really taking 
place.  
 
An actor who cleverly portrays an old man is for us an old man there on the stage, so 
long as we let the immediate impression sway us, and do not forcibly recall that the 
programme states that the person moving about there is the young actor with whom we 
are acquainted. We consider him as being angry or in pain according as he shows us 
one or the other mode of countenance and demeanour. He arouses fright or sympathy in 
us [...]; and the deep-seated conviction that all this is only show and play does not 
hinder our emotions at all, provided the actor does not cease to play his part. On the 
contrary, a fictitious tale of this sort, which we seem to enter into ourselves, grips and 
tortures us more than a similar true story would do when we read it in a dry 
documentary report. (Helmholtz, 1925, 28) 
 
So according to Helmholtz, even material of a fictitious nature may incur an unconscious 
inference which leads to emotional reactions even more profound than genuine events; the 
difference is created by our ability to experience the event visually (or other perceptual 
means, e.g. a radio play) (Helmholtz, 1925, 28). This is also very similar to the issues I raised 
in section two in chapter six about the phenomenon of being more emotionally invested in a 
fictitious television program than in a news report. One may detach oneself from a dry news 
report, and convince oneself that the events being described do not apply to them, and yet 
convince oneself that they have a great deal of stake in events not really taking place. Again, 
these kinds of reactions are consistent with how we are currently portraying empathy as a 
means of detecting and mirroring other people’s emotions. There is nothing in this definition 
that demands that these people or these events be real, or that on an unconscious level the 
process of moving from observation to reaction is devoid of unconscious inference.  
 
                                                          
39 The term ‘unconscious conclusion’ was first coined by German physicist and polymath Hermann von 
Helmholtz in 1867 in Handbuch der physiologischen Optik (Treatise on Physiological Optics) as translated by 
James P.C. Southall (Helmholtz, 1925, 28). It has since been referred to as ‘unconscious inference’ and used by 
Edwin. G. Boring (as seen in Boring, 1950) and Daniel T. Gilbert (as seen in Gilbert, 1989).  
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This brings us to one of our more vulnerable assumptions: that observing negative 
experiences in other beings produces negative emotional experiences in the observer. The 
reason I have marked this as a vulnerable assumption is that this is, again, an assumption 
about the meaning of empathy and what empathy generally entails. It also should be painfully 
obvious to any reader that this is anything but a universal. Not only is it clearly possible to 
observe pain and suffering without any sympathy or concern whatsoever, but there even 
appear to be individuals who seem to lack such reactions altogether (e.g. such as is the case 
with sociopaths). Therefore, I would argue that this assumption be seen as something 
resembling the antecedent of a conditional. If the observer can identify with the subject of 
their observation in such a way as to experience negative emotion upon observing it, then the 
rest of the account should make sense, and the next conclusion, that the observer experiences 
a negative emotion, can then be reached. If we accept this assumption, however, then we 
should be able to easily accept the conclusion that in observing the act, the speaker 
experiences a negative emotion, such as pity, outrage, anger or disgust. This conclusion 
should also be aided in no small way by referring to our discussions on social conditioning in 
the pride, shame and responsibility model. As seen in that model, individuals are raised over 
a long period of time to experience pride for behaviours which conform to the morality 
narrative, and shame for those which abandon it. This will greatly influence which emotions 
are likely to be experienced in response to observing how others maintain that narrative.   
 
The next assumption may also be somewhat controversial, however, that emotions motivate 
either preventative or reinforcing action, and by this I specifically refer to successful 
motivation where action occurs, assuming there are no countervailing motives sufficient to 
successfully counteract it. The problem is, of course, that it is not set in stone that emotions 
are indeed inherently motivating, despite what we discussed in regards to social conditioning 
in the pride, shame and responsibility model. There is also the issue of conflicting emotions; 
even if we assume that the negative experience of observing an abused cat motivates 
preventative action, there may be conflicting intentions which motivate the observer away 
from this. It is simply not clear that observing a terrible thing means that the observer will 
necessarily do anything about it. Therefore, once again, it is perhaps best if this assumption 
be seen as like unto the antecedent of a conditional claim. If the observer is motivated by 




I trust that the step where speaking out in a condemnatory fashion about a thing counts as 
preventative action of some kind is suitably non-controversial. If so, we should be able to 
reach the point where if all of the above counts as true, then the observer will speak out in a 
condemnatory fashion, assuming that they do not instead intervene in an alternative way. It 
should be noted that here is where we really start to see the pride, shame and responsibility 
model’s role in the empathy model. As we have seen, one very effective means of affecting 
the situation being described is to convey a sense of real emotional cost to the listener. This 
may be expressed by other emotions like anger or disgust, components of other-directed 
shame. This implies a degree of social rejection on behalf of the speaker in regards to the 
listener. For instance, remember one of our example sentences from the beginning of chapter 
five “How could you?” This can be a very potent sentence despite not really conveying much 
semantically. Semantically the sentence appears to be a request for information about how the 
action was achieved, which in the case of cat kicking ought to be self-evident (the kicking of 
cats is not physically difficult to achieve). That is not the implication; however, rather it is 
that psychologically bringing oneself to do such a thing ‘ought’ to be extremely difficult 
given that, according to the morality narrative, the assailant ‘ought’ to feel a great sense of 
shame, and in addition holds a responsibility to refrain and prevent such things from 
happening. So despite not asserting anything semantically, the sentence itself lying within a 
context of pretence surrounding the morality narrative, it nevertheless communicates a great 
deal of information about the speaker and their feelings towards what they directly observe.  
 
It also stands to reason if we posit that an expressive fictionalist is operating within a context 
where a vast majority of the people they are addressing are either moral realists or are 
morally agnostic on the issue. Certainly if I were addressing someone I knew to be an 
unwavering realist, then it makes sense to use a language that I know they will understand, 
and be motivated by, if my purpose is to either reinforce or prevent whatever it is they are 
doing by creating a sense of real emotional cost. In other words, if I say that kicking the cat is 
wrong, then I stand a much greater chance of the abuser listening to me and ceasing the abuse 
than if I merely say that I do not like the fact that the cat is being kicked, especially if I know 
that the abuser happens to be a moral realist. This is simply because the abuser may or may 
not see my own negative experience as a result of my empathy as remotely relevant to their 
actions. However, they may view what I am saying as relevant if they believe that it contains 
some emotional cost. To borrow another idea from the original fictionalist account, I describe 
what the fictionalist does here as the usage of a particular degree of ‘critical context’, as 
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Joyce would put it (Joyce, 2011, 290), and I will discuss this a lot more in my next chapter. If 
we accept this, then we can easily accept that the speaker will choose to speak out in a 
condemnatory fashion.  
 
The ninth step of the process comes from a conclusion from equivalence following from only 
one other sentence. My assertion here is simply to say that to speak out in a condemnatory 
fashion is directly equivalent to (or equal to) using moral terminology of some kind. This is 
assuming we are talking about a kind of condemnation that is regarded as worthy of special 
attention or concern regarding the genuine safety or wellbeing of oneself or others as opposed 
to the kind of condemnation that occurs when we express aesthetic disapproval or 
disapproval of poor etiquette. As stated above, this terminology also seems to be linked to 
preventative or reinforcing action and that it makes sense to use words like ‘bad’ or ‘evil’ in a 
world of realists who believe that these words have literal or referential meaning if the 
purpose is to convince them to stop whatever it is they are doing. This should also work in 
the opposite direction as well, as words like ‘good’ or ‘kind’, ‘brave’ or ‘benevolent’ 
naturally seem to carry more significance to any individual raised in an environment where 
possessing these ‘virtues’ or ‘values’ make one similarly ‘valued’, whether they happen to be 
realists or not. However, this brings us to a very important question about the expressive 
fictionalist, which also brings us to our final conclusion. 
 
My final conclusion (concerning the combined model) is that if we accept all of the above, 
then in using this kind of moral terminology, the speaker communicates information about 
their emotions and thus their ability to empathise with the subject in question, as well as 
expressing other information such as other-directed shame, as seen in the pride, shame and 
responsibility model. As previously mentioned also, this may be done in the opposite 
direction as well; a speaker may follow a similar process to express pride in another’s ability 
to conform to the morality narrative, and/or express empathy with their struggles in doing so. 
This conveys not only emotional information but also reinforces a sense of solidarity or 
collectiveness as well.  
 
The question is, however, how deliberate is this? No doubt this process can be, and no doubt 
often is, deliberately carried out by non-realist speakers. However, I would argue that more 
often than not it is not. If we suppose for a moment that a speaker is doing this deliberately, 
and is deliberately implying that they have empathy through moral terminology, then that 
176 
 
raises important questions about the motivations for speaking about morality in a realist 
sounding way. It may even lead to rather pessimistic conclusions. For example, we could say 
that the fictionalist only speaks the way they do due to selfish motivations e.g. in order to 
manipulate others (the vast majority of whom are realists) into doing what they want (in fact 
if we were to look at this again from a psychological perspective, this idea is not without 
some fairly compelling evidence). However, I argue that this is usually not the case and that 
what is actually going on is far more complicated, and this involves a lifetime of conditioning 
to certain ‘critical contexts’, something which, once again, shall be discussed in my next 
chapter. In doing so, I hope to shed some light on the question of how these emotions 
manifest in varying levels of situation and examination, ranging from emotionally detached 
conversations about morality and the nature of it, in contexts like a philosophy seminar, to 
highly emotionally charged ones in the context of extreme situations as they are occurring 






Chapter 6: Critical Context(s) and the Problem of Deception 
 
As I began to discuss in my last chapter, I feel it is important to return to the subject of 
critical contexts, because what we ultimately want is a thorough account which includes how 
an expressive fictionalist may speak about ethical values both in standard conversation as 
well as in highly critical, academic conversations about meta-ethics. Therefore, I would like 
to see how the Joycean account of critical contexts or as Joyce calls them ‘critical 
perspectives’ (Joyce, 2011, 289), and which I discussed in the second section of my thesis, 
applies also to my account of expressive fictionalism. Ultimately, I would like to make the 
case that the standard use of expressive fictionalist language more often than not is not 
deliberate but is rather a result of speaking in less critical contexts than when we talk about 
those same values in academic discourse. I also argue that these less critical contexts display 
some dependency on situational emotion states. The two main concerns in this chapter are 1) 
why the fictionalist would speak using moral terminology when they do not believe that they 
name anything real and 2) whether the fictionalist is being deceitful or manipulative when 
they do this. These are both important questions, because ultimately they might, if left 
unaddressed, cause serious problems for expressive fictionalism. It might seem plausible to 
suppose that someone using terminology which does not reflect their beliefs about the nature 
of ethics may do so specifically to mislead others. However, I argue that it would be 
problematic to apply this interpretation to all instances of expressive fictionalist discourse. 
What I do not wish to do is to portray expressive fictionalism as a form of elaborate lie 
spinning, but rather as something more akin to storytelling. The purpose behind telling others 
about a narrative that is not (in the strictest sense) true is rarely to mislead, but rather to 
communicate things above and beyond semantic content; one extensive example of this is 
literary fiction. In other words, in order to avoid the problem of deception, it is important not 
to look at expressive fictionalism at face value but rather to look beyond what is said literally 
and at how and in what context it is said.  
 
In section two chapters six and seven, I mention Joyce’s account of critical contexts in which 
a speaker may speak of things they do not believe exist. To recap, I will briefly go over 
Joyce’s thought experiment once again in regards to colour fictionalism. Supposing an 
individual has a philosophical opinion or belief about the metaphysics surrounding the 
ontology of colour and has come to the conclusion that colour does not really exist. In other 
words, when it comes to the ontology of colour they are akin to an error theorist, but they 
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nevertheless continue to use colour terminology in everyday conversation. Note that I make 
no commitments towards any claims about the actual ontological nature of colour, rather 
what is at issue for me is the fact that this individual believes, philosophically, in an error 
theoretic account of colour ontology and yet continues to speak about colour in a way that 
does not resemble this account on a regular basis. It is thus an issue specifically related to the 
language surrounding colour and light. The individual continues to talk about colour as if it is 
a real thing even though they do not believe that this is scientifically or philosophically 
accurate. This, as I have said multiple times before, is an issue at the very heart of most 
objections to fictionalism. How does it make sense to talk about things realistically when one 
categorically believes that these things are not real? In response to this mystery, Joyce 
establishes a concept of varying degrees of critical context:  
 
...it would be too bizarre to hold that an individual, who has never given the issue any 
careful thought whatsoever, but thinks and acts in accordance with theory T, does not 
really believe T simply because if he were to think carefully about it, he would deny it. 
But if we add that at some point he has adopted a critical perspective and therein 
sincerely denied T, and remains disposed to deny T, were he again to adopt that 
perspective, then he disbelieves T, regardless of how he may think, act, and speak in 
less critical perspectives. (Joyce, 2011, 290) 
 
This, unfortunately, is the majority of what Joyce has to say on the matter in 2011. However, 
I believe there is much more to be said about critical contexts than this, as I believe this is by 
no means the only conceivable example of it and that our everyday language is, in fact, 
saturated with them.  
 
First of all let us attempt, as best as we can, to recap what a critical context is in the first 
place. Based on what Joyce has mentioned, I would best describe a critical context as its 
name implies, that is as a conversational context in which the subject matter is under 
particularly significant critical and/or academic scrutiny. For example, suppose that in one 
conversation I describe distinctly anti-realist ontological beliefs about something as concrete 
as a physical object (such as this laptop). For example, I may take some ontologically 
sceptical approach or even a completely nihilistic one, and yet in an entirely different 
conversation, which does not happen to be about philosophy but rather about the fact that I 
use said laptop to answer emails & write thesis chapters, I will describe the laptop in a way 
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that directly contradicts the beliefs I conveyed in that earlier, more philosophical 
conversation. My point is that it seems clear from this observation that the level of realism we 
attribute to the subject of a given sentence seems to depend very heavily on the context in 
which we are referring to it and the critical nature of the conversation in which we utter it.  
 
Therefore, in addition to what Joyce has to say on this subject, I would like to continue with 
some previously mentioned analogies and thoughts as well as adding some new ones. Colour 
fictionalism is a useful springboard into a discussion of critical contexts in everyday 
language, but what truly interests us for the purpose of this thesis is where we speak in these 
contexts specifically during moral discourse. Suppose that we choose to believe in the ten 
stage process of expressive fictionalist discourse I outlined in my previous two chapters. 
Given the frequency with which this process may occur in which a fictionalist speaks in a 
way resembling a moral realist despite having specific ontological views that contradict 
moral realism in a critical context, for the purposes of maintaining some semblance of 
meaningful dialogue with moral realists, to what extent and with what frequency should we 
expect this process to be consciously deliberate?  
 
For example, suppose I am speaking in a philosophy conference on sports ethics and I am 
discussing match fixing or doping or some other related controversial subject. To raise a 
meta-ethical discussion at an applied ethics conference would no doubt be distracting at best 
and actively counterproductive at worst. I may make a conscious decision to speak using 
realist sounding moral terminology. However, I think such an assumption would be 
misleading. The aim is surely not merely to entertain or humour the other speakers and 
listeners but rather to also engage with them, for instance to persuade and/or debate them. 
The fact that I have a meta-ethical view surrounding the ontology of moral language does not 
alter the fact that I have strong emotional feelings surrounding what it is I am talking about. 
Imagine then that I feel very strongly about a particular philosophical point to do with 
doping. I may speak both passionately and with a degree of apparent moral earnestness on the 
subject. Am I being insincere? I would not say so. I would argue that I am merely attempting 
to persuade those listening to adopt my point of view, and that the non-realist nature of my 
more critical ontological view on the morality of doping is not, at that point at least, at the 
forefront of my mind in the context of that level of conversation. In other words, there are at 
least two layers of reasoning behind the specifics of why I use realist sounding moral 
terminology in this kind of setting. First, moral terminology seems to be the most effective 
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terminology to use when motivating a majority of others to one’s own point of view (this is 
not to say that it will always be effective e.g. sociopaths simply may not care no matter what 
I say or how passionate I sound). Second, repeated use of moral terminology is intrinsically 
habit forming. In other words, I use this terminology so often that I do not have to think 
overly hard about the fact that I am using it. In other words, I am speaking in a less critical 
context than I would be if I were talking about meta-ethics rather than applied ethics. By 
‘less’ I mean specifically, in this case, less critical of moral language. I may, however, be 
extremely critical of certain applied ethical views during a conversation on applied ethics. At 
best, I would argue that I am being inadvertently insincere. Assuming this is the case, does it 
make sense to suggest that it is necessary to make a conscious choice to speak resembling a 
realist, given the nature of this kind of language? I argue that it is not.  
 
If the language I use were to accurately resemble my ontological meta-ethical views on 
whether morals are real or not, then I suspect my language would very quickly become either 
convoluted or at the very least less persuasive to the points that I am trying to raise. We could 
potentially counter this by supposing that were a particularly strict non-realist to speak in 
such a setting, one with strong emotional feelings towards the subject matter in question if 
not any belief in ‘real’ moral truth conditions, then they would endeavour to speak as 
objectively as possible without utilizing any moral terminology whatsoever. In other words, 
they would merely quote the facts without expressing any opinion on them, but would also be 
selective in the facts that they disclose. However, I would argue that whilst this may be a 
perfectly common argumentative strategy, not only is it by no means limited to non-realists, 
but that even the most devout of anti-realists are very much in the habit of both having and 
conveying moral opinions towards the facts that they disclose. One implication of what Joyce 
says is a phenomenon in which one’s ontological beliefs appear to shift depending on the 
context in which one is speaking. For example, if we temporarily return to our colour 
fictionalism analogy, when pressed on what he actually thinks about the nature of colour, 
David replies that it is not a real thing. However, when engaging in casual conversation, 
David answers the enquiry about the colour of his mother’s eyes replying that they are green. 
When pressed again in response to this, on whether or not he thinks his mother’s eyes are 
actually green given his earlier confession that he does not believe green is a real thing, he 
begrudgingly replies that he does not, directly contradicting an earlier statement made in a 
less critical context. My question then is this: when David was asked about his mother’s eyes 
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in the less critical context, did he believe the answer that he gave? I argue that he did, and I 
suspect that Joyce would also argue this as well.   
 
To help explain why I think this, I would like to discuss one final concept. Suppose that I 
came home one day from a philosophy seminar on meta-ethics in which I discuss at length 
my non-realist views on the ontology of moral values only to discover that my house had 
been burgled & important family heirlooms or mementos of lost loved ones stolen while I 
was away. In other words, I am confronted with something which would have very severe 
emotional implications for me. Under such extreme circumstances, I suspect that the moral 
outrage that such a thing could even happen that I would inevitably express would certainly 
feel very real to me at that given moment despite what I said about moral ontology earlier or 
what I might say about it at a later date when I eventually calm down from the distress and 
anger that I would temporarily be experiencing. More importantly, in such an extreme 
situation, I suspect that it would be difficult for anyone to come to the conclusion that the 
realist sounding language being tearfully uttered is insincere. Indeed, I suspect that there are 
instances in every non-realist’s life where a particularly extreme or traumatic experience 
occurs, they express a passionate, realist sounding moral sentiment and in doing so believe 
everything that they say at the time without any hint of insincerity.  
 
So what is going on? If we look at this from a very strict Joycean analysis, then clearly 
traumatic or otherwise highly emotionally charged conversations seem particularly devoid of 
critical context, because other, more important aspects of those conversations temporarily 
take priority. In other words, if I am trying as hard as I can to convey the severity of my 
emotional situation to others in an attempt to motivate them to help me reclaim the important 
lost items, then the ontological nature of the moral values I am referring to are doubtless not 
particularly important to the pragmatic objectives of that conversation. Similarly, if we 
assume from my analysis that I am motivated to speak at all by strong emotions myself, then 
they will also be at the forefront of my conscious experience of that conversation. In other 
words, I describe what happens as a kind of ‘emotion override’, in which any critical 
perspective I may otherwise take on my own moral language is temporarily overridden by the 
emotional experience and rendering me, in effect, a fully functioning temporary moral 
realist for the duration of that conversation. As to why this override occurs, I suspect that that 
is relatively straight forward. Not only are most of us raised in an environment surrounded by 
realist sounding moral language, but from both media portrayal and from genuine and 
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constant interpersonal experience, as discussed in previous chapters, rarely are these moral 
values expressed dispassionately. In other words, we have been conditioned, through 
experience and observation, to use moral language to persuade, inspire, comfort and confront 
by talking about it in both an emotional and a realist sounding manner, which means that 
when we are faced with a particularly emotion engaging conversation, such as one following 
the discovery of lost mementos of deceased loved ones, then the objective of the moral 
language of that conversation to motivate some kind of real life response demands a degree 
of empathetic focus which should override any critical perspective we may otherwise take on 
that language in a different context. I say ‘should’, because I argue this is what usually 
happens, but we should also not fail to forget that there are some individuals who are unusual 





Chapter 7: Moral Progress 
 
If we accept that expressive fictionalism, when analysed within a high degree of critical 
context, amounts to concluding that the moral language is used with pretence assertions (for 
the purposes, for instance, of emotive communication and social cohesion), then this may 
have some wider implications, specifically regarding whether or not there is a case to be 
made for the presence or detection of moral progress or moral improvement. To put it simply, 
how would moral progress be possible if moral language does not refer to or assert anything 
ontologically real? In the following two chapters I shall explain my reasons for believing that 
moral progress is possible within the narrative of an expressive fictionalist. Rather than trying 
to explain elaborate reasons why moral progress exists or is true in a quasi-logical sense, 
such as is the case with quasi-realism for example, I argue simply that there is no reason to 
suppose anything of that kind. However, that does not mean that we cannot or do not treat 
moral progress as a real thing even if in reality it is nothing more than a particular way of 
perceiving things, which is what I demonstrate in chapter nine. I will also attempt to argue, in 
a similar way that Blackburn does, that we can construct a case for an analysis of moral 
improvement of attitude by looking at the overall consistency of what is expressed, among 
other things. In particular, the case I will make includes an endorsement of a kind of anti-
hypocrisy principle. Again, however, I argue that all of this lies within the context of the 
fiction rather than existing independently.  
 
In my second chapter concerning moral progress, I will also look closely at the arguments of 
Catherine Wilson from her text “Moral Progress without Moral Realism”. Wilson puts an 
intriguing epistemological spin on the subject, arguing that there is also a case to be made for 
moral progress if we compare the retrospective perception of new moral beliefs over old with 
a similar narrative of scientific understanding of the natural world. According to Wilson, we 
can track a narrative of epistemological progress fuelling moral attitudes in a way very 
similar to what we see in the progression of theories in natural sciences. Just as there are 
pragmatic reasons for elevating the oxygen theory of combustion to the status of truth, 
replacing the phlogiston theory of combustion, so too are there pragmatic reasons to do the 
same thing with the theory that slavery is morally indefensible (Wilson, 2010, 106). This is 
also compatible with my own argument from anti-hypocrisy in the sense that it is beneficial 
to all agents involved, in most situations, to be as informed as possible to ensure that the 
moral attitudes expressed are consistent and do not create double standards. There are, 
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however, also some problematic issues with this approach which I will attempt to deal with. 
There are also some axiomatic assumptions which I am using, most notably that it seems 
given by the very nature of the idea of a ‘moral’ rule that it should reasonably apply to the 
needs and desires of the subject in question, that it should appear well constructed, consistent 
and that it should not create unnecessary double standards (this being a similar definition of 
‘moral’ to the one used in Hare’s Freedom and Reason) (as seen in Hare, 1963). 
 
To begin with, we must ask the simple question of how moral progress may be possible under 
an expressive fictionalist analysis. My first response to that question is that given the nature 
of expressive fictionalism not as a necessary error theoretic account, but rather as the account 
championed by the moral agnostic then one kind of progress is already theoretically 
possible.40 What I mean of course is that there is room under this analysis to suppose 
metaphysically real (in one sense or another) moral facts and/or properties, which exist 
independently from the fictionalist language used, but that the language does not actually 
refer to them, being based semantically on pretence assertion. It is theoretically possible for 
moral progress to be made if the fictional language in some way mirrors what is 
metaphysically real. However, such mirroring would be coincidental, as again the language 
does not refer to the fact or the property, it merely pretends to. As such, I do not find this 
either sufficient or persuasive, and I certainly question the qualitative value of ‘accidental’ 
moral progress as being at all in the same league as moral progress as a result of conscious 
self reassessment, experience and attention to past events, both personally and academically; 
this is, I clarify, what we are really looking for when we talk about moral progress. It 
becomes more difficult, however, to account for this kind of moral progress if we choose not 
to presume anything whatsoever about moral ontology; the moral agnostic chooses not to rely 
on the existence of any realist notions of moral truth to help them out here, much less 
anyone’s epistemic capacity for providing any reliable information on them even if they do 
exist.  
 
If we cannot rely on moral ontology or moral epistemology to directly validate moral truth 
conditions, then what can we use to assess moral sentences? Can we assess them? One thing 
                                                          
40 Harkening back to my chapter on Jonas Olson, I describe the moral agnosticism in expressive fictionalism as 
the commitment (or lack thereof) of one who is neither convinced nor fully dismissive of the proposal that moral 
properties exist. To the expressive fictionalist, such a proposition is largely irrelevant, because what this kind of 
revisionary fictionalism is describing is not what necessarily is or is not the case metaphysically but rather what 
is simply treated as such in order to express some kind of attitude towards the relevant action or circumstance.  
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that we can look at is the consistency of moral sentences (this will mean ‘consistency within 
the pretence’ in the case of the fictionalist). For example, if the moral justification I give for 
not wanting to be kicked is that people ought to generally refrain from kicking other people, 
because being kicked is painful and unpleasant, then it would be hypocritical to then proceed 
to kick people for no reason. General moral rules which we (fictionally or not) assign to large 
groups of people are, therefore, fairly easy to grasp. What becomes more complicated, 
however, is when we assign very specific rules to specific groups, or individuals or oneself. 
For example, recall the case I used in section two chapter three where a monk takes a vow of 
celibacy but does not complain when one of his friends, who has not taken any such vows, 
gets married and starts a family. This does not seem to be overly hypocritical; the assignment 
of this celibacy ‘rule’ is deeply personal and deeply specific to he who takes it. Were the 
monk himself to get married and have children, however, without relinquishing his vow, then 
this surely would strike people as hypocritical. It does, however, become more difficult to 
make reasonable cases of hypocrisy against people when we consider that different people, or 
for instance different animal species, have different needs and different desires. Whilst I 
would certainly argue that kicking a cat is at the very least a similar, if not equal offence to 
that committed by a human kicking another human, it seems intuitively obvious to us, for 
example, that putting a collar around the neck of and assigning ownership of a cat is not in 
the same vein as doing this to a human being.41 Generally, we do not regard the practice of 
keeping pets as morally problematic, and yet the idea of keeping human pets is regarded as 
morally abhorrent. This sort of issue is important to understand, because it helps to 
demonstrate the limitations and subtle nuances of consistency as a tool being applied to the 
issue of hypocrisy. 
 
So it seems as though a rigid form of consistency alone is not enough to make an attractive 
case for moral progress. If, for example, we say that the way we treat adults should be 
consistent for children as well, then this would no doubt be an undesirable conclusion. 
Instead, it would be better if we utilized a more loose form of consistency whereby assigned 
moral rules are consistent unless there is a morally relevant difference that requires some 
kind of exception clause. In other words, moral ‘rules’ do seem to require some kind of 
tailoring for whom, specifically, they are intended. What appears to be more questionable, 
                                                          
41 It should be noted here that assigning ownership of human beings without their consent has existed in human 
history for a very long time. The difference is we call that slavery, and we do not advocate it in mainstream 21st 
century moral tradition or in international law. 
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however, and more open to analysis is the extent to which physical, environmental and/or 
neurological differences between individuals really are relevant to the moral rules being 
assigned. What is also open to analysis is the factual accuracy of the alleged differences 
which supposedly call for this difference in treatment. For example, it is difficult to 
reasonably argue, within the context of a 21st century scientific understanding of 
neurobiology, that there is any reasonable evidence for a conclusion that women are any less 
capable or competent in political or managerial roles than men are. Therefore, the fact that 
this has been a commonly held belief that has been held for significant periods of time prior 
to 20th century feminist movements should strike us as questionable at best. The question is, 
where exactly do we place the blame for this? Do we use this as justification to accuse the 
ancient world of a kind of ‘moral laziness’ or ‘moral hypocrisy’, or do we argue that they had 
less scientific knowledge about the subject, and so assumptions of this kind where not 
unreasonable within that historical context? Unfortunately for ancient peoples, I am inclined 
to lean towards the former conclusion for the simple reason that to make any such assumption 
in the face of ignorance strikes me as epistemologically irresponsible.42 In other words, if 
they had no reasonable evidence, whether by rational deduction or by empirical validation 
that women were any less capable or competent at managing political institutions than men 
were, then the default assumption should have been that they were not, and in fact there are 
several very famous exceptional instances of ancient women in very high political positions 
which directly provided evidence to the contrary even at the time (Balliet, 1974, 89). 
 
I would, however, clarify that many of what we would regard nowadays as bad conclusions 
were not always seen as such within their historical contexts. There have been attempts at 
rational arguments on the subject of women in politics throughout history just as there have 
been on many matters we now regard as morally problematic. For example, in ancient Rome 
it was largely believed that slavery was morally acceptable for the simple reason that one 
allowed oneself to become a slave (Funk, 2011, 15). In other words, if enslavement was 
unacceptable then death would be preferable. If a slave did not want to be a slave, then they 
did not have to be, they could simply commit suicide, and this would be seen as a very 
honourable thing to do, and so they believed the lack of hypocrisy stemmed from the 
following attitude, “I would rather die than be a slave, so the fact that my slaves clearly don’t 
                                                          
42 It is not a lack of scientific knowledge that is necessarily problematic, but rather the presumption of a 
conclusion in the absence of evidence based validation or rational inference and a presumption that is primarily 
made for the pragmatic purposes of maintaining the status quo at the wilful expense of the liberty and potential 
of a particular group of people. 
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think this, not having killed themselves, proves that they are different”, so just as animals do 
not express a desire for liberty, those slaves that did not commit suicide were placed within a 
similar category (Funk, 2011, 23). Whilst this is not a particularly philosophical approach, it 
is one which is endorsed by ancient philosophers, from Aristotle’s theory of ‘natural slavery’, 
to Seneca, to the ex slave and stoic philosopher Epictetus in the first century AD, the stoics, 
for instance, famously advocating benevolent treatment of slaves but never actively opposing 
the institution of slavery, believing that it did not necessarily impede the stoic ideal of liberty 
of will (Funk, 2011, 23). My point, of course, is that whilst the common justification of 
slavery from antiquity does indeed resemble a logical argument, it is not a very well 
constructed one, as it is clearly something of a red herring.43 
 
By now we should be able to piece together some criteria for a qualitative analysis of moral 
rule assignment. The rule should reasonably apply to the needs and desires of the subject in 
question, it should appear well constructed, consistent and it should not create unnecessary 
double standards. Most importantly, it should reflect some factually accurate picture of what 
the needs and desires of the subject are within the context of the situation that they are in. For 
example, the needs and desires of a child are quite different from those of an adult, and they 
are usually relevant to how we treat them in, say, a parental, disciplinary or educational 
context, whereas the needs and priorities of an adult woman in a political or managerial 
context are rarely if ever so different from those of most men in the same position that her 
gender should be regarded as remotely relevant to how she is treated or how seriously she is 
taken. Returning to the matter at hand, however, does all of this help us address the issue of 
moral progress from the perspective of an expressive fictionalist? If we take moral progress 
to be something within the fiction we are projecting, then the answer would seem to be yes, 
but the question then becomes what exactly it is that we are pretending. I argue that what is 
being pretended/projected is the use of consistency and anti-hypocrisy being applied to 
recognised rules and social norms. The idea is that we can see changes in the rules that an 
individual or a society accepts as being progress if the new rules conform better to these 
kinds of criteria, and that we have a tendency to call that moral progress.  
  
                                                          
43 Just because something as extreme as death may or may not be preferable to slavery does not make slavery at 
all desirable or acceptable, provable by the fact that many slaves attempted to escape captivity. By the same 
logic, I could argue that it is acceptable to commit banditry by threatening members of the public with a firearm, 
because if they really didn’t want to be robbed, then they would fight back and risk me shooting them. This is 
clearly a fallacious argument. You cannot justify an action or situation just by the threat of something worse.  
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Chapter 8: Wilson on Moral Progress 
 
In the last chapter I discussed how we may assess moral progress from the perspective of an 
expressive fictionalist. This involves establishing a kind of non-hypocrisy principle by which 
we can examine the consistency of moral belief states as applied to varying situations and 
people as compared to how one also applies them to oneself. One of the key features of this is 
recognising that it is not enough to simply be consistent in self assigned moral ‘rules’ when 
applying those rules to other people, because, for example, the rules one adheres to as an 
adult may not be exactly the same as those one assigns to a child. In other words, the rules 
that we assign require some tailoring to the needs, vulnerabilities, beliefs and emotions of the 
individual or group. This then leads us to examine the factual accuracy and/or relevance of 
supposed criteria by which we differentiate the needs and treatment of others. For example, 
we do not hold children morally responsible for their actions in the same way that we do 
adults, because we realise that they are at an earlier developmental stage psychologically. By 
contrast, there are no reasonable grounds for affording a similar liberal attitude to harm 
caused by people of a particular race, gender or religion, as these factors are not relevant to 
whether or to what extent they are responsible for their own actions like any other adult. In 
this chapter I will continue this theme of epistemological factors and how they contribute to a 
means of assessing moral progress from the perspective of an expressivist (i.e. where moral 
discourse is treated as a communication of attitudes). In particular I will reference some of 
Catherine Wilson’s work on this subject, who I believe gives us a very elegant analogy to 
how we make progress in our understanding of the natural world. However, I will also 
discuss why this analogy suffers from a similar problem to that of quasi-realism; it tries to 
give the moral realist everything they want without committing to any realist metaphysics, 
but in this case it becomes borderline relativistic and semantically ambiguous. I believe we 
can take the pragmatic element from this, however, but that we still require some semantic 
explanation, which I will attempt to provide myself from the position of an expressive 
fictionalist, which I believe fares better in this respect.  
 
As mentioned, a good method we can use to assess moral progress from an expressivist 
viewpoint is an overall progression of epistemological awareness of information relevant to 
the construction of moral systems aimed at avoiding hypocrisy, inconsistency and double 
standards. This appears to be a recurring theme in the work of Catherine Wilson in “Moral 
Progress without Moral Realism”, and from which I take some inspiration here. Wilson 
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argues that moral belief changes share certain key features with theoretical progress in the 
natural sciences, and that the process of convincing one’s peers that one belief is formally and 
empirically superior to another means that the seemingly better theory will often be promoted 
to the status of truth, that is accepted as true (Wilson, 2010, 106). For example, consider the 
following two sentences: 
 
1a) M used to subscribe to the phlogiston theory of combustion, but now she has come to 
favour the oxygen theory. 
 
1b) M used to subscribe to the oxygen theory of combustion, but now she has come to favour 
the phlogiston account. (Wilson, 2010, 105) 
 
According to Wilson, 1a) is a story about epistemological progress, whilst 1b) is one of 
regress (Wilson, 2010, 106). Certainly we can understand why 1a) is progressive whilst 1b) is 
regressive if we assume that beliefs improve by matching reality or corresponding facts. 
However, surely this is, by definition, not the case for moral claims unless we are arguing for 
some level of moral realism. If the assumption from which we are working is that there are no 
moral facts or reality to correspond to or to corroborate moral claims, then what exactly is the 
difference, in terms of either progress or regress, between a and b? So it seems that this 
cannot be the direction we must go to understand what Wilson is saying. Rather, the strategy 
appears to be to reverse this direction by saying that what we take the facts to be, what we 
assign as ‘true’ is just whatever beliefs survive some process which is driven by pragmatic 
concerns. Wilson goes on to give a similar account of moral progress and regress to her 
account of scientific progress and regress: 
 
2a) M used to hold that slave labour was sometimes necessary for a society, but now she 
holds that no one should own slaves. 
 
2b) M used to hold that no one should own slaves, but now she holds that slave labour is 
sometimes necessary for society. (Wilson, 2010, 106) 
 
However, it is not enough to simply say that these two examples are analogous without 
explaining why it is that Wilson thinks this. Surely there are important differences.  In the 
case of scientific progress, we have measureable evidence from experiments, which 
190 
 
demonstrates that the oxygen theory is more factually accurate than the phlogiston theory. 
For a moral anti-realist and/or a moral agnostic, we do not have a similar apparatus or 
working knowledge of moral facts to act as any frame of reference to verify or measure the 
superiority of anti-slavery attitudes to pro-slavery attitudes. So, what methodology does 
Wilson use to compare the scientific progress of example 1, with the supposed moral 
progress of example 2 in such a way that they seem analogous? As Wilson puts it, “what 
process of confirmation established these truths?” (Wilson, 2010, 106)  
 
Wilson’s answer to this conundrum involves what she calls ‘unidirectional narratives’, in 
which, in both the scientific and the moral case, we can describe a narrative of belief change, 
in which both are treated as examples of progressive thought, but in which the understanding 
of this is retrospective (Wilson, 2010, 106). For example, it would be unfathomably arrogant 
to accuse 18th century scientists of being unintelligent simply because they did not understand 
the relationship between oxygen and combustion whilst in the 21st century this is common 
knowledge to most high school students. It is, however, important to remind oneself that the 
scientific method that we use today is far more sophisticated than it used to be not by 
accident but by a rigorous process of trial and error stretching back centuries. Put oneself in 
the 18th century and be given only the data and the methodology that was available at the time 
and one may very well come up with a similar conclusion. In other words, the phlogiston 
theory is a perfectly reasonable and logical explanation of why things burn, given the data 
and the methodology that they had. With the addition of developments to the scientific 
method and acquisition of additional data, we have retrospectively reached the conclusion 
that the oxygen theory is a better explanation, and so we have elevated it to the status of truth, 
replacing the phlogiston theory. We would also do well to remember with a degree of 
humility that should further developments in data or methodology arise, the oxygen theory 
might itself be replaced by an even more reasonable explanation. This narrative of scientific 
progress portrays the apparent ‘improvement’ in scientific belief not as correspondence to 
ultimate fact or ultimate reality per se, but rather more how that conclusion is reached, and 
how it is perceived retrospectively.44 In that sense it is analogous to the moral case. We can 
observe a similar unidirectional narrative of progress in applied ethics and moral philosophy 
on the topic of slavery whereby we judge new attitudes superior to old based on innovations 
in the kinds of arguments used or the acquisition of new perspectives, and much like the 
                                                          
44 The scientific community is not in the business of declaring that their conclusions are most definitely true. To 
the contrary, they will be the first to say that their conclusions are as close to the truth as we can currently 
manage given the data and the methodology currently available.  
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scientific case these new attitudes are elevated to the status of ‘truth’ and replace previous 
attitudes.  
 
As Blackburn has a particular way of depicting moral truth, so too does Wilson depict both 
moral and scientific truth as being based on things other than correspondence to reality or 
nature, most notably retrospective perception. Both are driven by pragmatic rather than 
semantic concerns. In other words, what is being said is not as important as what is being 
communicated. From an expressivist point of view this seems to be, in the moral case, to 
express some approving or disapproving attitude towards the subject of discourse. In the 
scientific case, it is to convey the best possible explanation for observed natural phenomena. 
At face value this appears to be a significant difference, but when we start to unravel these 
apparently distinct cases more similarities begin to emerge according to Wilson (Wilson, 
2010, 100), and this is to do with theories and belief states. In order to communicate some 
belief state about oxygen there must be, as Wilson puts it, a logically ordered nexus of wider 
beliefs about chemistry and about how the natural world works, or at the very least to be 
‘following or imitating some causally related source that does hold such a nexus’ (Wilson, 
2010, 100). According to Wilson, scientific claims about oxygen are interpretable ‘only 
within the wider theory of chemistry’ (Wilson, 2010, 100). Similarly, moral claims, whilst 
independently non-referential (not corresponding directly to a moral fact), serve as a proxy to 
a very similar nexus of belief states: 
 
The conjecture that capital punishment is wrong has several rivals to contend with: the 
conjecture that capital punishment is morally permissible as well as the conjecture that 
it is obligatory for certain crimes. These theoretical conjectures too stand proxy for 
entire sets of beliefs about the awfulness of certain crimes, about desert, deterrence, and 
other matters. My conjecture that torturing cats is wrong is dependent on my beliefs 
about what actually happens when a cat is being tortured, and it is in competition with 
rival conjecture that torturing cats is plain good fun because cats are insensate 
machines, or because the feelings of cats do not matter. It is the isolated moral 
statement that is considered truth apt, but behind it is a theory about the way the world 
is and what ought to happen in it. (Wilson, 2010, 100) 
 
So what seems to be happening, according to Wilson, is that both scientific and moral claims 
act as proxy utterances summing up opinion on a large nexus of interacting belief states about 
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their retrospective perception of some important matter about how the world is, and what 
ought to happen in it.  However, even this, personally, I find unsatisfying.  
 
I agree that it is very convenient for us in the 21st century to accuse the ancient world of a 
kind of moral blindness in regards to something like the institution of slavery, and that we 
would do well to remember that we only think this because we live in a time period which 
fosters particular brands of the cultural values of liberalism, dignity and egalitarianism, and 
reflects retrospectively on a long and fascinating history of civil rights and abolitionist 
movements. Put yourself in ancient Greece or Rome, and listen to what Aristotle or the Stoics 
say on the subject of slavery, and the practice of slavery might not seem so barbaric, but 
rather as what is completely normal for that time period. I would, however, add to Wilson’s 
argument by clarifying, to myself as well as others, that this need not necessarily be an 
argument for moral relativism. Just as we can argue that there are good philosophical and 
pragmatic reasons for judging the oxygen theory superior to the phlogiston theory by 
appealing to developments in scientific methodology, evidence and research data, so too can I 
do something similar with the moral case by appealing to developments in moral philosophy 
and the study of history. However, it is important from the position of both the anti-realist 
and the moral agnostic (where there are no known/knowable moral facts to verify our 
conclusions), for us to find some additional explanation as to how this works exactly and to 
place such explanations and arguments within their proper semantic context. For example, 
what is the point in justifying the abolition of slavery if, in reality, slavery is neither good nor 
bad; it simply is? 
 
Again, this seems to be an important difference between scientific discourse and anti-realist 
moral discourse that Wilson, much like Blackburn, does not quite confront head on. In both 
approaches the goal seems to be to be able to give the moral realist all that they want without 
actually committing to any realist metaphysics. However, just as we discussed in section two, 
this is a very slippery fish to catch. Even as a pragmatic expressivist, what is actually being 
communicated when we say that slavery is wrong is surely to convey a disapproving attitude 
towards slavery. In this case, we do not need moral facts to verify this, because our own 
attitudes should be clearly apparent to we who are experiencing them. However, this is surely 
not analogous to what is being communicated in scientific discourse about oxygen. In 
scientific discourse, generally speaking, realist facts are being asserted semantically. We can 
say that the scientific community is not in the business of declaring absolute certainty 
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regarding the truth or the reality of these facts, rather in terms of what is probable given the 
evidence, but that does not mean that they are not presented or intended to reference what is 
ultimately real and true.  So unless the expressivist has some notion of truth in which moral 
attitudes are comparable with scientific facts on a semantic level, then this is a big problem. 
Blackburn attempts to do this of course and runs into all of the difficulties I discussed in 
sections one and two. We could, alternatively, try to go in the other direction and portray a 
non-realist picture of scientific discourse in order to make the two more comparable and then 
work on the analogy within the pragmatic content(s), which seems to be what Wilson 
attempts to do. However, this too is problematic. Scientific discourse is generally regarded as 
being distinctly realist in nature, both semantically and pragmatically (the goal being to 
communicate what is most probably true fact and not to express any approving or 
disapproving attitude towards it).  
 
What we can do, however, is present a fictionalist narrative of moral progress discourse 
which is analogous to scientific progress discourse. Just like any kind of fictionalism, 
however, this does require a degree of bullet biting. Referring to my chapter on critical 
context(s) (see section three chapter six), if we take a hard line fictionalist approach to moral 
progress then we are ultimately forced into the conclusion that, in a maximised (and 
extremely rare) level of critical context, there is no compelling evidence in favour of any 
moral claim about progress, and there is no reason to think that any moral assertion about it is 
true, rather it is a fictional concept. This is what it means to take an agnostic stance on moral 
metaphysics. If we take an anti-realist stance, then we should by rights go even further and 
say that there is no such thing as moral progress any more than there is morality in general. 
Despite what Blackburn may claim, this does seem to be an inescapable result of being a non-
realist; to be a non-realist is not to believe that something is ultimately real, and to be a non-
realist about moral language is to believe that moral discourse does not refer to anything real. 
However, and this goes both for non-realism and for moral agnosticism, this does not mean 
that moral discourse (including discourse about moral progress) is meaningless, insignificant 
or vague, any more than fictional discourse about Spiderman or any other fictional object is. 
Pragmatically, we use fiction to communicate above and beyond the semantic content of a 
sentence even if semantically, we are saying very little. Referring to earlier discussions of 
expressive fictionalism, I would say that whilst ultimately it may or may not be a true fact 
that slavery is wrong, I am still inclined to say so, ‘as if’ it were so, because not only do I 
disapprove of it, and I wish to communicate this, but I also want action to be taken against it 
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by others including moral realists, and because when I am not looking at it in a maximised 
critical context (which is most of the time), I perceive it exactly as I would any real fact 
about my environment.45  
 
So in essence what we can have is the same kind of fictionalist narrative of moral progress 
that we do for moral assertion(s), moral utterances being pretence assertions which look a lot 
like other, more fact oriented utterances (e.g. scientific ones). Similarly, the process of 
conveying a narrative of moral progress is much like telling a story about something which is 
very similar to scientific progress. In other words, moral progress can be seen as part of the 
morality fiction. We can assert (or pretend to assert) that 2a) is moral progress, and 2b) is 
moral regress; these statements are untrue in a maximised critical context but are nevertheless 
treated as true in the same way that scientific facts are treated or any other claim about how 
we perceive the world to work. To be analogous, the two do not need to be given the same 
ultimate truth status; they need only behave in a similar way. For example, if I were to say 
that the way Spiderman conceals his identity as Peter Parker is analogous to a spy concealing 
their identity from their family, one is fictional (it has not happened) and the other is not (it 
does happen; spies in fact do conceal their identities from their families, else they would be 
poor spies). So we need only treat moral progress as a real thing to make this analogy; we 
need not say that it is ultimately the same in every possible sense. With that in mind, we can 
then begin to look at all the ways in which they are similar.  
  
                                                          
45 It may or may not be true that slavery is wrong; as moral agnostics we should not discount the possibility that 
there is a moral fact that could conceivably verify this one way or the other, but we should also not rely on this, 




Chapter 9: Applying Expressive Fictionalism---A Historical Narrative 
 
To recap what we have discussed thus far, if we want expressive fictionalism to be complete, 
then we want to be able to convey a narrative of moral progress, but in doing so we cannot 
compromise our own non-realism, otherwise we become, as Lewis describes of Simon 
Blackburn, queasy-realists (Lewis, 2006, 319). Thus far in this section I have provided a form 
of fictionalism which also contains additional layers of pragmatic discourse which acts in a 
way similar to expressivism or quasi-realism; the idea is that we project qualities of 
wrongness through moral utterance in order to communicate emotions and attitudes, such as 
approval and disapproval, but unlike quasi-realism, expressive fictionalism implies that this is 
done through the lens of fiction and does not refer to anything real or quasi-logically true; 
ultimately, it is all pretence. In the last two chapters I explained that we can also apply this 
idea to moral improvement and moral progress, and this involves applying (or pretending to 
apply) rules of consistency and aversion from hypocrisy or double standards. In this chapter, I 
will temporarily enter the fiction and turn on the expressive fictionalist projector in order to 
demonstrate how this is done. In this case, I will use as an example one means of applying 
this principle of comparing moral progress with scientific progress that I discussed in my last 
chapter on Wilson, and that is is by looking at human history through the lens of this morality 
fiction.  
 
Whilst I may run the risk of constructing something akin to a pseudo Marxist reading of 
history, looking with a somewhat euro centric pair of eyes at empires of antiquity followed by 
medieval feudalism, industrialisation and capitalism followed by early modern socialism, or 
seeming to throw my lot in with the likes of Thomas Hobbes in his position on civilisation as 
opposed to that of Rousseau, I would nevertheless argue that there is an apparent progression 
throughout human history towards greater understanding of nature and of the universe. In a 
very similar way, there is also greater understanding of socio-economic systems and in turn 
greater understanding of conflict(s) and how and why they arise. This can be interpreted as a 
greater understanding of people in the sense of how they work, physically and 
psychologically, what the similarities and differences are between different groups of people 
and how relevant they are within various political, social and scientific contexts. Within the 
morality fiction, assuming what we have claimed to be the case in previous chapters, this 
creates a narrative of moral progress analogous to that of scientific progress. Whilst this trend 
does appear to be ultimately progressive in nature, it is not, however, without several 
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significant and famous backlashes, just as there has been an overall progression with 
occasional regression of technological and scientific progress throughout history. I will 
discuss this further later on.  
 
There are, however, some additional issues with the analogy that Wilson makes between 
something like the historical narrative of slavery and the phlogiston theory of combustion that 
I would like to add before continuing, and I would like to make them now, because they are 
at this point very relevant to the how we are portraying the morality fiction. As I have 
mentioned before in my previous chapter, something like the Roman belief that slavery is 
justifiable because one allows oneself to become a slave by failing to honourably commit 
suicide is unlike the phlogiston theory in that it is not an argument based on any real lack of 
evidence, nor is it a credible attempt to explain the nature of things. To the contrary, the fact 
that slave escapes and even armed slave rebellions occurred should ideally have at least led 
people to question the argument somewhat, and so the fact that this does not seem to have 
happened very often seems to imply that, just like many uncomfortable or inconvenient 
moral issues today, such as intensive animal farming, the environment, third world 
exploitation or foreign civil warfare, there was a degree of wilful apathy amongst Roman 
citizens in regards to the plight of slaves. In addition, ancient philosophical attitudes towards 
the institution of slavery, such as those of Aristotle (Wayne, 1987, 390-410), were sometimes 
and unapologetically born out of pragmatic necessity. It is fairly easy in a 21st century age of 
machines and technology to condemn the ancient world for the practice of slavery, but it is 
worth considering that without those institutions, it is unlikely that many of the great 
civilisations of the ancient world would have ever existed. By contrast, the phlogiston theory 
of combustion, far from being an argument intended to preserve the status quo put forward 
from a position of wilful apathy for the purposes of avoiding inconveniencing people’s 
comfortable lives, was never a particularly politicised argument, rather it was merely an 
attempt by 18th century chemists to explain why things burn.  
 
The reason I bring this up now is because this highlights an important consideration for moral 
rule assignment as analysed by the expressive fictionalist. If we want to analyse the quality of 
a moral expression by the factual accuracy of the subject matter that inspires the respective 
attitude, then aspects like political convenience and political allegiance must surely play an 
important role in the morality fiction as it is portrayed by individuals. On the other hand, it is 
simply not enough to say that the fact that everyone accepts something as morally acceptable 
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proves that this is an attitude of any real quality, because this has absolutely no baring 
whatsoever on the fact, for instance in the case of Roman slavery, that millions of men, 
women and children suffered and died as a direct result of this collective attitude. By intuition 
alone, this certainly seems unsatisfactory. When we say that a moral rule ‘ought’ to be based 
on some factually accurate picture, current popular opinion may be taken as an indicator, but 
never as sufficient justification, for the simple reason that individuals that make up large 
populations are often very divorced from moral issues that do not directly and negatively 
affect them or anyone close to them, often deliberately, and this must surely influence their 
arguments somewhat. After all, whilst our modern societies are vastly different from the 
small hunter gatherer tribes which human beings first evolved into, hundreds of thousands of 
years ago during the stone age, our brains are virtually identical in evolutionary terms, and 
we have simply not yet evolved to cope with the awfully inconvenient truth that our actions 
now have social consequences far beyond those who live in our immediate vicinity. 
 
What does seem apparent from Wilson’s argument, however, is that the trend of scientific, 
moral and technological progress, as we tend to see and portray it, appears to be linked to 
peoples’ understanding of the world and those who live in it, and all of these things are 
related to one another. Indeed, what is science and technology for if not for at least aiming at 
providing people with an easier, more opulent and generally better quality of life, not to 
mention increasing their capacity for survival? Healthcare is perhaps the most obvious 
example of this, but also things like transportation, electricity, communication, all of which 
are at least intended to augment our day to day lives and our capacity to be productive (note: 
I say ‘intended’ because this is not always the result). Even weapons, whilst harmful by 
definition, are rarely if ever invented to cause harm for the sake of harm, but rather are 
intended to protect and defend one group of people from another and/or to forcibly secure 
resources for that group (albeit at the expense of another). Hunting is also another primary 
use of a weapon dating back to prehistory. Similarly, morality too appears to hold a very 
similar function in that it appears to provide better quality of life and better survival prospects 
by focussing on things like social cohesion and on mutual cooperation and understanding. 
However, if we are talking about progression in all of these things, then we would do well to 
consider its opposite; what about regression? This is also important to ask, because unlike 
Wilson, I argue that scientific and technological progress is not unidirectional but 
bidirectional; it does go backwards sometimes, and so if we want to claim, by way of the 
morality fiction, that moral progress behaves in a similar way, and is therefore in some sense 
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analogous to science and technology, then we should consider this as a potential aspect of it 
within the fiction.46  
 
Before we can answer the question of moral regress, however, we should see if scientific or 
technological progress indeed appears to hold up in both directions. Can we have scientific 
and/or technological regress? Most certainly if we define this as a loss of either some useful 
methodological approach or more overtly in the case of a loss of technological capability. 
Whilst the description of the period between the  5th and the 11th centuries following the 
decline of the western Roman empire as “the dark ages” is a controversial one amongst 
modern historians given the continued achievements of the Byzantine Empire, the Sassanids 
in Persia, the Tang Dynasty or Moorish accomplishments in Spain, it has been generally 
accepted that in much of north western and central Europe (such as Gaul, Britain, Italy and 
parts of Southern Germania), there was a severe and dramatic loss of knowledge regarding 
architecture, engineering and healthcare as well as things like history, art and literature, not to 
mention previous century’s worth of decline in military technology (Postan, 1966, 5).47 
 
The question then becomes: can we see similar regressions in moral attitudes throughout 
history? Even within the morality fiction, this is far more difficult to say, especially for a non-
realist. Historically, losses in science and technology are often the result either of economic 
problems which cause less incentive to preserve knowledge and technology, such as was the 
case in the decline of the Roman infantry soldier by the 4th century AD, or from particularly 
destructive political conflicts which results in people and places of learning being destroyed, 
such as may have been the case in the destruction of the library of Alexandria.48 Similarly, as 
developments in new technologies replace old ones, knowledge of how those previous 
                                                          
46 In theory, I could claim that it is not even bidirectional but multidirectional in the sense that there may be a 
loss in science and technology for a period of time followed by the invention of alternative inventions in a 
different direction, rather than a reinventing of technology now lost forever. One example of this might be the 
chemical ingredients for Greek fire, used in the early medieval period in Byzantium and beyond, the recipe of 
which is a well known historical mystery, and yet there have been several chemical agents which act similar, or 
even better, as incendiary weapons invented since then. (Pardington, 1960, 42) 
47 Western Roman legions of the 4th century were a far cry from the Marian and Augustian reforms half a 
millennium before---as the empire expanded, military spending meant that they could not equip each soldier 
with the classic rounded scutum, pilum, gladius and lorica segmentata of the early imperial era, and eventually 
legionaries were reduced to far less effective flat shields, a maile shirt and a spear (as seen in Cowen and 
McBride, 2003). 
48 Unfortunately, when exactly this occurred and who was responsible is also a controversial historical point 
(Lerner, 2001, 30). 
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technologies worked often declines.49 If we want to compare this to apparent regresses in 
moral attitudes, which to recap for our purposes we are taking to mean a decline in 
adherence to principles of non-hypocrisy and avoidance of double standards, and/or an 
adherence to moral belief states constituted by beliefs based on factually inaccurate 
information, then I believe the answer is: yes, this does also happen. For example, we can and 
do observe widespread backlashes against progression in some particular direction politically 
and socially which may be to conserve previously held moral attitudes, many of which may 
be based on either blatant double standards or on scientifically inaccurate information. At the 
risk of sounding too topical and political, that may even be what happened in the United 
States in 2016 in what appears to have been a severe backlash against globalisation, 
multiculturalism, firearm legislation, feminism and lgbt rights following the Obama 
administration. This is also not a new phenomenon historically.  
 
So in conclusion, I would argue that not only is moral regress possible within the morality 
fiction, but it has indeed happened on many occasions throughout history. This is usually the 
result of some radical change, whether it is political, social, economic or migratory and as a 
result a major breakdown of social and/or political cohesion between multiple groups or 
factions. Indeed, this is perhaps the story of all conflict(s) in a nutshell, even on a personal 
level, where some major change in circumstance that cannot be easily prepared for or some 
major misunderstanding results in some kind of conflict between friendships or relationships. 
However, moral progress is also possible in the sense that certain events and levels of mutual 
understanding can similarly foster greater degrees of cohesion and team work. On a broader 
historical level, I would argue, as Wilson does, that the trend of increased epistemological 
awareness has not only increased mankind’s scientific and technological expertise, but also 
our moral capacity overall. To avoid becoming too Eurocentric, whilst there is very little that 
has happened in history that does not ever occur somewhere in the 21st century: slavery still 
occurs (illegally), as does ethnic cleansing, the wilful destruction of settlements, warfare, 
economic disparity and exploitation not to mention more common social problems like 
racism, sexism and religious prejudice, and crime too exists in abundance, none of these exist 
with anything like the same frequency or distribution as we see commonly in previous 
centuries, and, more importantly, the common attitudes towards these things seems to have 
                                                          
49 It is questionable at best how many in the mainstream public today know how to use many historical 
household tools and appliances used as recently as the Victorian era given the invention of electricity, warm 
running water and gas central heating. 
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gradually changed. These things are no longer natural and necessary aspects of the human 
condition to be accepted or even glorified; rather they are seen and are portrayed (or 
projected) as evils to be actively kept to an appropriate minimum if not completely 
eliminated. The rise of international law has also had a profound impact on the relative scale 
of these issues. This is not to say that there are not entirely new problems that face modern 
people, such as the wilful apathy towards environmental responsibility in the wake of 
increased urbanisation, population and rate(s) of climate change, but I suspect that even such 
things as this are, like slavery, a simple matter of whether and how much people understand 
the issue, how relevant and significant it is to them, and if they are aware of or willing to 
cope with alternative ways of doing things as to whether or not they will feel motivated to do 
anything about it. One of the main limiting factors in any assignment of a moral principle 
within the morality fiction, such as legal autonomy or environmental responsibility, is in how 
well it is fully understood by those who have the ability to affect it. It is not enough to 
simply ‘know’ of a problem, one must fully ‘understand’ the gravity of the situation and what 
can be done about it. This is, after all, the purpose of any language, moral or not, fictional or 




Chapter 10: The Final Result 
 
The aim of this thesis was to piece together an account of the kind moral language used by 
non-realists, that is, those who take either an anti-realist stance on the metaphysics of moral 
issues or are agnostic on those issues. To do this, I needed an account which deals with the 
semantic content of what the words in moral sentences literally mean, and I also needed one 
which deals with those elements concerning pragmatic discourse and the motivational 
reasons behind why this kind of language is used, in what context(s), what kind of 
information is conveyed in the process and in what form. I also wanted an account which 
deals with the emotional state(s) of those speakers when engaging in moral discourse, owing 
to an observation I have made over the years when looking at not only what people are 
saying when they engage in moral argument, but how they are saying it. I do not believe it is 
any coincidence that moral arguments are rarely made dispassionately, and I believe that 
emotion plays a vital role both in a cognitive sense in how moral thoughts are processed 
psychologically, and also in how these thoughts are communicated through moral language.  
 
What I have attempted to provide, in answer to these observations and enquiries, is 
‘Expressive Fictionalism’. ‘Expressive Fictionalism’ is, in essence, a theoretical way of 
explaining how we may create a story or narrative about something we call ‘ethics’ in 
order to give meaning, direction, purpose and persuasive power to our emotions and our 
attitudes, even though, on inspection in the most maximised of critical contexts, it is but a 
perception of the nature of things we have attitudes towards rather than an observation of any 
natural properties beyond what we merely invent for our own purposes. This is not to say that 
the creation of morality is necessarily ‘selfish’. The idea is that we use the morality fiction to 
communicate our feelings, and this may be of use to us, but equally it can also get us into a 
great deal of trouble50. It is, therefore, a marriage between fictionalist semantics, and 
pragmatic expressivism.  
 
We began way back in section one with non-realism. This involved providing some 
convincing arguments giving us cause to doubt a realist interpretation of moral language (the 
                                                          
50 I may bring voice to my objections towards something which everyone else believes is a good idea; I may be 
fully aware that my voice will not be listened to and that speaking out will only get me in trouble, but still 
conclude that speaking out is the right thing to do. Whether or not this ‘right thing’ is indeed a natural property 
of the thing in question is not the point, the point is that I disapprove psychologically, therefore it feels bad to 
stay silent, and good to publically condemn it, and that is the motive behind these moral utterances.  
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idea that moral adjectives refer to natural properties), and to give us some basis for 
considering a non-realist interpretation. We briefly looked at error theory (the idea that moral 
adjectives attempt refer to natural properties and that the speaker is somehow mistaken in 
doing this), and moved away from that theory owing to the belief that such an account, whilst 
straight forward, does not always help us explain why non-realists continue to use moral 
language despite their sceptical beliefs about the nature of morality. It also does nothing to 
explain the passionate nature of moral discourse that I mentioned earlier. What does help in 
all of these things, however, is expressivism (the idea that moral language is a means of 
communicating attitudes). However, we still needed a theory which accounts for what the 
content of a moral sentence translates to, and as we later discovered, when we apply 
expressivism semantically, issues start to arise, most notably the Frege-Geach problem.  
 
Enter Simon Blackburn, our champion with a brand of super efficient and super economical 
semantic expressivism to get round the Frege-Geach problem: ‘Quasi-Realism’. The Quasi-
realist project aims to circumvent the Frege-Geach problem by providing a platform for a 
form of logic of expressive utterances rather than a form of logic based on assertions, thus 
providing a means by which we can make valid inferences even when using premises that 
include unasserted contexts. What we also get from this is a fascinating story about the 
motivations behind non-realist moral discourse in the form of communication of attitudes of 
approval and disapproval. This is particularly useful, because it allows us to take something 
from the quasi-realist project even though, as we see later on, it is actually far more expensive 
than Blackburn and the quasi-realists initially expected. As we see in chapter five of section 
two in particular, in Blackburn’s response to David Lewis’s paper on quasi-realism and 
fictionalism, quasi-realism is not the same creature as fictionalism, but in highlighting the 
differences, Blackburn reveals a potentially fatal flaw in the quasi-realist project: in order to 
preserve the ‘realism’ it sacrifices its own expressivism in the process; the debate also reveals 
an inability to confidently demonstrate attitude inconsistency, and in pushing for an account 
of moral truth, Blackburn seems to abandon simple expressivism in search of something 
else, what exactly that may be becoming more and more nebulous as he does so. 
Nevertheless, the essence of the quasi-realist project, to provide a platform for explaining 
expressivist moral language and circumventing the Frege-Geach problem is extremely useful, 
because, as we see later on, it very much helped us out when we later combined it in a more 




Enter Joycean fictionalism then, a form of non-realist semantics in which we see a similar 
situation of moral utterances made in unasserted contexts, whereby there is the pretence or 
illusion of assertion. In this situation, there is no real need to demonstrate attitude 
inconsistency in the same vein as the quasi-realist is required to provide; it is enough to 
demonstrate theoretical inconsistency within the context of the fiction, and not to provide 
genuine inconsistency of assertions that are not really being made. This straightforward yet 
elegant solution provides some useful evasive manoeuvres away from the Frege-Geach 
problem. However, as I explain in section two, fictionalism is at the same time a frustratingly 
one dimensional approach in that all we are getting is some useful semantics and not a 
complete theory about what is actually being communicated when we speak about moral 
issues in the form of fictional utterances. It is one thing to say that the literal translations 
behind the words we use are as they appear, but they do not refer to anything that really exists 
in the same sense that scientific discourse might. Therefore, in terms of moral discourse in a 
fictional context, the semantics are largely dealt with, but the greater question of the meaning 
behind the communicative act of speaking in moral terms is what now interests us, and for 
that I refer back to expressivism.  
 
What seems intrinsic to the idea of a moral principle by which we guide ourselves to act is to 
have an attitude (or at the very least some strong emotional feeling) towards whatever this 
principle is being applied to. To provide some evidence of this, rather than to proceed on this 
kind of conjecture, I spent a great deal of time in section three looking at the scientific 
relationship between emotions, behaviours and mental states associated with the theme of 
morality, for example altruism and empathy. I also examined what happens when emotional 
sensitivity is impeded and the effect that has on those same ideas of doing ‘right’ by others. 
Whilst I do not provide a purely necessary or logically deductible connection, the correlations 
that I investigated are, I claim, striking enough to suggest a causal link between emotional 
sensitivity and moral thought, and therefore by proxy, moral language. I then used this as a 
base upon which I began to construct an inferential process linking the sensing of others’ 
emotions with approving and disapproving attitudes, and then preventative or reinforcing 
action in response to it. In doing so, I attempted to paint a logical picture of the kind of 
processes involved in a non-realist observing that which they approve or disapprove of, 
processing that and speaking out, for or against it, using the fiction of morality as a contextual 
platform. I then developed this idea of translating emotions into moral language via two 
models, one based on pride, shame and responsibility, the other on empathy and compassion, 
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the former of which relying on a complex web of emotions created via social and 
psychological conditioning. The idea is that a non-realist must be able to communicate their 
emotions in a way that is not only understood, but also listened to; else the mere act of 
communicating those attitudes becomes trivial at best, or worse completely irrelevant. To do 
this, the expressive fictionalist conveys not only approving and disapproving attitudes 
towards actions and emotional responses to them, but also a sense of emotional cost resulting 
from perceived transgressions. This cost manifests in criticism, social rejection, or in some 
cases real life punishment. Similarly, in an environment where the dominant, mainstream 
platform of moral discourse appears to adhere to the conventions of moral realism, then 
whether listeners are realist, non-realist or morally agnostic, that is the language convention 
that is already used, and the means by which important (by one measurement or another) 
decisions are made. Therefore, whether a non-realist or an agnostic believes in natural moral 
objects or properties or not, if they care on any level what happens to individuals, it still 
makes a great deal of sense to speak in moral terms, even if it is used merely in the context of 
a useful fiction. In other words, what I am saying is that whether or not there is some natural 
basis for moral thought and language, or whether it is more akin to a construct of our own 
imagination, giving form to our emotional pleasure or displeasure at certain behaviours or 
attitudes we observe, what is even more important is the way in which moral language is 
used, and the effect that it has on behaviour and on society more broadly, whether it is 
actually based on anything real or not.  
 
This can be easily seen when we ask questions like, ‘is moral progress a thing?’ To speak as a 
strict non-realist, in a maximised critical context, the simple answer is either ‘no’, or at the 
very least, ‘there is no evidence to suggest that it really is’. However, this does not mean that 
even such a non-realist is totally devoid of having an opinion on whether or not he/she 
approves of the way their world has been unfolding. Such a tragic lack of feeling or 
imagination would be unfortunate indeed. It would be akin to asking what a person thinks 
about a fictitious character’s actions in a story, only to be met with, ‘I don’t care, they don’t 
exist, and my opinion is irrelevant’. Clearly, the person being asked has completely missed 
the point of the question. In fiction, we speak ‘as if’ to reveal things about ourselves and 
about each other. If I say that Romeo and Juliet were victims of infatuation rather than love, 
then that tells you absolutely nothing about any real life couple in particular, but it tells you a 
great deal about my feelings on the matter of short vs. long term relationships. I argue that 
moral discourse operates in a very similar way. If I say that kicking that cat was ‘wrong’, that 
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does not really tell you anything about the nature of that act on any metaphysical level, other 
than that it was an event which took place. It does, however, tell you everything you need to 
know about my reaction to it, the political stance that I am taking, and potentially even the 
actions I intend to take in response to it, which is, I argue, far more useful and relevant 
information to communicate to you. Similarly, if I say that mankind has made great progress 
not only technologically, but also morally since the dawn of human civilisation, that tells you 
far more about me, who I am and what I believe in, than it does anything about human 
civilisation itself, which is, in reality, neither progressive nor regressive, neither good nor 
bad, it simply is. So, in essence, what we have here in this analysis of meta-ethics and moral 
language is a system of storytelling designed to tell the listener less about the thing in 
question and more about the person telling the story, what they believe in, what they value 
and what is important to them.  
 
In the final analysis then, I would certainly argue that my original objective has been 
fulfilled. I have examined the case of non-realism, and I have investigated the various 
problems and major theories that exist on the subject and the strengths and weaknesses of 
those theories. In response, I have created a new theoretical approach designed not only to 
answer some of the most pressing questions in non-realism, and in a way that I do not believe 
has been attempted before or to this extent, but also to introduce new questions and a new 
avenue for future research. ‘Expressive Fictionalism’ is an account which deals both in the 
fictionalist semantics of non-realism and in the pragmatics of the communicative act of 
speaking up for moral attitudes from the position of an expressivist. It is also compatible with 
a scientific approach towards moral thought and moral language and in doing so combines 
armchair philosophy with evidence from empirical research. I argue that it succeeds in 
avoiding the Frege-Geach problem, and even more importantly succeeds in not 
compromising its own non-realism in the process. It provides us with a means of explaining 
non-realist moral language in a non-error theoretic way, as well as a platform for a creative 
narrative about moral improvement and moral progress. Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly, it is not a position against moral realism per se, but rather it is a position that 
withholds judgement on the existence of moral properties. There is nothing in my thesis 
which directly contradicts theories about the nature of ethics in either metaphysics or 
epistemology, but rather it stands apart from them, in no way relying on them, as a separate 
entity, and in doing so, I leave those theories about the metaphysical nature of ethics in the 
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